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Some Introductory Remarks on Embodied 
Cultures and Scenarios for the Times to Come1
Chiara Cappelletto
On the soft fibres of the brain 
is founded the unshakeable base of the soundest 
of Empires. 
Joseph Michel Antoine Servan, Discours sur 
l’Administration de la Justice Criminelle, 1767
It is generally agreed today that the living human body should 
be conceived of as a transcendental, in whose light not only our cog-
nitive activity, our intentionality, and our pathic states but also the 
status of the subject itself must be understood. The human sciences 
have largely adopted a materialist approach (Apter [2016]) and are 
increasingly inclined and able to pursue dialog with the life sciences. 
This convergence of research perspectives suggests a conclusion to 
the long and tempestuous phase of interdisciplinary discussion that 
has characterized the last thirty years of scholarship, during which 
the human sciences, the life sciences, and neuroscience challenged 
one another routinely before finally settling on a common area of 
inquiry under the umbrella of “embodiment.”
The notion of embodiment is implicated in any stance that more 
or less openly opposes the mind-body dualism or that subsumes this 
dualism in the nature-culture polarity, thus turning an epistemologi-
cal and ontological question into an anthropological one. It is, at the 
same time, a notion compatible with a wide variety of approaches. 
It admits the possibility of considering the body both as a substra-
tum onto which thoughts and artifacts that complement it are graft-
1 The essays collected here take up and expand on the topic discussed at the 
international conference Bodies and Cultures: How We Become Ourselves, co-
hosted by me and Carmine Di Martino, which took place on May 17 and 18, 
2017, at the University of Milan and the Milan Natural History Museum. 
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ed, allowing it to realize its full potential, and as 
a live constraint that can (or must) be mastered 
and from which one can be emancipated by vir-
tue of intelligence and technology. The selection of 
the body as a condition of possibility and think-
ability for the humanity of our life need not, how-
ever, entail any claims to its superiority. That is, 
we must not repeat the same move that modern 
philosophy made with the mind by valorizing it—
epistemically, heuristically, cognitively…
The set of disciplines that take the process-
es of embodiment as a common denominator is 
prompting aesthetics—itself finally free of “gno-
seological inferiority”—to rethink its own grounds 
and aims, and to extend its field of inquiry to 
the point of a fruitful dialog with philosophi-
cal anthropology, cognitivism, neuroscience, and 
media and cultural studies. The three «funda-
mental anthropological laws» set out by Helmuth 
Plessner (1928), the idea of «freedom from bod-
ily limits» put forward by Paul Alsberg (1922), 
and the notion of «techno-aesthetics» drawn up 
by Gilbert Simondon (1982), along with the inter-
pretation that John Dewey proposed of pragma-
tism (1925), are fully integrated into the current 
aesthetic debate, which also benefits from the 
viewpoints of more recent authors, such as Anto-
nio Damasio (1994), Shaun Gallager (2005), Erika 
Fisher-Lichte (2008), Alva Noë (2009), Lambros 
Malafouris (2013), Tim Ingold (2013), and Vit-
torio Gallese (2020), among others. These multi-
disciplinary grafts are but symptoms of the wide-
spread need for a fundamental renegotiation of 
what exactly constitutes the humanity of human 
beings, at a time when the «dark foreboding dan-
ger [scil. overshadowing] life,» which Ernst Jünger 
sensed almost a century ago (1934: 3), is consub-
stantial with the very idea of the Anthropocene. 
It seems to me that to meet this need we must 
accept the thesis—deemed «self-evident» by Pietro 
Montani in the pages that follow—whereby «the 
forms of life with which the genus homo experi-
mented in the course of its evolution are primar-
ily characterized by a set of practices related to 
its specific technical creativity.» It is therefore not 
possible to discuss the question of embodiment 
without considering the now widely-held position 
that human history is a «continuum of human-
prostheses inter-relations» (Ihde-Malafouris 
[2019]: 196), although the locations of the  cut-off 
points between such open-ended practices remain 
to be established (Barad [2003]).
The convictions that, as Carmine Di Martino 
writes, «technology is separable neither from the 
rough course of the hominization of the indi-
viduals (phylogeny) who make up the species 
homo sapiens nor from that of their humaniza-
tion (ontogeny),» and the processes of embodi-
ment remain incomprehensible if this inseparabil-
ity is not taken into account, are not based on the 
results of theoretical and experimental research 
alone. In my view, the fact that the body is con-
ceived of as the original cognitive and sensible 
agent insofar as it is rooted in a world scene that 
it manipulates, and no longer as an obstacle to 
the whole affirmation of our human nature, rep-
resents the final and fullest affirmation of biopoli-
tics. This development stands to influence not 
only economic choices and institutional practices 
but also the very critical thought devoted to find-
ing the best strategies of what I would call “body 
management,” to the point of finding surrogates 
for our living organism when the body’s perfor-
mance is not fulfilling. Bruno Bonnell, the former 
director of Infogrames/Atari, predicts that the first 
soccer game between humans and robots will be 
played in 2050, with the victory going to the lat-
ter (Blouin [2011]: 34). Widespread AI is the next 
step on the road after that. 
The current alliance between criticism and 
special interests from the industrial, pharmaceuti-
cal, military, and entertainment spheres, is so pro-
nounced that the “body turn” currently at hand is 
in jeopardy of repeating those logics of domina-
tion that it actually means to deconstruct. It runs 
the risk of reducing the qualitative richness of 
plural bodies and (contradictory) individual sen-
sible experiences to statistical data and predictive 
hypotheses tailored to “standard” neurobiologi-
cal and anatomic mechanisms, so as to map out a 
paradoxically idealist notion of the body, whereby 
“a body as such” exists.
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To unmask the ideology of such an idealism, it 
is useful to recall that the relationship between life 
and technology, and its impact on the evolution 
of human beings, has a history, which is not lin-
ear and incremental (Corbin, Courtine, Vigarello 
[2005]). Introducing this history into the debate, 
for instance, by reflecting on the co-dependence 
of matter, imagination, and machines, as Barbara 
Grespi does further ahead, makes it possible to 
resist the homologating effect of the rearview mir-
ror while implying that no teleology is legitimate. 
Even more to the point, it presents the body as a 
theoretical object where epistemic outlooks and 
political plans participate in ongoing processes of 
becoming, rather than as the last resort for finding 
an answer to long-standing questions about iden-
tity, cognition, and the purposiveness of life. The 
current neo-animist shift itself prompts a reconcep-
tualization of the idea of the human body-mind as 
coextensive with the physical, social, and cultural 
environment, revealing the significance of pros-
thetic and technological dilations attached to adapt-
able biological beings, and therefore of the impact 
of goods, products, and lifestyles introduced by 
empires old and new. If our inherent plasticity res-
cues us from a biologically deterministic fate, it also 
makes us a favored site for projection, manipula-
tion, and product placement (Bahri [2017]: 6). 
Any investigation of the body as a mate-
rial apriori must thus be inscribed in the wake 
of Maurice Merleau-Ponty as much as in that of 
Frantz Fanon. 
Gender studies and, above all, Judith Butler 
have long been committed to exposing the nor-
mative and conservative character of a notion 
of Body that neglects the phenomenology and 
power games entailed thereby. In looking back 
on her idea of the “construction” of identity, But-
ler has stated: «Basically, I am saying that a body 
emerges in the world in a state of dependence 
with respect to other bodies and institutions, and 
that as a consequence, the body is “outside of 
itself ” and in the social in order to exist, in order 
to survive» (Butler [2011]: 86). Yet, the idea that 
the body is exposed to practices—including those 
of a juridical, medical, pedagogical, reproductive, 
athletic, culinary, ornamental, and ritual nature—
that shape it, seems to me to come too late. Of 
course the body’s situatedness is expressed in pro-
cesses and metamorphoses influenced by dynam-
ics of domination to which it contributes in turn 
and that enable it to meet the demands of an 
ever-greater identitary articulation—male versus 
female, young versus old, white versus non-white, 
cisgender versus transgender—better than a uni-
versal mind could do. But this plasticity does not 
guarantee that every individual is recognized as 
determined. Invoking the plasticity of an embod-
ied mind does not suffice to exhaust the question 
of the processes of individuation. On the con-
trary, individuals can—once again—be placed in 
the service of the One: Jean-Francois Toussaint, 
in collaboration with the IRMES, has determined 
that “the” human body will reach its peak athlet-
ic power in 2060. It is then to compensate for the 
fact that the athletic body is ineluctably doomed 
to exhaust its own potential that more and more 
space is given to the Paralympics, whose contest-
ants have a greater margin of improvement in 
their competitive results than able-bodied subjects 
(Blouin [2011]: 25 and 31).
The question is how human bodies trigger, 
partake in, and/or direct the reflexive processes 
carried out by subjects in environments that are 
always already inhabited by other living and arti-
factual bodies, and within what limits they can 
and should realize their own “technical creativity,” 
knowing that this opens the door to new mate-
rial possibilities but also to the destruction of the 
same. The question is thus in fact an eminent-
ly aesthetic one. If we insist on the reflexive and 
autopoietic capacity of the body, the variety of its 
forms and their evolution will no longer stand out 
as exploitations of the norm but as variations of a 
type whose “naturalness” is the result of an origi-
nal collaboration between organisms and tools. 
Resisting the intellectual partisanship between 
apologetics and apocalyptics about the co-depend-
ence of humans and technology, our present dis-
cussion therefore sets its sights on the legality gov-
erning the imbrication of bodies and prostheses.
Whereas in the human type that was being 
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developed at the beginning of the 20th centu-
ry, and that has since come into its own, Jünger 
detected «the presence of a “second” conscious-
ness» that «reveals itself in the ever-increasing 
ability to see oneself as an object. […] [For w]e 
are not only the first creatures to work with arti-
ficial limbs; through the use of artificial limbs we 
also find ourselves in the process of erecting unu-
sual realms with a high degree of accord between 
man and machine» (Jünger [1934]: 14), in The 
Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduc-
tion, Walter Benjamin hints at a similar kind of 
«accord», which we would describe today in per-
formative terms. Countering the idea that humans 
are passively subjected to artifacts and their 
codes, he draws a distinction between a «first» 
and a «second technology»: «The first technology 
[which, scil., «made the maximum possible use of 
human beings»] really sought to master nature, 
whereas the second [which, scil., «reduces their 
use to the minimum»] aims rather at an interplay 
between nature and humanity» (Benjamin [1935]: 
107). The second technology—which we are cur-
rently experiencing—originates where «human 
beings first began to distance themselves from 
nature» (Benjamin [1935]: 107)—that is, from 
their biological givenness. 
Understanding this distance is crucial to 
clarifying the reach of the notion of embodi-
ment, which renders the distinction between an 
environment outside the anatomical boundaries 
of the human body and an environment inside 
these boundaries inadequate. Elsa Dorlin rightly 
observes, for example, that «masculine and femi-
nine, taken as so-called “natural” identities, are 
products of Bayer, Sanofi-Aventis and Pfizer-
Wyeth» (Dorlin [2011]: 18). This elision of bor-
ders means not only that—as Elisa Binda and Dar-
io Cecchi, respectively, write in the present issue—
«the [scil. human] body itself becomes an inter-
face, a medium, that is performatively engaged in 
commerce with the things around it,» and that 
«the human body manifests [scil. the tendency] 
to be prolongated by technological proxies», but 
also that, in the words of Roberto Redaelli, «it is 
necessary to rethink the relationship between the 
apriori and material level, starting from the nor-
mativity inherent to the sphere of aisthesis», since 
the mediality of the body is not a biologically neu-
tral given. 
It seems to me that this rethinking must start 
from a discussion of the polarity of endo and exo-
somatization, of internalization and externaliza-
tion, which makes Montani’s and Ian Tattersall’s 
focus on the emergence of language as an «exter-
nalized attribute,» whose corporeality is certainly 
not reducible to its thinghood, and whose mean-
ingfulness is not reducible to its discursivity, all 
the more relevant. This polarity plays a part in the 
feedback movement produced by such attributes—
a broad movement encompassing senses and 
feelings, which, as Cecchi stresses, «enhance the 
exchange with the surrounding world» through 
being, in Montani’s terms, «technically attuned». 
It would therefore be apt to investigate new 
possibilities for conceptualizing the human form at 
the precise moment in which it is taken as becom-
ing—that is, as genetically artificial. This could ena-
ble us to understand the technological device, not 
as a tool that is in itself special by virtue of extra-
natural powers, but as a pharmakon, the quality 
of whose effects depends on the quantity and the 
modes of administration, and includes unforeseen 
secondary effects as well as achievements and fail-
ures that may or may not have occurred or occur 
in the future. I therefore subscribe to the incisive 
claim put forth by Tattersall in his valued contribu-
tion to the present issue: admitting the possibility 
that there were elements of chance in our becom-
ing what we are, he contends that «we are opti-
mized for nothing, and thereby not condemned to 
be anything». One thinks of the Speedo and Jaked 
01 swimsuits, used since the 2008 Beijing Olympics, 
which make it easier to float so that swimmers can 
limit their exertion to thrust and speed by reduc-
ing the impact of muscle mass (Blouin [2001]: 29). 
«Technology is our uniform», writes Jünger (Jünger 
[1934]: 11). How exactly we wear it is the crux of 
the matter. 
There are two possible roads here. Either we 
opt for the binary choice whereby technology 
functions as a mask that at degree zero assimilates 
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individual identities and at its maximum degree 
diversifies them through hyperspecialization; or, 
we interpret the significance of technology’s inter-
vention in life as an expression of the fact that the 
body is a medium—that is, a mode of organizing 
intentional and unintentional processes. In this 
second case, the human being is not a variable of 
technology but a technical agent, and imagina-
tion—not the effectiveness of the tool or the use-
fulness of the result—plays a privileged role in our 
embodied cultural formation. «Thanks to a long 
series of externalized experiences», the imagina-
tion is able to «gradually achieve […] a self-con-
sciousness of its articulatory function» (Montani). 
This ongoing achievement is at the core of any 
inquiry about the living body. 
Finally, the abandonment of the idea of bio-
logical givenness has three orders of consequences 
that deserve to be further investigated. The first 
is on the order of substance. Taking the body as 
transcendental does not imply thinking of the 
human being as the inevitable result of the activa-
tion of neuro-anatomical mechanisms conditioned 
by the environment. On the contrary, the very fact 
of culturally qualifying our innate readiness to 
action when we encounter inorganic matter allows 
us to reflect on the original self-alienation of the 
human animal, on its eccentricity, and on its free-
dom. In order to understand the reach of a self-
experience that is genetically vicarious, indebted 
to the technical devices whereby human beings 
are co-constituted, it is necessary to refine the 
investigation of embodied cultural practices and 
to assume a heterological point of view. This is the 
same point of view that runs through the pages of 
A Cyborg Manifesto by Donna J. Haraway (1985), 
of the less well-known Postcolonial Biology by 
Deepika Bahri (2017), and of certain recent stud-
ies on pregnancy—deserving of attention from 
contemporary academic aesthetics—that focus 
on the natural situated condition during which 
the pregnant subject has a salient and develop-
ing experience of her own duality (Young [1984], 
Depraz [2003]).
The other two sets of problems are methodo-
logical in nature. In order to think the body heter-
ologically, it is useful to reason by way of simula-
tion, outlining “scenarios”—as Tattersall does here. 
The idea of the scenario updates that of the tradi-
tional “thought experiment” by better adapting it 
to research in which scholars are required to form 
hypotheses about recurring behavioral patterns in 
a variety of contexts and cultural habits but that 
does not dispense with empirical evidence and 
historical sources. This methodological choice is 
exemplified in the work of Richard D. Alexander, 
who makes use of the notion of «surrogate scenar-
io-building» in his research on human behavioral 
evolution (1989), and Vilayanur Ramachandran, 
who considers art to be «nature’s own virtual real-
ity» in his neuroaesthetic studies ([2011]: 243). 
In order to operationalize the notion of sce-
nario, we need to bring up that of performance, 
as used first by Simondon, and later by Malafouris 
(unfortunately without citing the former). In 
L’Individuation à la lumière des notions de forme et 
d’information, the French philosopher begins his 
reflection on individuation with the example of 
the production of a clay brick, which entails more 
than the mere application of a rectangular shape 
to passive matter (2005). This discrete and specific 
artifact comes into being through the intentional 
manipulation of a given material, which expresses 
its own possibilities thanks to the involvement of a 
particular human being, whose contingent action 
is in turn shaped by that clay. In Creative thinging 
Malafouris calls attention to «the feeling of and 
for clay,» referring specifically to the «dynamical 
process of creative material engagement, wherein 
material and human agency are coupled to each 
other and allow action to gain a “life of its own”» 
(2014: 151). As not all actions are performative, 
such a coupling of natural element and human 
intervention must be held mandatory in order to 
understand life as a historical performing process 
in itself.
The arguments that I am proposing here find 
support in the essays by Grespi and Christoph 
Wulf, the second of which has the merit of link-
ing culture to sociality, allowing us to understand 
the former not as a mere knowing (how to make) 
but as a situated and relational know-how. Perfor-
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mances—which intervene in external objects and 
in the living body itself—are in no way a repro-
ductive but rather a productive activity that pro-
poses “altered” versions of the initially available 
model: independent variations on the theme. Thus, 
as Wulf claims, «while maintaining continuity», 
performances «also offer scope for discontinuity» 
such that «alterity is conveyed through performa-
tivity.» “Conveying” is produced by a broader set 
of technical-corporeal gestures. These types of ges-
tures govern the ways in which each body acts in 
its own environment. This is why «the gesture,» 
as Grespi writes, «is no longer [to be conceived 
of as] an involuntary, corporeal manifestation of 
emotional states, but rather an interface between a 
subject and the world, a creative form of thought 
that rejects both rationality and the dimension 
of the drive.» The historicity of man is ultimately 
expressed through a series of practices that inter-
act, challenging the very idea of human “evolution”.
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This issue of Aisthesis is enriched by a focus 
on Florens Christian Rang, William Shakespeare, 
and Walter Benjamin. Marina Montanelli pre-
sents here for the first time an Italian translation 
of Rang’s Vom Weg messianischer Deutung (On the 
Way of Messianic Interpretation), the introductory 
essay to his work on Shakespeare’s sonnets. The 
translation is accompanied by Montanelli’s com-
ment paper on Rang’s text, Florens der Christ. Un 
commento a La via dell’interpretazione messianica 
di Florens Christian Rang. This paper aims both at 
contextualizing the figure of Rang and his work 
on Shakespeare and at addressing the most impor-
tant conceptual issues of messianic interpretation, 
work of art, and faith work that Rang’s essay pre-
sents. Fabrizio Desideri’s paper, Hamlet or Europe 
and the end of modern Trauerspiel. On some 
Shakespearean motifs in Walter Benjamin, deals 
with the possibility of interpreting Hamlet’s time 
as the time of an “interim” in light of the claims 
Benjamin makes about Shakespeare’s drama in 
his book on the German Trauerspiel. Taking into 
account the interpretations of Pavel Florensky, 
Lev S. Vygotsky and Carl Schmitt, Desideri shows 
how Benjamin’s characterization of Hamlet reveals 
something about the nature of modern conscious-
ness and the aporetic character of modern politics. 
Lastly, Alice Barale’s «Unbewaffnetes Auge»: Ben-
jamin’s interpretation of comedy in Shakespeare 
and Molière examines two early works by Walter 
Benjamin on Shakespeare’s comedy As you like it 
and on Molière’s Le malade imaginaire. The paper 
deals with the role of the comic within Benjamin’s 
philosophy, including in its relationship to mourn-
ing and what Benjamin writes about it in The Ori-
gin of German Tragic Drama.
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Evolution and Human Cognition
Ian Tattersall
Abstract. There can be no reasonable doubt that our living species Homo sapiens 
is fully integrated into the great Tree of Life that unites all living organisms on this 
planet. But it is also obvious that we are not just another run-of-the mill primate. But 
what distinguishes us most strongly from those relatives – and all other organisms – 
is something more abstract: the unusual and unprecedented way in which we process 
information in our minds. That is not so in our case, and a useful shorthand descriptor 
of the difference between us and them is that we think symbolically.  In other words, 
we mentally deconstruct our exterior and interior worlds into a vocabulary of discrete 
symbols and then rearrange them, according to rules, to describe those worlds not 
only as they are, but as they might be.  
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There can be no reasonable doubt that our living species Homo 
sapiens is fully integrated into the great Tree of Life that unites all 
living organisms on this planet. But it is also obvious that we are not 
just another run-of-the-mill primate. There is, after all, a long list of 
physical features differentiating us even from our closest living rela-
tives, the African apes, most of them relating in one way or another 
to our unusual bipedal form of locomotion. But what distinguish-
es us most strongly from those relatives – and all other organisms 
– is something more abstract: the unusual and unprecedented way 
in which we process information in our minds. The great apes are 
highly intelligent beings, who nonetheless react more or less directly 
to their environments, albeit sometimes in remarkably sophisticated 
ways (Cohen [2010]). They live essentially in the world as Nature 
presents itself to them. Not clear that is not so in our case, and a 
useful shorthand descriptor of the difference between us and them is 
that we think symbolically. In other words, we mentally deconstruct 
our exterior and interior worlds into a vocabulary of discrete sym-
bols and then rearrange them, according to rules, to describe those 
worlds not only as they are, but as they might be. And as a result of 
this, we actually live for much of the time less in the “real” world 
than in the worlds we individually reconstruct within our heads.
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This is not, of course, to suggest that the cog-
nitive processes of primates and other vertebrates 
cannot be very complex indeed. For example, 
apes can readily recognize and respond to sym-
bols, both visual and verbal. And they can even 
use them additively, to make and understand sim-
ple statements, such «take … red … ball … out-
side». But this basic additive treatment of symbols 
is hugely limiting; and what apes evidently do not 
is to engender multiple alternatives by rearrang-
ing such symbols in the human fashion. And as a 
result, there is a narrow but hugely significant gulf 
between the cognitive styles of human beings and 
all other organisms.
Nonetheless, given our deeply embedded 
position within the Tree of Life, there can be no 
rational doubt that our symbolic and linguis-
tic species Homo sapiens was descended from an 
ancestor that was neither of these things. Which 
means that, at some point in our evolution, the 
symbolic and linguistic gulf must have been 
bridged. This is an almost unimaginable event; 
and it is hardly surprising that, while many have 
pondered upon how this bridging was achieved, 
resulting conclusions have diverged greatly. Some 
scientists have concluded that such attributes as 
language and symbolic cognition are so complex 
and deeply ingrained in our species that their 
roots must extend far back in time (Pinker, Bloom 
[1990]). Others alternatively believe that they are 
“either/or” traits that probably originated in short-
term events (e.g. Berwick and Chomsky [2016]). 
The implications of these two scenarios are not 
only starkly different, but they are hugely conse-
quential for our ideas of who we are as a species. 
The gradualist viewpoint implies that our behav-
ioral features have been slowly honed by natural 
selection over the eons and are thus deeply encod-
ed within us, making us to a significant extent 
the behavioral prisoners of our biological herit-
age. In sharp contrast, the sudden-origin notion 
eliminates natural selection as a driving force in 
the origin of the unique modern human form of 
consciousness, thereby admitting the possibility 
that there were elements of chance in our becom-
ing what we are. If this view is correct, it is more 
probable that our behaviors are not closely chan-
neled by our genetic heritage, and that we possess 
a significant latitude in our behavioral repertoire.
In choosing between these options, only 
empirical evidence will help. And, since cogni-
tion itself obviously does not preserve directly and 
such factors as the brain sizes and external mor-
phologies of our extinct fossil relatives have prov-
en rather disappointing in this respect (Tattersall 
[2012]), we have only two places to look for such 
evidence. One of these is the overall pattern of 
human evolution, which is reflected in the family 
tree given in Figure 1. This might be expected to 
show a basically linear form if our evolution had 
been dominated by steady within-lineage natural 
selection, whereas more adventitious influences 
would be expected to produce a bushier profile. 
And as the figure shows, this highly speciose tree 
shows a vigorously branching pattern in which 
Figure 1. Outline schema of hominid evolution, showing that sev-
eral hominid species typically coexisted at any one point in time; it 
is Homo sapiens that is highly unusual in being the only hominid 
on the planet. Drawn by Kayla Younkin. 
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numerous hominid species were evidently spun 
off to do battle in the ecological arena, with both 
their relatives and more distantly related competi-
tors, and to succeed or more likely fail. The pat-
tern is one of diversity. It shows active experimen-
tation with the hominid potential, rather than the 
smooth and gradual change that might be expect-
ed from improvement via within-lineage selection.
The second source of information on evolu-
tionary process is the archaeological record, the 
direct if sometimes rather murky material register 
of ancient hominid behaviors. For the Pleistocene 
epoch, roughly the two million years over which 
our genus Homo evolved, this record is pretty 
limited, consisting for the most part of stone tools 
and butchered animal bones, and of the ways in 
which those elements are spatially disposed at 
occupation sites. And although technological 
indicators of this kind may in the aggregate be 
indicative of general complexities of lifestyle, it 
is hard to argue that any of them is a good proxy 
for any specifiable cognitive condition – which is 
one major reason for the disputes already allud-
ed to. Still, while many Paleolithic stone-working 
techniques are certainly witness to very sophis-
ticated cognitive states, it seems pretty evident 
that few of them, if any, can be used in isolation 
to infer the specifically modern human symbolic 
cognitive style: something that may be particu-
larly relevant in light of the fact that learning by 
imitation can extend to some extremely complex 
processes indeed. And this, for the most part, 
leaves us only with explicitly symbolic artifacts as 
reliable proxies for the specifically modern sym-
bolic cognitive style.
But then again, opinions may legitimately dif-
fer as to what might or might not be considered 
a symbolic artifact. Can we consider as symbolic 
a roughly-altered lump of stone that looks vague-
ly anthropomorphic to a modern observer? Were 
colored gastropod shells, presumptively pierced 
for stringing, necessarily part of a symbolic orna-
mentation system? Does the simple presence of 
ground ochre in archaeological deposits necessar-
ily imply that this functionally-useful pigment was 
also used for symbolic bodily decoration? There 
will always be difficult cases like these, but fortu-
nately certain early expressions were more overtly 
symbolic. Such expressions include the realistic 
animal representations that began to be produced 
around 40 thousand years ago, by artists who were 
clearly our cognitive peers. Perhaps even more 
importantly, symbolic thought allows hominids 
with clever hands not only to remake the world in 
their minds, but to shape the world around them 
to conform to what they have imagined. Symbolic 
Homo sapiens has transformed the landscape in a 
remarkably short lapse of time, and if any other 
hominid lineages had possessed this ability, we 
should surely expect to find it expressed in some 
visible inflection in the archaeological record.
Given all this, it seems worthwhile to look 
briefly back over the long record of the hominid 
family, to see at what point in human evolution we 
are able to reasonably infer the possession of mod-
ern symbolic behaviors. To begin at the beginning, 
long before we have any archaeological record to 
hand, the earliest probable hominids consist of a 
handful of generally poorly-known and rather 
ill-assorted African forms, between about 7 and 
4 million years (myr) old, all of which owe their 
hominid status largely to claims that they were 
upright bipeds when they moved on the ground. 
Much better documented are the so-called “aus-
tralopiths” of between about 4 and 1.5 myr ago. 
These relatively diminutive and short-legged 
human precursors were clearly bipedal on the 
ground, but they also retained numerous features 
of the skeleton indicating that they were agile in 
the trees. Their brains were slightly larger than 
those of the living apes and the earliest homi-
nids, but they were still small, and they had large 
chewing teeth housed in protruding faces. Not for 
nothing have the australopiths sometimes been 
called “bipedal apes”. Still, from the very begin-
ning they seem to have shown different ecological 
preferences from today’s apes, exploiting a much 
wider range of resources in the expanding Plio-
Pleistocene African woodlands and bushlands.
By around 3.4 myr ago there are already hints 
that early hominids had begun to use sharp stone 
flakes to butcher mammal carcasses; but deliber-
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ately-made stone tools actually begin to show up 
rather later, at sites in Kenya and Ethiopia dating 
from about 2.6 myr ago. And it is with these sim-
ple implements, small cutting flakes bashed from 
one small cobble using another, that we have the 
first definitive evidence that hominids had moved 
cognitively well beyond the ape league. Still, 
despite this radically new behavior, the earliest 
stone tool makers seem anatomically to have been 
standard-issue australopiths. And this gives us 
the first indication of another significant pattern 
we find repeated throughout the hominid record. 
Namely, that new kinds of technology tend not to 
be introduced by new kinds of hominid: as far as 
innovation is concerned, the archaeological and 
fossil records are clearly out of phase.
This certainly held true for the earliest well-
characterized members of our genus Homo, whose 
fossils begin to be found in Africa at sites a little 
under 2 myr old. For, as physically advanced as 
they may have been, these hominids of the species 
Homo ergaster appeared in association with simple 
flake tools identical to the ones their predecessors 
had already been making for half a million years. 
Still, in other ways, they were indeed radically new 
creatures: tall, slender, long-legged, and with sig-
nificantly expanded brains. Physically, they were 
adapted for life in the expanding bushlands of the 
time, far from the protection of the forest. And for 
energetic reasons it is reasonable to conclude that 
they had already assumed an at least partly preda-
tory way of life.
Once more, it took a while before the new 
hominids started regularly to manufacture a new 
kind of implement: the large and bifacially-flaked 
“handaxe” that was made to a predetermined form 
and that became common at about 1.5 myr ago. 
What is more, although several kinds of Homo 
apparently came and went in the intervening 
period, it was not until over a million years after 
the introduction of the handaxe that a conceptu-
ally new kind of stone tool began to be regularly 
used. This was the so-called “prepared-core” tool 
in which a stone nucleus was elaborately worked 
on both sides until a final blow, or blows, would 
detach a more or less finished implement. And, 
once again, these conceptually more complex tools 
appeared well within the tenure of an existing 
species, in this case the world’s first cosmopoli-
tan hominid, Homo heidelbergensis. This hominid 
appeared in both Africa and Europe at about 600 
thousand years (kyr) ago, and it boasted a brain 
only slightly smaller than that of today’s Homo 
sapiens. Within its time span several other radical 
technological innovations were also introduced, 
among them the hafting of stone tools, the con-
struction of artificial shelters, the regular domes-
tication of fire, and the first finely-shaped wooden 
throwing spears. But significantly, virtually noth-
ing produced during its tenure is uncontestably 
symbolic. The clear message of Homo heidelber-
gensis is that a hominid can be resourceful, smart, 
behaviorally flexible, and technologically sophis-
ticated in the absence of symbolic reasoning, or 
at least of any deeply embedded inclination to 
express this cognitive style (Tattersall [2012]).
We can also say more or less the same thing for 
Homo neanderthalensis, which evolved from indig-
enous European predecessors at about 200 kyr ago. 
The Neanderthals had brains as big as ours, they 
were wonderful craftsmen in stone, and they left 
us an incomparable record of very complex lives. 
They flourished in an age of difficult climates; they 
hunted some fearsomely large animals; and, at least 
occasionally, they buried their dead. There is even 
genomic evidence of occasional interbreeding with 
Homo sapiens (Green et al. [2010]), although there 
is actually nothing surprising about interbreeding 
among very close relatives. But despite some equiv-
ocal and disputed expressions mostly in very late 
times, the Neanderthals bequeathed us very little 
convincing evidence of any consistent tradition of 
symbolic activity. And in a record as geographical-
ly, temporally, and materially as expansive as theirs 
is, if the Neanderthals had been symbolic think-
ers, they would surely have left us more convincing 
indications of this fact. Of course, to say this is not 
to disparage the Neanderthals in any way. Clearly, 
these were complex and sophisticated beings, clev-
er exploiters of their environments. Nonetheless, it 
is hard to avoid the impression that they interacted 
with the world around them very differently from 
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the way in which Homo sapiens typically does.
Perhaps even more amazingly, the same iden-
tical thing also appears to have held for the earli-
est fossil representatives of our very anatomically 
distinctive species Homo sapiens. Fossils showing 
substantially modern morphologies have been 
found at Ethiopian sites dating between about 200 
and 160 kyr ago. And those early anatomically 
modern humans are associated with some nota-
bly archaic toolkits. Now obviously, members of 
our species eventually began to reason symboli-
cally, or we wouldn’t be discussing the issue today. 
But it is not until around 100 kyr ago that we 
start finding the first plausible indications of this 
unprecedented cognitive style. And again, those 
indications first show up in Africa and nearby. At 
about this time, pierced marine shell beads and 
ochre deposits start to show up at sites around the 
Mediterranean and in South Africa (Bouzouggar 
et al. [2017], d’Errico et al. [2009], Henshilwood 
et al. [2011]). Such objects may on their own 
be arguable as indicators of modern cognition. 
But they are soon supplemented by more direct 
evidence, the best of which comes from Mid-
dle Stone Age (100-70 kyr-old) occupation strata 
at Blombos Cave, on the southern African coast. 
This evidence consists of smoothed ochre plaques 
engraved with geometric designs, the best of 
which dates from some 77 kyr ago (Henshilwood 
et al. [2002]).
Hominid fossils are sparse at MSA sites, 
but the evidence overwhelmingly suggests that 
these early expressions of behavioral moderni-
ty in South Africa were the work of members of 
our own anatomically distinctive species Homo 
sapiens. And, as a result of this evidence, a fairly 
firm scenario of modern human origins and geo-
graphical dispersion is emerging. What seems to 
have happened is that Homo sapiens appeared as 
a distinctive anatomical entity in Africa at about 
200 kyr ago. At first, members of the new spe-
cies behaved much as had their predecessors and 
hominid contemporaries. But at around 100 kyr 
ago they began to show new and unprecedented 
behavioral tendencies that included the produc-
tion of symbolic objects. And very soon after that, 
populations descended from those first symbolic 
humans exited Africa and rapidly took over the 
world. Earlier, non-symbolic Homo sapiens had 
forayed into the Levant without displacing the 
resident Neanderthals, or even gaining a lasting 
foothold. But these later symbolic emigrants from 
Africa clearly had a cognitive edge that allowed 
them rapidly to displace the hominid competition 
throughout Eurasia. From Homo erectus in the Far 
East, to Homo neanderthalensis in the far west, all 
hominid competitors promptly disappeared.
In the best-documented case of early behav-
iorally modern penetration of remote Eurasian 
regions, the dazzling tradition of European cave 
decoration had already begun by around 40 kyr 
ago, accompanied by an amazing record of musi-
cal instruments, notations, portable art, and evi-
dence of unprecedentedly sophisticated economic 
strategies. What’s more, animal images have now 
been dated to around 40 kyr ago in Sulawesi and 
Borneo, suggesting that the tradition of represen-
tational art in Europe and Asia had originated ear-
lier yet. The most plausible place of origin is Afri-
ca, and the timing would have been soon after the 
emergence there of symbolic cognition.
Of course, human beings are complex crea-
tures descended from complex precursors. And 
occasionally we do find unusual expressions in the 
record those precursors left. For example, half a 
million years ago someone incised a zig-zag pat-
tern on a mollusk shell found in Java, in putative 
association with Homo erectus (Joordens et al. 
[2014]). At the other end of the timescale, a deep 
hash engraving was found in a site were very late 
Neanderthals had lived (Rodriguez-Vidal et al. 
[2014]). But one swallow (or even two) doesn’t 
make a summer; and, while intriguing, these items 
and a small handful of others are floating points 
that were not embedded in any identifiable sym-
bolic tradition. Whereas, in dramatic contrast, the 
entire tenor of human life was clearly and dramat-
ically changing among Homo sapiens in the later 
African Middle Stone Age, adding up to a funda-
mental behavioral transformation that sparked a 
revolution in the way in which hominids did busi-
ness in the world. Previously, hominids had met 
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environmental challenges by adapting old technol-
ogies to new purposes, rather than by inventing 
new ones. Hence the typical stasis in stone tool 
kits. But with the emergence of behaviorally mod-
ern Homo sapiens a totally unprecedented entity 
was on the scene: one that clearly possessed the 
very same restless appetite for change that increas-
ingly dominates our own lives today. 
So, how do we explain the rapid emergence 
of this extraordinary and basically unprecedented 
new neophile phenomenon? Virtually overnight 
in evolutionary terms, human beings were behav-
ing in an entirely unprecedented new way; and it 
was clearly not long-term natural selection that 
precipitated a sudden event that, moreover, clear-
ly took place within an existing species. Further, 
the acquisition concerned was a behavioral one; 
and that such a behavioral event could have taken 
place at all can only be explained by the recruit-
ment of neural systems that already happened to 
be in place. So how and when might those systems 
have been exaptively acquired? The only obvi-
ous possibility is the radical developmental reor-
ganization that resulted, some 200 kyr ago, in the 
highly derived skeletal anatomy of the new spe-
cies Homo sapiens. The genetic alteration involved 
in this event was almost certainly a rather minor 
one at the molecular level (likely involving chang-
es in gene expression rather than in the protein-
coding genome itself), but it evidently had cascad-
ing developmental consequences throughout the 
body; and there is no reason to believe that those 
consequences should necessarily have been con-
fined to the skeletal and dental systems which are 
all that the fossil record preserves.
Still, the lag in the archaeological record indi-
cates that the new cognitive potential lay fallow 
for a short but significant time. During this time, 
anatomical Homo sapiens continued to behave 
in the old manner, producing an unremarkable 
archaeological record. But then something hap-
pened to stimulate the recruitment of the new 
behavioral potential inherent in an adventitiously 
rewired brain, much as ancestral birds rather tar-
dily discovered that they could use their feathers 
to fly. So what might the necessarily purely cul-
tural stimulus for this change have been? By far 
the most plausible candidate we have is the spon-
taneous invention of language, which several fac-
tors combine to make particularly attractive in 
this role. First, language is the ultimate symbolic 
activity. Indeed, from our modern perspective it is 
virtually impossible to imagine thought in isola-
tion from language. The linguist Wolfram Hinzen 
has, for example, recently recalled that the «close 
connection between grammar and thought» was 
a consistent theme in early studies of generative 
grammar, and he has provided persuasive argu-
ments for reviving the view not only that language 
and thought are «not two independent domains 
of inquiry», but that thought itself is inherent-
ly grammatical. In other words, among modern 
people language and thought are so closely inter-
twined that they appear functionally, if not con-
ceptually, inseparable. 
In terms of interpreting the material archaeo-
logical record one can of course object that, while 
all human beings are symbolic, they do not all 
necessarily leave traces of this proclivity in objects 
that might be preserved. But over the long haul, 
and over the entire expanse of its distribution, we 
would surely expect any species that processed 
information in the modern human manner to 
have left some consistent material indication of its 
unusual cognitive status, just as we ourselves have 
so dramatically done in recent millennia. And 
we simply do not find anything equivalent in the 
case of any extinct hominid species, even the big-
brained and well-documented Neanderthals.
Significantly, there is no reason to question 
the notion that the invention of language by a bio-
logically predisposed hominid might have been a 
more or less instantaneous event. On a theoretical 
level, for example, Noam Chomsky and his col-
leagues have recently argued that the algorithmic 
basis of language is extremely simple (Berwick, 
Chomsky [2016]), so that an “either/or” switch 
is highly likely, much as in the case of the struc-
tured sign language observed to emerge virtually 
instantly among a community of deaf but “lan-
guage-ready” children in Nicaragua (Senghas et 
al. [2005]). This property of suddenness not only 
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makes language a particularly credible driver of 
symbolic reasoning, but also distinguishes it from 
such rival stimulants of symbolic thought as the-
ory of mind, which all demand long-term direc-
tional selection. Just as importantly, language is 
not only a portal to thought but is an externalized 
attribute that would have been poised to spread 
rapidly within a population that was already bio-
logically-enabled for it. 
In the scenario envisaged here, language and 
symbolic thought are inextricably intertwined. 
And the two were more or less simultaneously 
acquired by Homo sapiens in a single, short-term 
feedback event – an event that was both recent 
and emergent.
And it was exaptive, rather than adaptive. It 
was a randomly occurring event, rather than one 
driven by eons of natural selection. Exaptation is 
the routine evolutionary process whereby novelties 
arise in contexts entirely other than the ones in 
which they will eventually be co-opted. And neat-
ly, this very same evolutionary mechanism also 
explains how the highly derived modern vocal 
tract needed to produce articulate speech was in 
place at precisely the point when it was needed 
for the expression of language – having originated 
as no more than an incidental byproduct of the 
retraction of the face beneath the braincase that 
is the most fundamental cranial specialization 
of Homo sapiens. Interestingly, this renders the 
long-running argument over the condition of the 
larynx and various other structures of the upper 
vocal tract in fossil hominids irrelevant to the pre-
cise point in human history at which language was 
acquired. The vocal tract simply happened to be 
there first, as of course it had to be. 
The notion that the human brain recently 
underwent a recent and sudden algorithmic shift, 
a radical change in the way in which it worked, is 
supported by the rather counter-intuitive fact that, 
after two million years of steady expansion, our 
brains have apparently shrunk significantly since 
the end of the last Ice Age, some 10 kyr ago.
Both the Neanderthals and the early mod-
ern European Homo sapiens who replaced them 
some 40 to 30 kyr ago seem to have had brains of 
approximately equal volume, making both almost 
13 percent bigger than the brains of people today. 
And, especially because brain is metabolically a 
very costly tissue, this fact strongly suggests that 
the ancestral intuitive brain operated on a “brute-
force” algorithm, in which “intelligence” scaled 
more or less directly with brain volume (Tattersall 
[2017]). In contrast, the new symbolic algorithm 
proved to be a much more metabolically frugal 
one, demanding less energy input to produce an 
emergently different cognitive product: a product 
that made its possessors significantly more effec-
tive in the competition for ecological space than 
any hominid that had previously existed. And 
hence our lonely status as the only hominid in the 
world today.
All this having been said, we unquestionably 
share vastly more similarities with our closest ape 
relatives than we show differences from them. 
And, for all its peculiarities, our cognitive style 
is clearly built upon a long and complex series of 
acquisitions over almost half a billion years of ver-
tebrate brain evolution. Yet our unique mode of 
information processing was clearly acquired amaz-
ingly recently, in an abrupt and emergent event 
that was entirely random with respect to adapta-
tion. And that, in turn, strongly suggests that we 
human beings as we are today have not been pro-
grammed by eons of evolution to behave in spe-
cific ways, as some scientists like to suggest. The 
algorithmic change shifted all the rules by which 
humans play the evolutionary and cognitive games, 
allowing us to stand back and rationally appraise 
the situations in which we find ourselves. Knowing 
that the rules themselves have changed is incred-
ibly important, because it helps us to understand 
a lot about our condition, why it differs from 
those of other organisms, and why it is so diffi-
cult to pin down. For we are optimized for noth-
ing, and thereby not condemned to be anything. 
The fact that we can envisage alternatives makes 
all those alternatives at least conceptually available 
to us, and it gives us an astonishing latitude in the 
behaviors we exhibit. Our genotypes may incline 
us to respond in particular ways to the situations 
we find ourselves in, but we nonetheless have free 
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will to the extent to which we are consciously able 
to modify those responses. And that also endows 
us with a peculiar kind of responsibility: one that, 
sadly, it is all too easy to ignore.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I thank Chiara Cappelletto and Carmine Di 
Martino for the opportunity to participate in the 
fascinating symposium at which these remarks 
were made.
REFERENCES
Aubert, M., Brumm, A., Ramli, M. et al., 2014: 
Pleistocene cave art from Sulawesi, Indonesia, 
“Nature” 514, pp. 223-227.
Aubert, M., Setiawan, P., Oktaviana, A. et al., 
2018: Palaeolithic cave art in Borneo, “Nature”, 
564, 254-257. doi:10.1038/s41586-018-0679-9
Berwick, R., Chomsky, N., 2016: Why only us. 
Language and evolution, MIT Press, Cam-
bridge.
Bouzouggar, A., Barton, N., Vanhaeren, M. et al., 
2007: 82,000-year-old shell beads from North 
Africa and implications for the origins of mod-
ern human behavior, “Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences, USA” 104, pp. 
9964-9969.
Cohen, J., 2010: Almost Chimpanzee: Searching for 
What Makes Us Human in Rainforests, Labs, 
Sanctuaries, and Zoos, Times Books-Henry 
Holt, New York.
d’Errico, F., Vanhaeren, M., Barton, N. et al., 2009: 
Additional evidence on the use of personal 
ornaments in the Middle Paleolithic of North 
Africa, “Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences, USA” 106, pp. 16051-16056.
Green, R. E., Krause, J., Briggs, A.W. et al., 2010: A 
Draft Sequence of the Neandertal Genome, “Sci-
ence” 328, pp. 710-722.
Henshilwood, C. S., d’Errico, F., Yates, R. et al., 
2002: Emergence of modern human behavior: 
Middle Stone Age engravings from South Afri-
ca, “Science” 295, pp. 1278-1280.
Henshilwood, C. S., d’Errico, F., van Niekerk K. et 
al., 2011: A 100,000-Year-Old Ochre-Processing 
Workshop at Blombos Cave, South Africa, “Sci-
ence” 334, pp. 219-222.
Hinzen, W., 2012: The philosophical significance of 
Universal Grammar, “Language Sciences” 34, 
pp. 635-649.
Joordens J. C. A., d’Errico, F, Wesselingh, F. P. 
et al., 2014: Homo erectus at Trinil on Java 
used shells for tool production and engraving, 
“Nature” 518, pp. 228-231.
Pinker, S., Bloom, P., 1990: Natural language and 
natural selection, “Brain Science” 13, pp. 707-
784.
Rodriguez-Vidal, J., d’Errico, F., Pacheco, F. G. 
et al., 2014: A rock engraving made by Nean-
derthals in Gibraltar, “Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences, USA”, 10.1073/
pnas.1411529111.
Senghas, A., Kita, S., Özyürek, A., 2005: Children 
creating core properties of language: Evidence 
from an emerging sign language in Nicaragua, 
“Science” 305, pp. 1779-1782.
Tattersall, I., 2012: Masters of the Planet: In Search 
of Our Human Origins, Palgrave Macmillan, 
New York.
Tattersall, I. 2017. Why was human evolution so 
rapid? In Marom, A., Hovers, E. (eds.), Human 
Paleontology and Prehistory: Essays in Honor of 
Yoel Rak, Springer, Heidelberg, pp. 1-9.
Aisthesis. Pratiche, linguaggi e saperi dell'estetico 12(2): 19-26, 2019
Firenze University Press 
www.fupress.com/aisthesisAisthesis
Citation: C. Wulf (2019) Dance as 
Experience Field of the Body: A Con-
tribution to Aesthetics. Aisthesis 12(2): 
19-26. doi: 10.13128/Aisthesis-10712
Copyright: © 2019 C. Wulf. This is 
an open access, peer-reviewed article 
published by Firenze University Press 
(http://www.fupress.com/aisthesis) 
and distributed under the terms of the 
Creative Commons Attribution License, 
which permits unrestricted use, distri-
bution, and reproduction in any medi-
um, provided the original author and 
source are credited.
Data Availability Statement: All rel-
evant data are within the paper and its 
Supporting Information files.
Competing Interests: The authors 
have declared that no competing inter-
ests exist.
ISSN 2035-8466 (online) | DOI: 10.13128/Aisthesis-10712
Dance as Experience Field of the Body: A 
Contribution to Aesthetics
Christoph Wulf
Abstract. I will focus on dances as performances that bring a knowledge of man and 
his body to the representation, which would not be visible and comprehensible with-
out it. Dances will be conceived of as patterns in which collectively shared knowledge 
and collectively shared body practices are staged and performed, and in which a self-
expression and self-interpretation of a common order takes place. These are produc-
tive, and not reproductive, activities that create communities and cultural identities—
namely, by working through difference and alterity.
Keywords. Dance; Experience; Body; Aesthetics.
Dances are one of the most important forms of expression of 
people and their bodies. In them, cultural identity is expressed, and 
the self and world relationship of the people represented. They are 
multifarious. Depending on culture and historical time their forms 
vary (Wulf, Kamper [2002]). They reflect social and cultural struc-
tures. Dances are productive; they create their own field of cultural 
practice in which many characteristics condense (Junk [1930], Sorell 
[1983], Baxmann [1991], Brandstetter [1995], McFee [1999]). They 
bring a knowledge of man and his body to the representation, which 
would not be visible and comprehensible without them. They show 
different images, perspectives and interpretations of human physical-
ity. Dances embody a knowledge of man, bring it to the representa-
tion and make it experienceable in mimetic processes. At its center 
are the human body and its movements. These are subject to the 
dynamics of space and time in which the movements of the body 
unfold. From the dance movements, which take place in space and 
time, arise rhythmic dance configurations in which the dynam-
ics of a collective and an individual imaginary are expressed (Wulf 
[2014]). Bodies in dance are media of human self-expression and 
self-understanding. They make aesthetic experiences possible.
Dances have synaesthetic effects produced by several senses. 
Especially important are the movement, hearing, tactile and visual 
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senses; but also, the senses of smell and taste have 
meaning for the effects of the dance. Like rituals 
and games, dances are central to the formation of 
communities. Synaesthesia and the performativity 
of dance create an emotional and social similarity 
between people who dance together. Dances have 
a synaesthetic and a performative surplus, out of 
which their social dynamics and meaning devel-
op. Dances are physical, performative, expres-
sive, symbolic, regular, non-instrumental; they are 
repetitive, homogeneous, ludic and public; they 
are patterns in which collectively shared knowl-
edge and collectively shared body practices are 
staged and performed, and in which a self-expres-
sion and self-interpretation of a common order 
takes place. Dances have a beginning and an end 
and thus a temporal communication and interac-
tion structure. They take place in cultural spaces 
that shape them. They have a prominent character; 
they are ostentatious, their meaning is determined 
by their respective framing.
Dances are varied. 
In the wide spectrum of dances, stage dance is just 
one of the many forms of dance movement. Dances 
are also created in connection with rituals, festivals, 
religious ceremonies and pop culture events. Their 
forms of expression are extremely diverse and cannot 
be subsumed under a few universal principles. Dances 
stage body images and movement codes. They create 
and document body myths; they are expressions of 
aesthetic representations and inventions. (Brandstet-
ter, Wulf [2007]: 10)
They bring body knowledge to the presenta-
tion, which is a silent knowledge whose “blurring” 
is characteristic for body knowledge (Kraus, Bud-
de, Hietzge, Wulf [2017]). Dances can be analyzed 
under many aspects. In the context of UNESCO, 
they are understood as part of the Intangible Cul-
tural Heritage. They are an important element 
of the cultural heritage, encompassing practices 
from many cultures that are not handed down in 
the form of documents and monuments whose 
importance to the culture and beyond is undis-
puted. Among the Intangible Cultural Herit-
age practices, dances, rituals, oral traditions and 
expressions, as well as the practices of dealing 
with nature and traditional craft knowledge, play 
a particularly important role. If one tries to deter-
mine the peculiarity of these, above all, practical 
traditions, the following anthropological dimen-
sions are especially suitable for the development of 
cultural heritage:
• body and performativity;
• mimesis and mimetic learning;
• otherness and alterity;
• anthropological structural features;
• interculturality and anthropological research.
BODY AND PERFORMATIVITY
When the human body is the medium of 
dance, it results in consequences for the percep-
tion and understanding of dances. They result 
from the temporality of the human body and are 
determined by the dynamics of space and time. 
The practices of dance are not fixed but are sub-
ject to important transformation processes that are 
bound to social change and exchange. Since danc-
es are performed with the body, it is important to 
pay special attention to the physical side of their 
staging and performance. The question of which 
historical and cultural body images and body 
practices are expressed in dances is of importance. 
For dances to be successfully staged and per-
formed, individual body knowledge and knowl-
edge of how dancers relate to the other dancers 
is required. The moments of a dance that create a 
community are closely linked to its physicality and 
materiality. In its staging and performance, the 
corporeality and materiality of the individual bod-
ies create a collective (dance) body that is multi-
faceted and emanate aesthetic effects on the audi-
ence. Two aspects are particularly important for 
the performativity of dance. One is that dances are 
cultural performances in which societies represent 
and express themselves and help them to create 
communities. The second aspect of performativity 
characterizes the aesthetic side of the body-based 
performance of dances, without whose experi-
ence dances cannot be adequately understood 
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(Wulf, Göhlich, Zirfas [2001], Fischer-Lichte, Wulf 
[2001, 2004], Wulf, Zirfas [2007], Wulf [2004a, 
2004b]). Because of their performative character, 
dances create communities and create cultural 
identity; they also work on difference and alter-
ity. They are important cultural heritage practices 
that convey traditional values and help to adapt 
them to people’s current needs. When dances no 
longer express people’s attitude towards life, they 
are changed, or new dances from other cultures 
are “imported”, which then better express people’s 
current attitude to life. This leads to new cultural 
products in which different cultural traditions 
mix; hybrid dances are created with new forms of 
expression and physical representation.
MIMESIS AND MIMETIC LEARNING
The practices of dancing are learned in 
mimetic processes in which the body knowledge 
required for dance is acquired. This is done by the 
perceptive and above all by the practical participa-
tion in dances. Through the mimetic reference to 
dancing role models, the body knowledge required 
for the performance of dancing is acquired. Such 
processes of imitation are not aimed at copying 
the role models; the aim is rather a process of cre-
ative imitation that leaves room for the individual 
design of the dance. The process of approximation 
differs from one person to another and depends 
on many individual factors. When a dance is relat-
ed to a previous one, there is a desire to do some-
thing like the other dancers. This desire is based 
on the desire to become like the others, but at the 
same time to be different from them. Despite the 
desire to become similar, there is a desire for dif-
ferentiation and autonomy (Gebauer, Wulf [1992, 
1998, 2003], Wulf [2005, 2013]). At the same time, 
the dynamics of dances push for repetition and 
difference, thus generating energies that drive the 
staging and performance of dances.
Repetition is about taking a “copy” of earlier 
dances and referring to new situations. The repeti-
tion of the dance never leads to the exact repro-
duction of the earlier dance, but always to the 
production of a new staging and performance in 
which the difference to the former is a construc-
tive element. In this dynamic lies the reason for 
the productivity of mimetic actions. While main-
taining continuity, they also offer scope for dis-
continuity. Performances of dances make it pos-
sible to negotiate the relationship between conti-
nuity and discontinuity. The respective conditions 
of individuals and groups play an important role 
in the different manipulations of implicit pat-
terns and schemes. For the transmission of a 
practical knowledge of dance, the sensuality of 
the mimetic processes, which is bound to the 
human body, relates to human behavior and is 
often unconscious. Through mimetic processes, 
people incorporate images and patterns of danc-
es and make them part of their inner imaginary 
and imagination. Mimetic processes transfer the 
world of dance expressions into the inner world 
of humans. They contribute to culturally enriching 
and expanding this inner world through images 
of dance. The resulting mental images and their 
associated synaesthetic experiences vary from cul-
ture to culture, generation to generation, milieu 
to milieu. Since practical knowledge, mimesis and 
performativity are mutually interlinked, the rep-
etition plays an important role in the transmission 
of the knowledge of dance. Dancing competence 
arises only in cases in which behavior is repeated 
and changed in the repetition. Without repetition, 
without the mimetic reference to something pre-
sent or past, no cultural competence arises. There-
fore, repetition is a central aspect of transmitting 
practical dance knowledge (Resina, Wulf [2019]).
OTHERNESS AND ALTERITY
When dances are physical representations of 
cultural identity, they also give people experiences 
of alterity (Todorov [1985], Gruzinski [1988], Wal-
denfels [1990], Greenblatt [1994], Wulf [2016]). 
They are an expression of cultural diversity and 
can be used to communicate cultural heterogene-
ity, i.e., sensitize for otherness and alterity. Only by 
developing a sense of alterity a standardization of 
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culture because of the globalization processes can 
be avoided. With the help of dances from other 
cultures, people can be made aware of the impor-
tance of the diversity of cultural heritage. Only 
with the help of this experience they are able to 
deal with strangeness and difference and develop 
an interest in the non-identical. Individuals are not 
self-contained entities. They consist of many con-
tradictory and fragmentary elements. Arthur Rim-
baud found the still valid expression «I is another» 
for this experience. Sigmund Freud’s experience 
that the ego is not master in his own house points 
in the same direction. The integration of the parts 
of the subjects excluded from the self-image is a 
condition for being able to perceive and respect 
differences and alterity externally. Only when peo-
ple can perceive their own alterity are they able to 
perceive the alterity of dances and the otherness of 
other people and to deal productively with both. If 
one succeeds in perceiving the other in one’s own 
culture, interest arises in the foreign in other cul-
tures and willingness to appreciate it. For this it is 
necessary to develop the ability to perceive from 
the other, i.e., heterologically, and to try to see one-
self with the eyes of others (Wulf [2006]).
The development of this ability is opposed 
by several factors. Among the most important 
are the factors of rationality and individual-
ity that are particularly valued in European cul-
tures and which correspond with certain patterns 
of world experience and interpretation. Often, 
these are so determinative that they do not allow 
for experience of alterity. In dances, these two 
forms of reduction of strangeness play a minor 
role. Because with them it is the corporeality, the 
movements and rhythms that mediate alterity and 
that are hardly limited by rationality and indi-
viduality. In dances, alterity is conveyed through 
performativity. In mimetic processes, dancers and 
spectators reproduce foreign figurations, allowing 
them to capture and incorporate them. Insofar as 
movements, rhythms and figurations from foreign 
cultures are assimilated, new forms, rhythms and 
movement are created. In the age of globalization, 
hybrid formations are particularly widespread, 
in which the origin of individual structural ele-
ments can no longer be clearly identified. Since 
today more and more people live in different cul-
tures at the same time, hybrid forms of expression 
are becoming more and more important (Wulf 
[2016]). The transnational youth culture and the 
avant-garde of contemporary dance theater con-
tain many examples of this (Wulf et al. [2018], 
Brougère, Wulf [2018]).
ANTHROPOLOGICAL STRUCTURAL FEATURES
If dances are considered to be central expres-
sive forms of the human body and thus in an 
anthropological perspective, then some structural 
features can be sketched, which designate impor-
tant dimensions of the dance and the body.
SPACE AND TIME IN THE DANCE
Dances are tied to the spatiality and temporal-
ity of the human body and unfold their figurations 
in space and in time. They aesthetically are con-
nected by movements in which the human body 
moves alone or with other bodies in temporal 
sequencing in space. In this process, the context 
and the framing of space and time play an impor-
tant role. They incorporate historical and cultural, 
collective and individual elements that define the 
representation, expression and atmosphere of the 
dance. The pictorial scenarios, the virtual spaces 
and the multi-dimensional temporal orders of the 
contemporary avant-garde dance create conditions 
of space and time that expand the potentials of 
physical expression.
DANCE AND MOVEMENT
In the movements of dance, the body experi-
ences itself, with the music and the movements 
of the dancers. In its movements, it develops the 
ability of the design, it forms and becomes an 
instrument that is used, without going into func-
tional use. The movements of the dance contain 
a “surplus of meaning” in representation and 
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expression. In them, figurations are imagined and 
acted upon. The movements of dance form the 
body that produces them; they create imaginations 
and realize them in repeated stagings and perfor-
mances. They are regular and expression of order. 
The movements of the dance reveal the docility 
of the body; it presents itself in exercises and rep-
etitions (Resina, Wulf [2019]). In the movements 
of the dance an implicit knowledge arises, whose 
spectrum is very extensive. Depending on the type 
of dance, its movements are embedded in social 
power structures or, as with the contemporary 
avant-garde, largely released from them.
DANCE AND CULTURAL COMMUNITY
Cultural communities without dances are 
unthinkable. Through the symbolic content of the 
forms of interaction and above all through the 
performative processes of interaction and the gen-
eration of meaning, dances contribute to the for-
mation of community. The techniques that make 
dancing possible are based on the repeatability of 
the necessary procedures and their controllability. 
Informal communities formed around dances are 
characterized not only by the space of a collective-
ly shared symbolic knowledge, but also by the cor-
responding forms of interaction of the dances in 
which and with which they perform this knowl-
edge. These productions can be understood as an 
attempt to ensure self-expression and reproduc-
tion of the community and its integrity. Dances 
create communities emotionally, symbolically and 
performatively; they are staged and expressive, 
without achieving a comprehensive agreement on 
the ambiguity of dance and body symbolism.
DANCE AND ORDER
As interactive patterns of action, dances devel-
op a specific order and regularity. Correspondenc-
es and similarities can be identified and analyzed 
between the dances and the structures of their 
culture of origin. This is illustrated, for exam-
ple, by a comparison between the dances at the 
French court and the dances of bourgeois society 
at the beginning of the 20th century. Dances can 
therefore become sources for the analysis of social 
body images, order and power relations; an analy-
sis of the social order, in turn, can provide clues 
to understanding the structures of dances (Lippe 
[1974], Braun, Gugerli [1993]). In the dance a 
rhythmic dynamization of movements and a ludic 
handling of the production, change and dissolu-
tion of orders takes place.
DANCE AND IDENTIFICATION
Mimetic processes lead to the identification 
with the dancers and the dances and thus also to 
the identification with the body movements and 
body images implicit in the dances, the feelings 
they trigger and their inherent values and norms. 
Not occasionally, this also involves processes of 
inclusion and exclusion. Through identification 
with certain dances, an identification with life-
styles, milieus and groups is created and embod-
ied in dancing.
DANCE AND MEMORY
Dancing creates memories. These include 
movements, rhythms, sounds. These are where 
you will find: atmospheres, erotic experiences, 
feelings of “flowing”, of intoxication and some-
times even of ecstasy, memories of intensities, 
of rhythms in which people feel themselves and 
the others. They are synaesthetic memories that 
include multiple senses. Some are collectively 
shared memories, others are highly individual. 
Some memories are primarily related to men-
tal images, others to sounds, yet others to move-
ments. In all, the corporeality of the remembered 
dances plays a central role.
DANCE AS DIFFERENCE PROCESSING
In many dances differences are worked out 
that result, among other things, from gender, age 
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and ethnic differences. By dancing together, differ-
ent people fade the otherwise existing differences 
between them. Their dance moves succeed only 
when they relate to each other and cooperate. They 
work on the differences that separate them by mim-
ing each other in dance and making themselves 
known to each other. By deferring differences, they 
create a sense of belonging in rhythmic movements. 
In dance, in which collective feelings are generated, 
confirmed and changed, ritualized forms of staging, 
physical action and play practices as well as mimet-
ic forms of circulation become the focus. Therefore, 
a performative community of the dancers is under-
stood as an area of action and experience character-
ized by staged, mimetic and ludic elements (Wulf et 
al. [2001, 2004c, 2007, 2011]).
DANCE AND TRANSCENDENCE
In many cultures dances are related to the cos-
mic order, gods, spirits, dead and unborn. With 
the help of dances an attempt is made to gain 
influence on the powers of the hereafter. In many 
cases, these dances are part of sacrificial ritu-
als intended to favor gods and spirits. Mostly this 
happens with magical dances, in which people 
with the help of masks and other “props” ascribe 
supernatural powers, with which they can banish 
the evil gods and spirits. Not infrequently, through 
din and ecstasy, these dances mobilize “superhu-
man” forces to ward off the threat and endanger-
ment of the world. In these dances, people estab-
lish order and power with the help of exclusion 
and inclusion, through which they seek to secure 
the cosmic order as well.
DANCE AND PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE
Who dances learns much more than just 
dancing. Dancing develops into a physical com-
petence which goes far beyond the dance and 
which is also important for other life contexts. It 
is accompanied by a sensitivity for movements 
and rhythms, for space and time, for sounds and 
atmospheres. Dance creates practical, body-based 
knowledge that is acquired in mimetic processes. 
In this, the actors take pictures, rhythms, schemas, 
movements into their imagination. Their mimetic 
appropriation leads the practitioners to a practical 
knowledge that is transferable to other situations. 
Practical knowledge is practiced, developed and 
changed in repetition. The knowledge thus incor-
porated has a historical and cultural character and 
as such is open to change (Boetsch, Wulf [2005]).
DANCE AND AESTHETICS
Because of their representational and expres-
sive nature as well as their performativity, all 
dances have an aesthetic dimension that makes it 
clear that dances are human expressions that make 
them valuable components of the cultural heritage 
of humanity that cannot be replaced by anything 
else. Aesthetic dimensions include dances at the 
court of Louis XIV and the avant-garde of contem-
porary dance, as well as the magical dances of the 
conjuring of the gods and the spirits, the folk and 
ballroom dances of the 20th century and the con-
temporary dance forms of the youth. The cultural 
diversity of dances corresponds to different implicit 
aesthetics, which are characterized by several simi-
larities, but above all by serious differences.
INTERCULTURALITY AND 
ANTHROPOLOGICAL RESEARCH
When dances are cultural representations, they 
also reflect the diversity that defines cultural life in 
the world despite the unifying tendencies of glo-
balization. If the development of human coexist-
ence requires more than ever to be able to cope 
with cultural diversity, the practices of the “imma-
terial” cultural heritage, not held in monuments, 
and in particular the dances, offer opportunities 
open to the stranger and gain experience in deal-
ing with cultural diversity. In the field of educa-
tion, too, there is a challenge and opportunity 
here; today more than ever, education has to be 
understood as an intercultural task (Featherstone 
[1995], Wulf [1995, 2006, 2016]).
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OUTLOOK
Dances are forms of expression and expres-
sion of people and their bodies that make some-
thing tangible that would not be experienced 
without them. In many dances, people experi-
ment with themselves and their bodies, with their 
history and their culture, trying to express some-
thing that cannot be presented and performed dif-
ferently. Therefore, many dances, especially in the 
field of dance art, have an experimental claim that 
encourages dancers to invent and explore through 
the means of staging and performing the body, 
which contributes to the knowledge of man. If one 
approaches this knowledge today from the side 
of anthropology, three paradigms of anthropo-
logical research, with which an anthropologically 
oriented dance and body research can be consti-
tuted, are particularly suitable. This is philosophi-
cal anthropology, as it was developed in Germany, 
which emphasizes the inherently open character 
of human history and the possibilities of human 
perfectibility; the historical anthropology of the 
School of Annales developed in France in the first 
half of the 20th century and its further develop-
ments, which focus on the historical character of 
the human body and culture as well as questions 
of mentality research; as well as Anglo-Saxon cul-
tural anthropology or ethnology with its inter-
est in cultural diversity and heterogeneity (Wulf 
[2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2010, 2013]). On the basis of 
these paradigms is the development of a historical-
anthropological dance and body research, which 
is not limited to certain cultures and epochs and 
which is in the reflection of its own historicity and 
cultural ability, to overcome the Eurocentrism of 
large parts of the body research and the aesthetics. 
This requires a transdisciplinary and transcultural 
orientation as well as a reflexive self-criticism.
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Technical Creativity, Material Engagement and 
the (Controversial) Role of Language1
Pietro Montani
Abstract. For several hundred thousand years, the genus homo deployed a characteris-
tic technical creativity, communicating and transmitting its outcomes, together with its 
operative protocols, without the available recourse to articulated language. The thesis 
proposed here is that the aforementioned functions should be attributed to a complex 
intertwining of embodied abilities, which can in turn be ascribed to the classic philo-
sophical concept of imagination. It is through imagination that the human becomes 
involved in material engagement (Malafouris), by virtue of which its extended mind 
takes part in the processes of producing artifacts and is in turn shaped by them. The 
main issue of this article consists in investigating how this involvement occurs (§§ 1 
and 2) and the part that articulated language plays in it, following the invention of the 
latter (§§ 3 and 4). The latter’s emergence can indeed be traced back to the transfor-
mation and specialization of a recursive element, already present in the pre-linguistic 
work of imagination, whose ability to implement a denotative semantics is discussed in 
particular (§ 5).
Keywords. Technical creativity; Extended mind; Imagination; Language; Denotative 
semantics.
1. LIVING BEINGS AND THE INORGANIC
The forms of life with which the genus homo experimented in 
the course of its evolution are primarily characterized by a set of 
practices related to its specific technical creativity. Regarding this 
thesis, which I am inclined to take as self-evident, it seems to me 
that particular attention is due to the issue of empowerment: name-
ly, the process of acquisition, via interiorization, of skills previously 
experimented with for a long time according to the externalized2 
1 Acknowledgement. This article is a part of the European research project 
The Future of Humanity: New Scenarios of Imagination (Vilnius University). 
This research is funded by the European Social Fund (project No 09.3.3-LMT-
K-712-01-0078) under grant agreement with the Research Council of Lithu-
ania (LMTLT).
2 “Externalization” is a largely current, albeit unfortunate, expression. It is 
frankly deceptive inasmuch it makes us think that the process at stake here 
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modes typical of technical action. To clarify what 
is to be understood by “technical empowerment”, 
and what is important about it, one need only 
consider two particularly powerful technologies: 
articulated language and writing. My aim is to 
reflect on the former in particular, starting from 
the idea that, generally speaking, articulated lan-
guage – when not suppressed as irrelevant or even 
misleading – has not been adequately investigated 
within the overall context of technical creativity.
My starting point here is the concept of “mate-
rial engagement” introduced by Lambros Mala-
fouris in a recent influential book (Malafouris 
[2013]). Malafouris’s approach has the merit of 
integrating the phenomenon of technical creativ-
ity into a highly efficient and persuasive paradigm, 
Material Engagement Theory (MET), with which I 
largely agree. Recently, Malafouris, together with 
Don Ihde, reaffirmed the programmatic character 
of this approach, proposing anew the classic figure 
of homo faber: if we humans correspond primarily 
to this figure, rather than to that of homo sapiens, 
this is not so much on account of our propensity 
for creating artifacts, but because «we make things 
which in turn make us» (Ihde, Malafouris [2018]: 
195). The reversibility of this relation, along with 
the emergences that derive from it at each turn, is 
thus the main requirement of MET.
I cannot enter into the details of the theory 
presented by Malafouris, whose debt with regard 
to the concept of “extended mind” I assume is rec-
ognized (Clark, Chalmers [1998]). After all, Mala-
fouris himself defines MET as a «strong version of 
extended mind theory» (Malafouris [2013]: 227), 
and relates it to a “hylonoetic field”, while focus-
ing on the «importance of mediation in human 
thinking» (italics are mine), in direct opposition 
to the classic “hylomorphic” conception, accord-
ing to which a design conceived by a human mind 
gives shape to lifeless matter. For its part, “media-
tion” should be understood as the general techni-
consists in “putting outside” something already conceived 
“inside”. As will become clear in the following pages, this 
movement from inside to outside must be radically ques-
tioned.
cal action constituted by the equal interactive rela-
tion established among the different “contractors” 
of the processes governing the emergence of arti-
facts. Among the many cogent examples offered by 
Malafouris, let us take the case of a vase produced 
through the proper molding of a piece of clay; I 
will come back to this example several times. Con-
sidering this process in the light of MET implies, 
on the one hand, emphasizing the extent to which 
the affordances exhibited by the clay – pliability, 
flexibility, relative permeability, resistance, and so 
on – contribute as much as the sensitivity of the 
potter’s hands and the movement of the wheel to 
the emergence of an artifact. On the other hand, it 
highlights the configuration of the whole produc-
tive operation as a complex cognitive event, in the 
course of which the extended mind taking part 
therein ends up being re-modeled in its own turn 
and initialized to intentional competencies that did 
not exist prior to the event itself.3 In other words, 
intentionality itself is an emergence within the 
process of material engagement, not something 
instructing it in a privileged way. One last point 
needs to be underlined: the technical creativity 
related to material engagement and the empower-
ment processes is as old as the genus homo. This 
means that this creativity had been at work long 
before something like language even remotely 
emerged. I therefore assume that material engage-
ment can be considered a general sensorimotor 
agency of the human body, to which we can give 
the classic name of “imagination”, while taking care 
not to lose sight of its fundamental embodiment 
and constitutively interactive character. Human 
beings “imagine” with their whole bodies – and, 
of course, primarily with their hands. Likewise, it 
was an increasingly complex system of sensorimo-
tor protocols that drove the communicability of the 
human being’s interactive routines for thousands 
of years. In spite of that, it does not seem justified, 
strictly speaking, to grant these forms of commu-
nication (and learning) the status of “language” 
(Corballis [2002], Everett 2017).
3 This description essentially coincides with what I have 
called “technical empowerment”.
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Before focusing more closely on MET in con-
nection with the emergence of articulated lan-
guage, I would like to add that, if we consider a 
large number of disciplinary approaches that 
are mutually diversified but significantly repre-
sentative of the status assumed by the humani-
ties vis-à-vis the hard sciences for the last forty 
years, it is possible to observe a broad consensus 
concerning the theoretical paradigm that Mala-
fouris ascribes to the field of cognitive archaeol-
ogy. In other words, the idea that we should focus 
on the embodied character of human cognition 
and its communication systems is broadly shared 
across the anthropological, neuroscientific, pale-
ontological and psychological fields today (Gal-
lagher [2005, 2017], Gallese, Lakoff [2005], Grusin 
[2017], Ingold [2001, 2013], Latour [1999], Noë 
[2009], Tomasello [1999]). In short, the mode of 
formulating the question of human cognition and 
experience at stake here – beyond specific, and 
sometimes important and significant, divergences 
– can be identified with a philosophical orienta-
tion characterized by the clear and rigorous delim-
itation of a precise system of incompatibilities (for 
instance, with representationalist, intentionalist or 
innatist theories of the mind, etc.). To that end, it 
applies methodological protocols that are increas-
ingly scrupulous about the empirical adequacy 
and the experimental import of the theoretical 
hypotheses proposed. 
Two points in particular deserve to be under-
lined. The first, already mentioned, is the radical 
dismissal of the “hylomorphic” paradigm (Ingold 
[2013]). According to this paradigm, the inor-
ganic is nothing but a lifeless matter more or less 
compliantly available to receive the seal of a form 
following from an intentional design previously 
conceived by somebody’s mind. The second point 
is that the “imaginative” performance of homo 
faber largely precedes, and deeply instructs, that 
of homo symbolicus (Malafouris [2013]: 153-177, 
227-49). The two points are obviously interrelated: 
as we saw, on the one hand, material engagement 
implements and oversees the active participation 
of the inorganic in the emergence of the human 
mind; on the other hand, the temporal develop-
ment of material engagement produces cognitive 
infrastructures, preparing the field for the emer-
gence of the symbolic. The emergence, in particu-
lar, of something like a phonetically articulated and 
semantically denotative language – a technology 
whose implications for the radical reorganization 
of the human forms of life, where it likely intro-
duced an element of discontinuity, are indeed dif-
ficult to underestimate4 – is the specific issue that 
I would like to discuss.
The problems arising in connection with this 
event are impressive and far from being adequate-
ly formulated, let alone settled. I limit myself to 
listing a few of them, to which I will return in the 
conclusion of this article: Is it more likely that the 
appearance of articulated language had the char-
acter of a “sudden” irruption, or rather that of a 
long and gradual development? Is the phonic-
articulatory trait more likely to be discriminating 
or rather interchangeable with resources coming 
from other systems of organization on the plane 
of expression, for instance, gesture? Is the seman-
tic-denotative property of enunciation, that is, its 
“objectivity” or “aboutness”, likely to determine the 
characterization of this technology, or rather only 
to integrate it into other pragmatic, communica-
tional and expressive properties? Is the degree of 
self-consciousness governed by an articulated and 
denotative language likely to be in every way com-
parable with that imputed to the imaginative prac-
tices, both operative and performative, of homo 
faber, or rather to mark a significant and irrevers-
ible transformation?
2. MODES OF “CORRESPONDENCE”  
BETWEEN THE LIVING BEING  
AND THE MATERIAL WORLD
It might be useful to differentiate the equal 
interactive relation paradigm – as I have defined it 
in general, with reference to Malafouris’s theses – 
from the specific theoretical inflection that a simi-
lar interpretation of human technicity assumes 
4 I will take a position on this point, which is among the 
most debated, in my closing remarks.
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for an anthropologist such as Tim Ingold (2011, 
2013). As I have already pointed out, these two 
conceptions, and others besides them, share a 
radical critique of the matter-form model, as it has 
been conceived for thousands of years, in terms 
of a hylomorphic approach. By contrast, these 
two conceptions can be distinguished, as it were, 
by the description of the “role play” discernible 
within this very relation, starting from the rather 
significant fact that, per Ingold, the concept of 
“interaction” should be dismissed in favor of that 
of “correspondence”, and extending to a similar, 
even overly scrupulous, censure of other concep-
tual tools, such as embodiment and agency, which 
are usually associated with the idea of an extended 
mind.
In many respects, Ingold presents his posi-
tion, starting with his terminology and recurrent 
examples, as a conciliatory and reassuring ver-
sion of Martin Heidegger’s reflections on tech-
nics – especially the oft-cited Heidegger (1949). 
More precisely, Heidegger’s anti-humanism seems 
to resurface here, in the form of a non-anthropo-
centric humanism that willingly grants the human 
being’s propensity to enter into a deep resonance 
with those “things” whose most authentic nature 
essentially consists in keeping their “thing-ness” 
in a state of flow, unlike the deplorable “objects”, 
which Ingold considers to be stiffened products of 
a representational hybris. The result is a remark-
able view of technical mediation, understood as 
the invention of a system of “transductors”5 capa-
ble of setting the parallel course of two energetic 
flows – namely, the flow of human life and the 
many-sided flow of inorganic matter – into a syn-
chronic relation, to be renewed at each turn. Here, 
Ingold’s thought intentionally resonates with that 
of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1980). Ingold 
offers several examples, all of which are extremely 
evocative and presented with irresistible commit-
ment. Among these is Malafouris’s driving exam-
5 Ingold is careful to distinguish between his use of this 
term and the concept of transductivity advocated by Gil-
bert Simondon (1992), an author whose original theses 
he values and reechoes to a certain extent.
ple: namely, the particular material engagement 
through which artifacts – or rather, “things” – ref-
erable to the kind of “pottery”, emerge. Desiring to 
maintain a rigorously non-anthropocentric posi-
tion and, moreover, having opted to eschew the 
concepts of agency – whether human or material– 
and embodiment, Ingold describes the produc-
tive process according to the following scheme: 
the “correspondence” of the human being – and 
more precisely, its fluid proprioception – with 
the flow properties of clay is made possible only 
by the mediation of a transductor, which, for the 
matter at hand, is the potter’s wheel. In the afore-
mentioned “role play”, Ingold’s working model 
thus assumes a precise triadic configuration: the 
correspondence between human being and the fit-
ting and fluid overabundance of physis – although 
Ingold prefers to speak of “world” – must be 
creatively mediated by the invention of transduc-
tors that actualize and “phase” it, so to speak. 
The place for this encounter is simply the “thing”, 
considered in its irreducible difference from the 
object. This argument is commendable not only 
for its ability to put Heidegger in dialogue with 
Deleuze-Guattari, against the backdrop of a vital-
ist and conciliatory phenomenological Stimmung, 
but also for its effort at modeling the role of homo 
sapiens from a perspective that fosters technical 
creativity, outside of any lust for dominion. This 
Stimmung is the very “second technique” that Wal-
ter Benjamin (1935) connected to the ideas of play 
and mimesis qua “enhancements” of nature and 
neutralizations of any will to power (or destiny to 
submission6), although Ingold’s (2013) text lacks 
this reference.
Another remark is warranted before we can 
assess if and where Ingold’s approach encounters 
challenges. One might indeed wonder why such a 
rich and creative harmony with the fluid supera-
bundance of the world only characterizes the 
6 Granting the legitimacy of another Heideggerian refer-
ence, one could also speak of “production in the cradle 
of physis”. Nevertheless, the fact that so many authors, so 
different one from the next, can stay together – or “cor-
respond” – in the irenic problematic space opened by 
Ingold could be reasonable cause for suspicion. 
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existence of human beings, and not that of other 
living beings as well – or at any rate, why only the 
former is characterized as so powerfully marked 
by determining and downright catastrophic evo-
lutionary turns. Indeed, since Ingold cannot 
resort to the traditional explanations that lead 
us, in some way or another, to consider certain 
cognitive, presumably species-specific, functions 
as innate, he appeals to the human quality that, 
amongst all others, seems the least anthropocen-
tric: “feeling”, understood as an aisthesis attuned 
to the paradoxical, but far from counterintuitive, 
condition of an ek-static and decentered proprio-
ception7: 
To correspond with the world […] is not to describe 
it, or to represent it, but to answer to it. Thanks to 
the mediating work of transduction, it is to mix the 
movements of one’s own sentient awareness with 
the flows and currents of animate life. Such mixture, 
where sentience and materials twine around one 
another on their double thread until […] they become 
indistinguishable, is of the essence of making. (Ingold 
[2013]: 108, italics are mine)
It is therefore by virtue of an aisthesis that is 
particularly open, mobile and free from selec-
tive filters that, of all living beings, the human 
being alone seems capable of corresponding with 
the world in the creative and transductive, which 
is to say, technical, way considered above. As we 
will now see, this last position of Ingold’s must 
be maintained, though it cannot be taken at face 
value. Indeed, it does not suffice to say that the 
human being “feels” the fluid superabundance of 
the world in a “different” way than the tick or the 
chimpanzee does, let alone that this “diversity” is 
responsible for historical effects unknown to other 
living species – or perhaps for history tout court. I 
would now like to turn back to Malafouris’s work, 
in order to present the problem that I left open in 
7 Indeed, the prospect of a “decentered proprioception” 
sounds like an oxymoron. However, as a very simple 
exercise of insight should suffice to convince us, it is a 
condition readily available to intuition. For instance, it 
should suffice to relate it to the experience of beauty.
a new and potentially more appropriate way. I am 
referring to the question of articulated language 
as a benchmark of the specific role played by the 
human being within the radical and equal interac-
tion that characterizes material engagement.
3. ANTHROPOCENTRISM  
OR ANTHROPOMORPHISM? AESTHETICS  
AND TECHNO-AESTHETICS
Ingold and Malafouris, along with many oth-
ers, share an explicit suspicion toward the anthro-
pocentrism that is likely to have supported the 
objectifying position at its origins and through-
out its development: namely, toward the isolation 
of (human) agents from things, which is under-
written by the representative and hylomorphic 
approach. Malafouris responds very sharply to this 
position by definitively reaffirming a thesis that we 
have already examined:
If there is such a thing as human agency, then there 
is material agency; there is no way human and 
material agency can be disentangled. Or else, while 
agency and intentionality may not be properties of 
things, they are not properties of humans either; they 
are properties of material engagement. (Malafouris 
[2013]: 119, italics are mine)
Nevertheless, Malafouris is quite aware that 
the kind of entanglement evidenced by the mate-
rial engagement in which the human being takes 
part has something peculiar about it and is not 
entirely generalizable. He specifies this peculiar-
ity by distinguishing between anthropocentrism 
and anthropomorphism. He writes that «to engage 
in anthropocentrism is to perceive humans at the 
center of reality; to engage in anthropomorphism 
is to perceive reality in human terms», adding that 
this «is a biological necessity of the human condi-
tion that we need to embrace» and that it would 
be impossible even merely to imagine what it 
would mean, for us as humans, to live and think 
without the constituent metaphorical apparatus 
on which our perception of the world – interwo-
ven with deeply embodied sensorimotor schemes, 
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such as up/down, front/back, interior/exterior, 
and so on – is based. It follows that anthropomor-
phism must not be thought of «as a problem that 
we failed to overcome, but as a central character-
istic of human projection and material engage-
ment that demands attention and understanding» 
(Malafouris [2013]: 131).
The epistemological scope of this issue needs to 
be clarified and developed even beyond the meth-
odological boundaries to which Malafouris con-
fines it. More precisely, we should question wheth-
er the concept of “perception” used here is entirely 
appropriate, or whether it would be preferable to 
speak, as Ingold does, of a more general and inde-
terminate “sentient awareness”, namely, the charac-
teristic openness of human aisthesis. I mean to say 
that the reference to a specifically “aesthetic” ele-
ment could help ensure a better understanding of 
the anthropomorphic perception to which Mala-
fouris refers, as well as of the ek-static proprio-
ception advocated by Ingold. Now, the “anthro-
pomorphic” need noted by Malafouris is clearly 
foreshadowed in its specific epistemological status 
in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, the work 
in which Immanuel Kant (1781) unveils his aes-
thetics. Kant speaks of a “purposiveness of nature”, 
to be understood as a “subjective” principle of the 
reflecting faculty of judgment. That is, namely, the 
principle of the particular cognitive activity where-
by we formulate hypotheses concerning the exist-
ence and positive detection of regularities within 
the natural world. Kant writes that, in the exercise 
of this fundamental activity, we thus behave “as if ” 
an intelligible design were concealed behind the 
great and apparently irreducible “variety of forms” 
with which “nature” confronts us, although this 
design remains entirely to be discovered. In so 
many words, we behave “as if ” the internal struc-
ture of nature were anthropomorphically attuned 
to our way of knowing. It is a question, however, 
of a non-objective principle, a sort of hypotheti-
cal simulation, on whose grounds the reflecting 
faculty of judgment gives itself, and not nature, a 
procedural rule. Now, the point that most inter-
ests us here is that, according to Kant, the form of 
the anthropomorphic projection whereby nature 
is taken “as if ” it were spontaneously attuned to 
our deepest expectations, that is, available to be 
dwelt-in and known, is a “feeling of pleasure and 
pain” – a feeling of something together with a feel-
ing of oneself. It is therefore something very close 
to the “correspondence” claimed by Ingold, whose 
primary place is aisthesis, and not perception – as 
Kant would agree, insofar as the latter is interwo-
ven with conceptuality – much less understanding 
(which is the seat of conceptuality).
The question set aside at the beginning – 
namely, of what is at stake in the “role play” 
between the contractors of the equal interaction in 
which material engagement consists, and in which 
the technical creativity characteristic of homo 
faber is performed – thus points toward the pos-
sibility of an aesthetic answer. The human being 
enters such play initially by virtue of an extremely 
intense, but also indeterminate and open, feeling 
that orients its imagination in the course of the 
entanglement of material engagement. And it is 
clear that the import of this feeling has to do with 
the specific creative adaptation of a living being 
that is compelled to find the resources for survival 
technically because it lacks them biologically.
On this last point, it is noteworthy that, in 
the First Introduction to the Critique of the Power 
of Judgment (which was subsequently replaced), 
Kant defines the principle of the reflecting fac-
ulty of judgment as a “technique of nature”. This 
definition is less comprehensive than the defini-
tive one, but more revealing. Put otherwise, what 
is felt as anthropomorphic in nature, in a purely 
hypothetical and “simulative” way, is first and fore-
most nature’s conformation to a broad and inde-
terminate technical texture. It follows that, from 
its origin, human aisthesis has been a technically 
attuned feeling: a techno-aesthetics8.
In Kant’s original formulation, the commit-
ment assigned to the agency of the human being 
through its attunement with a constitutive tech-
nicity needs to be given its proper weight; this is 
one possible reason, and not the least important 
8 Simondon (2014) uses the term “techno-aesthetics” in a 
different acceptation from this one. 
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one, for the philosopher’s subsequent recourse to 
the much more indeterminate “purposiveness”. 
If we take this last scenario seriously, the frame-
work that we have hitherto established for relat-
ing Malafouris and Ingold in spite of their respec-
tive differences undergoes a rather fundamental 
change. Indeed, not only does Ingold’s concilia-
tory Stimmung make room for a certain uncanny 
compulsion to technical creativity – recalling the 
deinotes that Sophocles attributes to the intrinsic 
technicity of the human being in the first stasimon 
of the Antigone – but in addition, the repeatedly 
invoked “equality” of the elements contributing to 
material engagement is, at least partly, called into 
question by the excessive activism and spectacu-
lar plasticity displayed on the part of one of them. 
This last aspect needs to be better defined.
4. HYPER-INTERACTIVITY OF IMAGINATION: 
SALIENT AND SUPERVENIENT AFFORDANCES 
A final reference to the philosophical system 
of Kantian aesthetics will be useful for formulating 
the problem according to a conceptual scheme that 
I deem appropriate and intend to adopt for the rest 
of this article. While describing, in analytic terms, 
the aesthetic feeling whereby we humans feel an 
agreement, or correspondence, with nature, Kant 
speaks of a “free play” between imagination and 
understanding. More precisely, he speaks of a free 
play between the indeterminacy of the former and 
the determinateness of the latter. I will stress a few 
points from this well-known definition without 
excessive concern for philological rigor. What does 
it actually mean that imagination has to do with 
the indeterminate? It means that imagination’s task 
consists in going through9 the affordances of the 
empirical data, configuring the manifold possible 
9 In a surprising passage of the Critique of Pure Reason 
(Kant [1781]), Kant uses this very verb, durchgehen, to 
describe the synthetic action of imagination. In another 
passage in the third Critique, Kant speaks of “different 
proportions” of the relation between determined and 
indeterminate.
synthetic unifications10. In the clay-work example, 
for instance, these involve not only the affordances 
manifested through the pliability of the material 
but also those that make the material’s reactivity to 
a rotatory movement emerge. In the first case (pli-
ability), one might speak of salient affordances; in 
the second (sensitivity to the rotatory movement), 
one might speak of supervenient affordances.
The point that I want to highlight is the fol-
lowing: in the “free play” that Kant describes, we 
are bound to note a focused and attentional ori-
entation – governed, according to Kant, by under-
standing – along with another orientation, this 
one decentered and indeterminate – governed by 
imagination. Far from being compelled to distin-
guish between two faculties, as Kant does, we can 
attribute these two “phases” of the process to an 
attentive and at the same time unbiased hearing of 
the material: clay, in our case. It is a hearing that 
proves capable of focusing on the salient affordanc-
es and, at the same time, keeping a distance from 
them – a disinterestedness, as Kant would say – in 
order to anticipate hypothetically the superveni-
ent affordances. In other words, a disengagement 
is at work in the play. Such a disengagement is 
also temporal: it is a mode of delay, among other 
things. This disengagement is enacted with regard 
to the formative cogency of the moment of salience 
and focused attention (Desideri [2011], Nanay 
[2018]). In short, the play involves a deliverance, 
capable, as it were, of displacing the sensitivity 
to an area at a distance. Or rather: it is a sort of 
débrayage or real disembodiment, which realizes a 
reflective and recursive distancing within the imagi-
native event itself11. If this were not so, the element 
10 In § 21 of the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant 
describes this imaginative process in detail.
11 Lev S. Vygotsky was the first to present this situation 
in terms of recursion (Vygotsky [1934]). The aspect of the 
disengagement (débrayage) and of the following modi-
fication of the sensorimotor schemes is the pivot of a 
remarkable experiment with a group of macaques (Iriki 
et al. [1996]) that Malafouris reports (2013: 164-69) with 
precision. He speaks of a process of “disembodiment”, 
which is necessary to the formation of a new skill. The 
concept of débrayage, used here in a non-formalized way, 
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that Ingold calls transductive would not be able to 
emerge. In the case in point, this element is eas-
ily discernible, not only in the wheel, but also, for 
instance, in the firing that the artifact must under-
go to ensure its resistance and impermeability. 
We must extract and highlight two points from 
this brief discussion. The first concerns what could 
be called a hyper-interactivity of the human imagi-
nation: namely, the latter’s inclination to work 
with provisional syntheses while keeping open the 
possibility of grasping other profiles from among 
those offered by the affordances of the mate-
rial world. The second concerns the reflective and 
recursive distancing discussed above, and more 
specifically, the setting up of this distancing as the 
condition of a process destined to favor a detach-
ment from “things” that is sufficient to situate 
them in the position of “objectivity”. It should be 
noted that this same process must be thought of as 
subtending the phenomenon of scientific observa-
tion from an epistemological perspective. Indeed, it 
must be understood that the objective representa-
tion (ob-jectum, adaequatio, Richtigkeit, aboutness, 
etc.) is not a mistake of Platonic metaphysics or 
the Cartesian cogito; it is an event with an evolu-
tionary advantage, born of a joint action: on the 
one hand, of the need to identify and emend the 
technical errors necessarily encountered through 
the material engagement12 of homo faber, and on 
the other hand, of the onset of verbal articulated 
language qua specialization of the work of profiling 
and articulating, spacing and segmenting, already 
performed by the hyper-activism of imagination 
for hundreds of thousands of years.
It is by no means necessary to suppose that 
this very function of imagination, as an immedi-
ate forerunner of language, should have some-
how escaped the emergent and co-evolutionary 
belongs to the theoretical terminology of semiotics (Grei-
mas, Courtés [1982]). 
12 The derived and corrective character of the scientif-
ic attitude, with regard to technical creativity, is one of 
the guidelines in Georges Canguilhem’s thought. For an 
introduction to this thinker, see Fiorenza Lupi & Stefano 
Pilotto (2019).
process that Malafouris in particular elucidates.13 
Over time, in fact, imagination gradually achieved 
a self-consciousness of its articulatory function, 
thanks to a long series of externalized experiences, 
as one can clearly see in the earliest practices of 
intentional inscription, such as those found in the 
Blombos Cave dating back eighty thousand years. 
Here, imagination was at work in a hand as it 
traced lines or carved spots, testing itself out qua 
potential proto-writing and proto-language: this 
practice would later be taken up in the produc-
tion of a real mnemo-technique (d’Errico, Colagé 
[2018]). By virtue of this technique, it would be 
possible to implement the similarly externalized 
formation of the operative concept of number 
(Malafouris [2013]: 106-16).
5. REFLECTIVE DISTANCING  
AND LINGUISTIC ARTICULATION
But the second point is even more important, 
as evidenced by the fact that it can be considered 
a specific characteristic of homo sapiens, whereas 
the previously discussed scriptural phenomena are 
also observable in other families of hominins. On 
this specific point, André Leroi-Gourhan (1964), 
an author respected by both Ingold and Mala-
fouris, provides a guideline that is as valuable as it 
is neglected by the specialized literature. Leaving 
aside the fact that the periodization and terminol-
ogy used by Leroi-Gourhan has been substantially 
reconfigured by the most recent discoveries in the 
field, the theoretical import of the basic guideline 
that he provides us stands largely independent of 
any potential weight attached to its precise dat-
ing. The guideline is the following: in a timeframe 
attributable to the Middle Paleolithic period, «a 
very important evolution in the field of lithic tools» 
took place, whereby the block originally used as 
material for obtaining an artifact (e.g. an amygdala, 
i.e. a bifacial flint) began to be exploited to produce 
13 «The knapper first thinks through and with the stone 
before being able to think about the stone and hence 
about himself as a conscious and reflective agent» (Mala-
fouris [2013]: 176).
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a certain number of splinters, which would in turn 
be reworked to obtain diversified tools. According 
to Leroi-Gourhan, this implies that:
the tool function had shifted from the mass initially 
intended to constitute the tool to the flake derived 
from that mass. […] We shall see later that this pro-
cess is generally characteristic of the more devel-
oped industries. In other words, from being the tool 
itself the lump of stone has become a source of tools 
(as we shall see, an additional stage was to be intro-
duced from the Upper Paleolithic onward). The blade 
or flake would then no longer constitute the tool but 
would be divided into sections providing the start-
ing point for the making of the tool proper. (Leroi-
Gourhan [1964]: 100)
In this text, Leroi-Gourhan speaks of a “shift”. 
However, in a highly significant essay, Emilio Gar-
roni (1977) argues that the transformative pro-
cess that Leroi-Gourhan describes should be rec-
ognized as a full-fledged discontinuity14. Indeed, 
it was not just a question of the enhancement of 
previous productive protocols but of the emer-
gence of a new component, identifiable with the 
assumption of a specific role by the reflective and 
recursive trait of material engagement, which I 
traced above to the configuration and imposing of 
a process of objectifying distancing. It means that 
an original element was introduced into the radi-
cal and equal interaction of material engagement: 
this element was able to redirect material engage-
ment toward completely new evolutionary trends, 
thanks in part to the decisive processes of exapta-
tion concerning the phonatory and auditory appa-
ratus (Lieberman [2007], Tattersall [2016], Cox 
[2018]). In short, only on this basis was it possible 
for something like an articulated and denotative 
proto-language to appear.
If this account is coherent, the problems raised 
at the beginning of this article could be reconsidered 
in a new light. Here, I must limit myself to making a 
list and save a proper discussion for another time. 
14 Several paleoanthropologists agree about this specific 
discontinuity, on the basis of many other convergent 
clues. For all of them, see Ian Tattersall (2008, 2016). 
More precisely, on the question of whether the 
appearance of articulated language had the char-
acter of a “sudden irruption” or a long and grad-
ual development, one could answer that a gradual 
development was doubtlessly necessary, so as to 
allow for a reflective and distancing element to 
arise within the material engagement of the homo 
sapiens (and of it alone). This element would find, 
in phonic articulation, an extraordinarily effective 
medium for actualizing the work of profiling and 
segmentation imputed to imagination. As a con-
sequence, we should answer the second question 
as follows: the phonic-articulatory trait should be 
considered decisively discriminating with respect 
to the resources of other systems of organization 
on the plane of expression, such as expressive-
gestural ones. After all, it is clear that only once 
language had emerged could a large part of its 
articulatory properties be easily projected onto 
the structure of gestural communication. As to the 
third question, we should acknowledge that the 
semantic-denotative properties of enunciation, that 
is, its “objectivity” or “aboutness”, are determining 
for the characterization of this technology. Fur-
thermore, while language is integrated with other 
pragmatic, communicational and expressive prop-
erties, recognizable in the forms of pre-linguistic 
communication, it radically reorganizes these prop-
erties. This point leads us to another question, the 
one that I raised first, which now returns in all its 
theoretical scope and complexity. It is precisely 
what I called the «degree of self-awareness gov-
erned by an articulated and denotative language» 
that now appears incomparable with the one 
assigned to other communicational and performa-
tive practices governed by imagination, not only 
on account of the degree of grammatical formali-
zation attainable by the subtlety of this self-aware-
ness, but also, and above all, because language sup-
plies the specific form of metadiscursivity to the 
recursion already at hand in material engagement. 
As Emile Benveniste (1966, 1974) in particular 
underlines, articulated language is indeed the only 
semiotic system that is able to consider itself – that 
is, its constituent units and enunciations – as the 
object of enunciation.
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Without a doubt, in the end, the incredible 
technological innovation that articulated language 
represented would go on to reorganize the “role 
play” of material engagement in a profound and 
irreversible way, by introducing the absolutely 
original element of a denotative semantics. The 
latter, of course, is a very powerful device, albeit 
one that depends fundamentally on the work of 
imagination: only this work can supply it with 
objectual meanings – Bedeutungen, as Kant calls 
them (1781) – and indeterminate senses (Kant 
[1790], Garroni [2005], Montani [2017]). In other 
words, once language had been invented and had 
assumed its articulatory properties, the inexhaust-
ible synthetic movement of imagination alone 
ensured the continued rootedness of the linguis-
tic units in the world of praxis, together with the 
extension and reorganization of the latter. This 
point is hardly discussed in the studies exam-
ined here, perhaps in part as a consequence of a 
conception of articulated language aligned with 
what is essentially a conventionalist interpreta-
tion. It happens not only that language took over, 
with an unparalleled power, the articulatory work 
(“profiling”, “segmentation”) previously entrusted 
to imagination, as well as to the scriptural events 
that I briefly discussed above, but also that this 
work empowered many other actors in the “role 
play” of material engagement (Gahrn-Andersen 
[2017]). Some of these actors may be undesirable 
and uncanny. I refer in particular to the irresistible 
tendency of recursion to behave, and understand 
itself, not only in terms of metadiscursivity but 
also in terms of self-reference.
In other words, it is as if language were capa-
ble of forgoing the contribution of imagination 
(in the very broad sense given here) and autono-
mously providing for the constitution and reor-
ganization of the order of reference. It is not by 
chance that this process, reminiscent of autistic 
pathologies, evinces parallels with other symbolic 
practices that have a significant historical bear-
ing. In late modernity, for instance, the sphere of 
images, media (Manovich [2001, 2014]), and the 
arts (Danto [1986], Andina [2012], Velotti [2012]) 
has concerned itself with phenomena of this sort 
in a rather characteristic way, and – somewhat 
convergently (Cecchi [2013]) – so has the eco-
nomic sphere based on the tools of financial cap-
italism: one need only think of the intrinsic self-
reference of so-called “futures”. In our time, in 
short, material engagement is likely to unfold in a 
field so deeply permeated by technological medi-
ation (Grusin [2017], Cecchi, Feyles, Montani 
[2018]) that a general reorganization of its model 
of understanding seems to be in order: in the new 
model, the crucial question of articulated language 
and its effects on material culture – at times con-
troversial and at times even enigmatic – should be 
granted its rightful place. 
I wish to thank Samuel Fleck for his astute and 
generous revision of the paper.
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Corpus sive cultura. Nota su tecnica e corpi
Carmine Di Martino
Abstract. Even before turning to instruments, we already have a technical-cultural 
body, since our body always keeps track of the action of technology and culture. It is 
indeed thanks to both technology and culture that our body had become what it is, 
that is a human body, meaning a sort of biological paradox - a body unfit for survival, 
unspecialized and unadapted, but extremely plastic. This does not imply that the action 
that current technologies have upon our bodies, with their extraordinary capabilities of 
manipulation, does not have any consequences or cause concerns. We do nothing alien 
to our “nature” when we expose ourselves to the action of technology, as well as we do 
nothing alien to us when we set limits to technology, and not only to it. The conti-
nuous process of self-limitation is in fact a necessity for men. And setting limits to the 
possible (and to what can be done) is also the only way to safeguard it.
Keywords. Technology; culture, body; return effect; responsibility.
1. LA MARCIA DELLA TECNOLOGIA
Lo sviluppo della tecnica rappresenta un tratto essenziale, ad 
un tempo affascinante e inquietante, dell’attuale scenario mondia-
le. Pensiamo per esempio al rapporto tra l’uomo e i nuovi disposi-
tivi tecnologici, tra i nostri corpi e le manipolazioni a cui essi pos-
sono venire sottoposti, tra l’ambiente naturale e gli interventi arti-
ficiali che ne hanno modificato e ne modificano profondamente la 
fisionomia. Qualunque prospettiva si abbia, è difficile non cogliere 
relativamente a tale rapporto, per come esso si è configurato negli 
ultimi decenni, un certo carico di problemi. I piani sono moltepli-
ci e assai diversi tra loro. Possiamo qui solo menzionarne alcuni: la 
discussione sull’Antropocene, con i connessi interrogativi sui tem-
pi di sopravvivenza del pianeta Terra ovvero sulla possibilità di un 
suo collasso imminente; gli avanzamenti dell’ingegneria genetica e 
della bio-ingegneria, con implicazioni di vario genere, alcune delle 
quali vanno sotto il titolo di trans-umano o post-umano; i progres-
si dell’intelligenza artificiale, accompagnati da grandi ambizioni e da 
altrettanto grandi allarmi, per esempio relativi alla possibile incon-
trollabilità dei poteri delle macchine; lo sviluppo straordinariamente 
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efficace e pervasivo delle tecnologie comunicative 
e informazionali, che, poste al servizio del neuro-
marketing, ci stanno trasformando, connessione 
dopo connessione,  in consumatori telecomandati 
(la sinergia tra le scoperte neuro-scientifiche sui 
processi cognitivo-emotivi e l’algoritmo PageRank 
ci profila senza sosta, plasmando i nostri deside-
ri e predeterminando le nostre scelte). Sono solo 
accenni e suggestioni. Il dibattito intorno a questi 
temi è molto ricco e, come si può immaginare, la 
prima pagina è occupata soprattutto dalle posizio-
ni estreme, quelle degli opposti fronti di apocalit-
tici da una parte e apologeti dall’altra. Ma proprio 
in tale polarizzazione si mostra la nostra insuffi-
cienza, relativa tanto a un pensiero della tecnica 
quanto a un pensiero dell’umano.
Pensare l’essenza della tecnica. Questo sembra-
va a Martin Heidegger il problema decisivo per la 
filosofia del ventesimo secolo. Vale ancora per noi? 
Sì, ma esso non può a nostro avviso venire affron-
tato nei termini heideggeriani: essi non ci consen-
tono di cogliere il fenomeno ad una sufficiente e 
concreta profondità. Heidegger, è vero, ci invita a 
non farci catturare dalla concezione antropologi-
co-strumentale della tecnica, cioè a non fare della 
tecnica una questione semplicemente morale, di 
usi adeguati o inadeguati dei suoi prodotti, a non 
intenderla come un semplice mezzo in vista di fini 
o come una mera attività dell’uomo. Ma quando 
egli afferma che l’essenza della tecnica non è nul-
la di tecnico, poiché essa è un «modo del disvela-
mento» (un modo di dispiegarsi dell’orizzonte di 
manifestazione dell’ente) che precede e rende pos-
sibile (anche) l’azione tecnica e che non dipende 
da decisioni di singoli o di gruppi, questo non fa 
compiere alcun passo nella comprensione del sen-
so originario – costituente e performativo – del-
la tecnica. Heidegger è catturato da una visione 
“metafisica” (storico-destinale) della tecnica, che 
ci propone due grandi epoche, quella della tecnica 
antica (techne) e della tecnica moderna (Ge-stell), 
della “pro-duzione” e della “provocazione”, come 
esiti di rispettivi invii destinali dell’essere e non di 
escogitazioni dell’uomo. 
Heidegger risale dunque alle radici platoniche 
della tecnica, ossia alla techne, per mostrare che 
originariamente essa non significa fabbricare o 
approntare qualcosa, ma indica quell’atteggiamen-
to conoscitivo che coglie l’ente nella luce dell’i-
dea e si dispone così a dominarlo (a manipolarlo 
in un modo peculiare). In tale cornice, la tecnica 
moderna rappresenta l’incarnazione conclama-
ta e culminante della vocazione al dominio (una 
vocazione implicitamente nichilistica) della techne 
greca. Nel modo del disvelamento che ci concer-
ne oggi e che Heidegger chiama, appunto, Ge-stell, 
impianto, imposizione, provocazione, pretesa, 
sfruttamento violento, e che comporta la riduzio-
ne della natura a fondo impiegabile, si evidenzia 
nei suoi risultati estremi un seme di violenza e di 
dominio che appartiene all’alba della razionalità 
occidentale. A cominciare dalla techne platonica, 
l’atteggiamento teoretico-obbiettivante verso l’ente 
prende il posto del thaumazein, dello stupore, che 
caratterizza il rapporto originario dell’uomo gre-
co con la physis, con la presenza delle cose, con la 
totalità dell’ente, inaugurando così un trattamento 
dell’ente che si incammina nella direzione del sog-
giogamento della Terra.
Questa concezione heideggeriana, con tutte 
le sue innegabili profondità e con i suoi salutari 
risvolti antimoralistici, non porta tuttavia molto 
lontano sotto il profilo di una concreta compren-
sione della tecnica e della sua azione, del suo rap-
porto con l’umano. Se si parla dell’uomo, di quel 
vivente che noi stessi siamo, dotato di un certo 
corpo, con una certa conformazione, capace di 
certe prestazioni, emotivamente comprendente 
e parlante, la tecnica non può essere intesa come 
qualcosa che viene ad aggiungersi dal di fuori, 
a contaminare o a corrompere un rapporto col 
mondo che si sarebbe potuto mantenere nella sua 
originaria e pre-tecnica purezza. L’uomo non ha la 
tecnica fuori di sé, tanto se la si pensa heidegge-
rianamente come un determinato atteggiamento 
conoscitivo verso l’ente (fondato in un «modo del 
disvelamento») quanto se la si pensa, più comune-
mente, come un mezzo in vista di fini e come una 
attività dell’uomo.
Non vi è da una parte l’uomo e dall’altra la tec-
nica. Non si tratta, però, semplicemente di conce-
pire il rapporto fra essi come una necessità a poste-
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riori. L’affermazione che l’uomo ha bisogno della 
tecnica poiché il suo corpo, sprovvisto delle oppor-
tune capacità di difesa e di offesa, deve dotarsi di 
strumenti artificiali per affrontare la sfida della 
sopravvivenza non è sufficiente a farci compren-
dere il senso della tecnica e può addirittura fuor-
viarci. Anche quando interpretiamo la relazione tra 
uomo e tecnica come una necessità in vista della 
sopravvivenza possiamo infatti continuare a pensa-
re il rapporto tra i due poli nei termini di una ori-
ginaria esteriorità o di una contrapposizione.
Ciò che qui vorremmo mostrare è che la tec-
nica non si aggiunge all’uomo, al suo organismo, 
al suo corpo, dall’esterno, nemmeno come indi-
spensabile ausilio alla sopravvivenza, ma ineri-
sce essenzialmente al suo stesso costituirsi, al suo 
divenire “umano”. La tecnica non è separabile né 
dall’accidentato percorso dell’ominazione (filoge-
nesi) né da quello della umanizzazione (ontogene-
si) degli individui appartenenti alla specie Homo 
sapiens.
2. RINUNCIARE AL “DIFETTO D’ORIGINE”
Nel panorama filosofico degli ultimi decen-
ni non sono mancate notevoli riflessioni sul tema 
della tecnica. Esse hanno ripensato e condotto 
a una nuova profondità ciò che era già apparso 
all’inizio del secolo scorso ad opera della nascen-
te antropologia filosofica: «La tecnica è vecchia 
quanto l’uomo», essa «è insita nell’essenza stes-
sa dell’uomo», scrive per esempio Arnold Gehlen 
(1957: 32-33). Viene in primo piano l’essere essen-
zialmente tecnico dell’uomo. Tra gli apporti più 
recenti spicca per consapevolezza filosofica quello 
di Bernard Stiegler. Ci riferiamo qui in partico-
lare al primo volume di La Technique e le Temps. 
La faute d’Epiméthée, in cui, rileggendo il mito di 
Prometeo e di Epimeteo, Stiegler sottolinea l’ori-
ginaria interdipendenza dell’uomo e della tecnica. 
Il mito di Prometeo e di Epimeteo non va inter-
pretato come un mito dell’origine, ma del «difet-
to d’origine», un difetto assolutamente necessario 
(«un défaut qu’il faut»). La dimenticanza di Epi-
meteo nel procurare agli uomini le qualità speci-
fiche e i mezzi necessari per sopravvivere provoca 
il dono da parte di Prometeo della perizia tecnica 
e del fuoco, che consente agli esseri umani di vive-
re sulla terra: la tecnica si rivela perciò come una 
compensazione originaria, costitutiva dell’umani-
tà, di un difetto d’origine. In virtù di tale difetto 
l’uomo si rivela come essenzialmente bisognoso di 
protesi per esistere – per sopravvivere, socializza-
re, esprimersi ecc. –, è costretto a vivere mediante 
strumenti che suppliscono alle sue mancanze e lo 
conducono oltre sé.
Ciò che Stiegler intende affermare, sulla scorta 
della ricerca paleoantropologica di André Leroi-
Gourhan, è che il processo di ominazione incon-
tra la tecnica sin dagli inizi, o meglio, come il suo 
stesso inizio. Egli scrive significativamente: 
La comparsa dell’uomo è la comparsa della tecnica 
[…]. Leroi-Gourhan dice in effetti che è lo strumento, 
ossia la techne, che inventa l’uomo, e non l’uomo che 
inventa la tecnica. O ancora: l’uomo si inventa nella 
tecnica inventando lo strumento – «esteriorizzandosi» 
tecno-logicamente. Ora, l’uomo è qui «l’interno»: non 
esiste esteriorizzazione che non designi un movimento 
dall’interno verso l’esterno. Tuttavia, l’interno è inven-
tato da questo movimento: non può perciò preceder-
lo. Interno ed esterno si costituiscono di conseguenza 
attraverso un movimento che inventa, al tempo stesso, 
l’uno e l’altro: un movimento in cui si inventano l’uno 
nell’altro, come se vi fosse una maieutica tecno-logica 
di ciò che si chiama l’uomo. (Stiegler [1994]: 152) 
È chiara, dal passo appena citato, l’asserzione 
dell’essenziale dipendenza di ominazione e tecni-
ca, intese – queste ultime – come i due lati di uno 
stesso movimento, in cui nessuno dei due precede 
l’altro e in cui ciascuno concorre alla emergenza 
dell’altro.
A fronte della decisa proposta di una «tecni-
cità originaria», tuttavia, il lessico (di ascendenza 
derridiana) del «difetto d’origine» lascia sussistere 
sullo sfondo, malgrado tutto, una prospettiva teo-
rica all’interno della quale la tecnica appare come 
la «compensazione» di un deficit, di un difetto, 
cioè come un rimedio o un «supplemento» desti-
nato a rispondere a posteriori a una mancanza che 
si trova già là, come un appello ad essere colmata. 
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L’ottica stiegleriana, certo, impedisce di attribui-
re alla tecnica il senso, che aveva in Heidegger, di 
contaminazione di un originario o di contrapposi-
zione a esso, ma, proprio in virtù della semantica 
del «difetto» e del «supplemento», essa mantiene 
in vita un altro senso: quello della compensazione 
di una incompletezza, del rimedio a una sprov-
vedutezza originaria. Ciò comporta, nonostante 
le dichiarazioni in senso contrario e al di là delle 
intenzioni dell’autore, il rimanere nell’orbita di una 
concezione dell’uomo come l’essere originariamen-
te «carente» e della tecnica come una necessaria 
risposta a tale carenza.
Quella della carenza è una prospettiva che ha 
avuto una certa importanza nell’antropologia filo-
sofica. Essa non consente però di cogliere il sen-
so originario della tecnica e la co-appartenenza di 
ominazione e tecnica. Per pensare in maniera più 
radicale il ruolo della tecnica – in accordo, cre-
diamo,  con l’intento della riflessione stiegleriana 
– occorre abbandonare il paradigma del “difetto 
d’origine” e in un certo senso rovesciarlo. Si trat-
terebbe, in questo senso, per usare ancora il lessico 
derridiano familiare a Stiegler, di spingere fino al 
suo punto estremo la logica della supplementarie-
tà, così come Jacques Derrida ce la propone nel 
contesto di una discussione sul segno: «Qui appa-
re – egli scrive –  la strana struttura del supple-
mento: una possibilità produce a ritardo ciò cui è 
detta aggiungersi» (Derrida [1967]: 128). Tradotto 
nei termini del nostro problema questo significa: il 
fare tecnico, l’uso di strumenti artificiali, produce 
a ritardo la carenza (fisiologica e neuro-psichica) 
a cui “è detto aggiungersi”, a cui cioè si presume 
risponda o ponga rimedio. Occorre pensare, allo-
ra, riprendendo il mito citato e in una sorta di 
inversione, che è il dono di Prometeo a produr-
re la mancanza lasciata sussistere da Epimeteo, 
rispetto a cui si misura la sua dimenticanza. In 
questa logica, il supplemento, la protesi, non inter-
viene a rimediare a qualcosa che la precede nella 
forma di un deficit, di un inadattamento: il deficit 
è piuttosto il risultato della supplenza. Il supple-
mento non supplisce, dunque, bensì produce la 
carenza che sembrerebbe chiamato a compensare. 
Con ciò, naturalmente, il concetto di supplemen-
to è spinto fino alla sua autocancellazione, fino a 
richiedere la sua stessa sostituzione, e la carenza 
perde la sua patente di originarietà: essa si mostra, 
nell’ottica della struttura del supplemento derri-
dianamente concepita, come ciò che è prodotto 
«a ritardo» dalla compensazione che sembrerebbe 
deputata a soccorrerla.
3. IL DIS-ADATTAMENTO DEI CORPI
È precisamente il rovesciamento del paradig-
ma del difetto d’origine (l’idea cioè di una causa-
lità che va dalla mancanza originaria alla compen-
sazione tecnica) uno degli assi principali dell’ope-
ra di Paul Alsberg, L’enigma dell’umano, del 1922, 
una fonte a lungo oscurata e spesso fraintesa della 
antropologia filosofica primonovecentesca. Si deve 
a Peter Sloterdijk (2001), che si avvale del prezio-
so lavoro di rielaborazione di Dieter Claessens 
(1993), il merito di avere riportato l’attenzione su 
quest’opera e sulla fecondità della sua idea centra-
le. È stato Alsberg, osserva Sloterdijk,
a porre i fondamenti essenziali per una teoria dell’e-
voluzione umana. Alsberg riconobbe il meccanismo 
chiave dell’antropogenesi in quella che egli chiama la 
“liberazione dai limiti corporei”. Si tratta di un con-
cetto che coglie il punto critico delle possibilità storico 
naturali dell’evoluzione culturale; con il suo aiuto pos-
siamo mostrare come possa venire pensata la storia 
naturale della presa di distanza dagli ambienti natu-
rali. (Sloterdijk [2001]: 149)
L’intento di Alsberg è quello di gettare luce 
sulla differenza tra viventi umani e non umani e 
quindi sull’ominazione, ritenendo insufficienti tut-
te le spiegazioni sino ad allora fornite della moda-
lità di evoluzione che conduce alla apparizione del 
genere Homo prima e della specie Homo sapiens 
poi. Dall’interno della cornice darwiniana, egli 
cerca di identificare un principio evolutivo che 
sappia rendere conto adeguatamente del proces-
so di ominazione, facendo in tal modo compiere 
alla teoria evoluzionistica stessa un deciso passo 
in avanti. Dando per assodato infatti che non ci 
si possa affidare a ipotesi che ignorino la ricerca 
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scientifica e che si sottraggano al quadro stabilito 
dalla teoria evoluzionistica darwiniana, non ci si 
può tuttavia accontentare, secondo Alsberg, di una 
teoria meramente “incrementale” dell’ominazione, 
che riconduca l’apparizione dell’uomo al sempli-
ce incremento delle caratteristiche proprie di certi 
primati: per quella via non si può giungere a una 
chiarificazione soddisfacente del fenomeno che si 
ha di mira. Occorre percorrere altre strade.
È stato proprio Darwin, sottolinea Alsberg, a 
portare l’attenzione sul nesso tra l’organizzazione 
corporea degli animali e il loro ambiente, susci-
tando così, indirettamente, osservazioni compara-
tive relative alla struttura della corporeità umana. 
Possiamo riconoscere con piena evidenza come 
tutti gli animali si siano adattati attraverso il cor-
po a ciò che li circonda e come la lotta per l’esi-
stenza abbia fatto emergere i differenti meccanismi 
di adattamento e protezione. Nell’animale, scrive 
Alsberg, «tutto è adattamento del corpo» (Alsberg 
[1937]: 74). Nell’essere umano le cose stanno assai 
diversamente.
Il punto di partenza delle considerazioni alsber-
ghiane è l’osservazione delle caratteristiche del cor-
po umano: a esso «mancano tutte le garanzie neces-
sarie per la sua sopravvivenza e per la conservazione 
della specie, sulle quali può invece fare affidamento 
con certezza l’animale grazie al suo corpo perfetta-
mente adattato alla natura» (Alsberg [1937]: 74). Va 
detto però che, se anche i predecessori degli esse-
ri umani avessero avuto la stessa sprovvedutezza 
organica, essi avrebbero perso la scommessa della 
sopravvivenza: non avrebbero potuto provvedere a 
loro stessi e nemmeno assicurare la prosecuzione 
della specie. Bisogna dunque ipotizzare che, come 
tutti gli altri animali, essi fossero stati completa-
mente adattati alla natura. Da ciò deriva che, nel 
corso della loro evoluzione, tali esseri abbiano «in 
qualche modo perso il meccanismo fisico di difesa 
di un tempo» (Alsberg [1937]: 75).
È qui che si apre lo spazio per le teorie della 
carenza. Ci si è infatti spinti a pensare che, nel cor-
so del suo sviluppo, l’essere umano abbia dapprima 
perso la sua capacità difensiva e quindi, a causa 
di un tale stato di carenza, sia stato sollecitato, se 
non costretto, all’invenzione di nuove e compen-
sative maniere di difendersi (si tratta di una dire-
zione che va da Herder a Gehlen, passando per 
Nietzsche sul versante filosofico e per Bolk e Port-
mann su quello scientifico). Per Alsberg, questa 
ipotesi porta tuttavia in sé un controsenso. Infatti, 
se le capacità di adattamento e di difesa non fos-
sero state dapprima adeguatamente sostituite, il 
periodo di indebolimento organico avrebbe certa-
mente comportato l’estinzione dei primi ominini. 
Per tale motivo, le teorie della carenza sono state 
talvolta accompagnate dall’ipotesi di una nicchia 
ecologica protetta, priva di predatori, una sorta di 
“paradiso terrestre”, determinatosi per circostan-
ze fortuite e per un certo tempo, in cui le prime 
popolazioni di ominini poterono trascorrere un 
periodo di transizione, in attesa di maturare possi-
bilità alternative di difesa e di adattamento. Ma tale 
congettura, secondo Alsberg, costringe a supporre 
un uomo prima dell’uomo, un essere umano delle 
origini già straordinariamente intelligente e avan-
zato, in grado di escogitare pressoché d’improvviso 
soluzioni tecniche atte a compensare la mancanza 
di difese organiche. Egli la ritiene perciò del tutto 
improbabile e in definitiva insostenibile.
Considerando le condizioni di sopravvivenza 
di tutti gli esseri viventi sulla terra, l’unica inter-
pretazione plausibile è che, in ogni fase della sua 
evoluzione, al pari di tutti gli altri viventi, l’essere 
umano si sia adattato alla natura circostante e si 
sia equipaggiato nel migliore dei modi per soste-
nere la sua lotta per l’esistenza. Se si vuole ren-
dere conto della attuale e particolare condizione 
dell’uomo, in quanto essere sprovvisto degli adat-
tamenti corporei richiesti per sopravvivere, biso-
gna allora formulare l’ipotesi che esso abbia rea-
lizzato l’indispensabile capacità di adattamento 
e di difesa in altra maniera e che a motivo di ciò 
non abbia più avuto bisogno dei meccanismi fisi-
ci di adattamento e di protezione ereditati dai suoi 
antenati animali. Tali meccanismi, per via del loro 
mancato uso, si sono poi progressivamente dete-
riorati attraverso una graduale regressione. È dun-
que recisamente in virtù della acquisizione di altri 
mezzi di difesa e di resistenza che, in un secondo 
momento, l’organizzazione corporea dell’essere 
umano ha potuto indebolirsi.
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Ma – ed è questo il punto decisivo della teoria 
alsberghiana –, poiché i meccanismi alternativi di 
protezione dell’essere umano non si trovano all’in-
terno della sua corporeità, essi non possono che 
trovarsi fuori di essa. Di qui la conclusione che 
qualifica la prospettiva di Alsberg: sono stati gli 
strumenti artificiali a provocare l’indebolimento 
del corpo e non il contrario, come invece afferma 
la teoria della carenza, che interpreta la produ-
zione dello strumento come compensazione, cioè 
come conseguenza del deperimento del corpo o 
del suo mancato sviluppo. Gli strumenti artificiali 
si sono dunque assunti il compito dell’adattamen-
to alla natura «al posto del corpo» (Alsberg [1937]: 
77). Nella piena osservanza del precetto darwinia-
no, con l’essere umano si verifica allora un rove-
sciamento della tendenza rintracciabile nell’evolu-
zione animale: non si va verso un sempre maggio-
re adattamento del corpo alle condizioni ambien-
tali esterne, ma verso  un suo sempre maggiore 
disadattamento, disimpegno, ossia verso una sosti-
tuzione di funzioni e azioni del corpo median-
te la produzione, l’uso e lo sviluppo di strumenti 
artificiali. Si annunciano qui due direzioni anti-
tetiche dell’adattamento: somatica, nell’animale; 
esosomatica, nell’essere umano. «Per l’animale», 
scrive Alsberg, «il corpo è tutto» (Alsberg [1937]: 
78), perciò l’evoluzione animale si muove verso il 
massimo grado di adattamento del corpo. Per l’uo-
mo le cose stanno al contrario. L’evoluzione che 
concerne l’uomo «si muove in maniera altrettanto 
mirata verso l’utilizzo, il perfezionamento e l’accre-
scimento dello strumento artificiale. Perciò “tutto 
attorno” all’essere umano, indipendentemente dal 
corpo e fuori di esso, fiorisce un regno della tec-
nica fondato su se stesso, mentre il corpo stesso, 
sollevato attraverso lo strumento dal suo compito 
originario di adattamento alla natura, regredisce» 
(Alsberg [1937]: 78).
Ciò spiegherebbe come mai i corpi dei viventi 
non umani e dei viventi umani presentino, in rap-
porto all’ambiente, caratteristiche strutturali dia-
metralmente opposte: perfettamente equipaggiati 
e adattati i primi, sprovveduti e inetti i secondi. 
L’adattamento esosomatico darebbe luogo perciò a 
una regressione del corpo: in proporzione a quan-
to l’onere dell’adattamento all’ambiente si trasferi-
sce sul conto degli strumenti artificiali, si ingenera 
un conseguente disadattamento del corpo. Si sta-
bilisce, cioè, un «evidente parallelismo» (Alsberg 
[1937]: 77) tra progresso tecnico e regressione 
corporea. Corrispondentemente allo svolgimento 
dei compiti dell’adattamento mediante strumenti 
esosomatici, si produce una liberazione del corpo, 
un disimpegno di funzioni e di organi, con con-
seguenti trasformazioni somatiche in direzione 
di forme umane. «Nel corso della sua evoluzio-
ne», scrive Alsberg, «l’animale ha perfezionato il 
corpo; all’inverso, nel corso della sua evoluzione 
l’essere umano ha disattivato il corpo» (Alsberg 
[1937]: 78). Tale opposizione (perfezionamento/
disattivazione) corrisponde ai due opposti princi-
pi evolutivi: «Il principio evolutivo dell’animale è 
il principio dell’“adattamento del corpo (Körperan-
passung)”; il principio evolutivo dell’essere umano 
è quello della “disattivazione del corpo attraverso 
strumenti artificiali (Körperausschaltung mittels 
künstlicher Werkzeuge)”» (Alsberg [1937]: 79).
4. L’AUTONOMIA DELLO STRUMENTO
Ciò che fa da ostacolo a una genuina com-
prensione del principio evolutivo dell’adattamento 
esosomatico ora richiamato è, secondo Alsberg, 
una «erronea interpretazione del concetto di stru-
mento» (Alsberg [1937]: 83). Il principale frain-
tendimento è costituito dalla tendenza a concepire 
lo strumento come mera amplificazione o esten-
sione delle capacità corporee. Si è insistito, a suo 
dire, in maniera fuorviante sulla equiparazione tra 
«strumenti» e «organi»: in tale prospettiva i primi 
utensili non farebbero che prolungare il corpo. Il 
bersaglio dichiarato di Alsberg è la filosofia del-
la tecnica di Ernst Kapp (1887), che considera gli 
strumenti una «proiezione organica»: tutto sareb-
be già nel corpo e gli strumenti proietterebbero 
semplicemente gli organi corporei fuori del cor-
po. Vi sarebbe insomma una proiezione incon-
scia dell’organismo negli strumenti tecnici. Una 
interpretazione analoga, che non poteva essere 
conosciuta da Alsberg, è quella di Leroi-Gourhan, 
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il quale, ne Il gesto e la parola, parla dell’utensile 
come di una «vera e propria secrezione del corpo 
e del cervello degli antropiani» (Leroi-Gourhan 
[1964]: 109). Sicché, al paleoantropologo francese 
sembra ovvio «applicare» agli «organi artificiali» 
le stesse norme degli «organi naturali». Ciò che, 
secondo Alsberg, è contestabile nella concezione 
dello strumento come «proiezione d’organo» (e, 
aggiungiamo qui, come «secrezione del corpo») 
è la sua intrinseca tendenza a biologizzare la tec-
nica, a portare gli strumenti dal lato del corpo, a 
incorporarli, e a non distinguere tra organi e stru-
menti: ciò impedisce di comprendere il rapporto 
effettivamente intercorrente tra lo strumento eso-
somatico e il corpo, che non è di mera estensione, 
di semplice prolungamento, bensì di sostituzione, 
anzi, più precisamente, di sostituzione disattivante. 
Nella prospettiva della «proiezione d’organo» vie-
ne cioè occultata la specifica e determinante azio-
ne del mezzo artificiale sul corpo – vi torneremo 
fra breve – e viene conseguentemente preclusa la 
comprensione del processo di ominazione, che ha 
propriamente a che fare con essa.
Serviamoci dell’esempio fornito da Alsberg. Il 
martello, assunto come prototipo dello strumento, 
risulterebbe, nell’ottica di Kapp, «un semplice pro-
lungamento o rafforzamento del pugno» (Alsberg 
[1937]: 83). La prospettiva della «proiezione orga-
nica» potrebbe trovare in questo caso un suppor-
to nel fatto che è il pugno a dirigere il martello e 
che l’effetto del martello può essere inteso «come 
se il pugno fosse prolungato e rafforzato». Ma, a 
ben vedere, il martello non appartiene al pugno 
né, soprattutto, offre una prestazione che potrebbe 
essere compiuta dal pugno: al contrario, il mar-
tello svolge il lavoro «al posto della mano», dun-
que sostituisce e «disattiva» la mano come tale. 
Il limite della teoria kappiana si evidenzia ancor 
meglio allorché consideriamo uno strumento tec-
nico moderno come un calcolatore. Qui ovvia-
mente non potrebbe essere l’azione della mano che 
digita i tasti a venir prolungata o rafforzata, ma 
si potrebbe pensare che lo sia quella del cervello: 
è chiaro, invece, con ancora maggiore evidenza, 
che la macchina entra in funzione «al posto» del 
cervello, «disattivando» il cervello esattamente in 
relazione alla specifica operazione del calcolare 
(come avviene oggi con i navigatori satellitari dei 
nostri smartphone, che sostituiscono e disattivano 
la nostra capacità di orientamento).
Si delinea dunque una diversa concezione del-
lo strumento: esso è un mezzo per la disattivazio-
ne del corpo e può svolgere tale compito proprio 
in quanto si trova fuori del corpo, in una essenziale 
esteriorità e autonomia rispetto a esso. Se diciamo 
che lo strumento è un mezzo «artificiale», è pro-
prio perché è «esosomatico» e agisce «al posto» del 
corpo. Può sembrare incongruo parlare di disatti-
vazione corporea, dato che il corpo è coinvolto nel-
la produzione e – nella gran parte dei casi – anche 
nell’uso dello strumento. Ma occorre opportuna-
mente distinguere qui tra l’azione di fabbricazio-
ne e utilizzo dello strumento, che è compiuta dal 
corpo, e l’azione-operazione per la quale un certo 
strumento è creato e impiegato, che è realizzata in 
proprio da quest’ultimo. Il tipo di prestazione non 
dipende infatti dal grado di coinvolgimento del 
corpo, bensì dal grado di perfezionamento dello 
strumento. E, relativamente alla prestazione forni-
ta, il corpo (in senso ampio: parti, organi, funzioni, 
processi) è sostituito e disattivato. Ciò risulta anco-
ra più chiaro se prendiamo in considerazione le 
attuali tecnologie, il cui funzionamento si è larga-
mente autonomizzato rispetto all’intervento umano 
ed è altamente disattivante.
La fabbricazione e l’utilizzazione di strumenti 
che lavorano al posto del corpo inaugura secondo 
Alsberg una via senza ritorno e una direzione in 
tutti i sensi decisiva. Lo strumento artificiale per-
mette prestazioni che non potrebbero essere otte-
nute soltanto dal corpo e offre enormi vantaggi. 
Per quanto si dispieghi in tutte le sue potenziali-
tà, l’organo corporeo rimane infatti all’interno dei 
confini predeterminati dalla sua struttura, mentre 
lo strumento è suscettibile di uno sviluppo impa-
ragonabilmente più ampio, se non illimitato, e 
porta il corpo oltre i suoi limiti strutturali (non 
possiamo volare con il corpo, ma possiamo farlo 
con gli aerei e in modo da superare tutte le capa-
cità organiche di volo di altri viventi; con gli stru-
menti artificiali possiamo ottenere, in rapporto 
alle pressioni ambientali, risultati del tutto preclu-
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si al nostro corpo e a qualunque altro corpo). In 
sintesi, se si vuole intendere il principio evolutivo 
dell’essere umano e il ruolo della tecnica nell’o-
minazione bisogna, secondo Alberg, sgombrare 
il campo da una equivoca concezione dello stru-
mento, che lo assorbe nell’organo e ne fa un suo 
semplice potenziamento: «definisco “organo” una 
qualsiasi parte, anatomica o funzionale, appar-
tenente alla struttura del corpo, definisco invece 
“strumento” un qualsiasi mezzo esosomatico (arti-
ficiale) con il quale si produce una disattivazio-
ne del corpo» (Alsberg [1937]: 86). L’ambito degli 
strumenti è dunque essenzialmente distinto da 
quello degli organi ed è straordinariamente vasto: 
vi compaiono a giusto titolo tanto i ciottoli scheg-
giati degli ominini di due milioni di anni fa quan-
to gli smartphone di ultima generazione, il fuo-
co deliberatamente acceso e il linguaggio (di cui 
normalmente si tralascia la dimensione di “stru-
mento”), ossia qualsiasi mezzo esosomatico atto a 
disattivare in qualche modo il corpo (e la parola è 
uno di questi).
5. EFFETTI DI RITORNO 
PRETERINTENZIONALI
Messo a fuoco il concetto alsberghiano di 
strumento, possiamo ora tornare sulla azione che 
esso esercita rispetto al corpo, completando gli 
accenni sopra compiuti. Dove conduce la siste-
matica utilizzazione di strumenti «al posto» del 
corpo? A una duplice liberazione: una liberazio-
ne del corpo, la quale implica correlativamente 
una singolare e specifica liberazione dal corpo (il 
termine impiegato da Alsberg, Körperbefreiung, 
contempla entrambi i significati). In primo luogo, 
lo strumento libera il corpo dall’onere dell’adatta-
mento, sollevandolo dal compito di una reazione 
diretta alle sollecitazioni esterne, e soprattutto lo 
libera dai suoi limiti, dagli stretti confini delle sue 
possibilità strutturali (è ciò che inizia ad avvenire 
con l’uso sistematico del ciottolo scheggiato e si 
prolunga fino all’uso degli aerei, del telefono, dei 
computer ecc.). Tale liberazione del corpo com-
porta una corrispondente liberazione dal corpo, 
vale a dire una sua trasformazione in direzione 
di quel «caratteristico stato di indigenza» che ha 
costituito la constatatazione di partenza dell’analisi 
alsberghiana, ossia la carenza: il corpo subisce un 
processo di impoverimento, di perdita delle spe-
cializzazioni e delle capacità di difesa e protezione. 
Sostituito da strumenti artificiali incomparabil-
mente più efficienti, il corpo arretra, si ritira, non 
occupa più un ruolo centrale nell’adattamento, e si 
trova aperto a inedite possibilità di trasformazio-
ne. Alsberg afferma: «L’animale sta sotto il princi-
pio evolutivo della “costrizione del corpo”, l’essere 
umano sotto quello della “liberazione dal corpo”» 
(Alsberg [1937]: 87).
In che consiste e come avviene questa secon-
da liberazione (dal corpo)? Se non vengono uti-
lizzati, gli organi del corpo si atrofizzano e regre-
discono, mentre con l’utilizzo essi si rafforzano e 
si perfezionano: questa è la regola generale richia-
mata da Alsberg. Disattivazione significa dunque 
regressione. Non solo, però. Essa significa anche 
progressione: la costante sollecitazione del corpo 
attraverso gli strumenti provoca infatti una modi-
ficazione fisiologica anche sul versante opposto. 
Prendiamo ad esempio la mano. Se consideriamo 
l’originaria capacità di brachiazione, essa subisce 
una regressione, diventando di gran lunga meno 
efficiente di quella di una scimmia. Se invece con-
sideriamo la destrezza e la versatilità, essa acqui-
sisce un notevole grado di perfezione, con possi-
bilità di manipolazione uniche e completamente 
diverse da quelle dell’arto anteriore di una scim-
mia. Ovviamente, il concetto di perfezione ha qui 
esclusivamente legittimità in relazione allo stru-
mento. Un altro organo con un’evidente tendenza 
regressivo-progressiva è il piede d’appoggio, che fa 
la sua comparsa grazie all’andatura eretta. Con l’u-
so sistematico degli strumenti, la capacità del pie-
de di arrampicarsi sconta un drastico ridimensio-
namento (regressione), trasformandosi però in un 
solido organo d’appoggio (progressione). Anche in 
questo caso, l’acquisizione progressiva è tale sol-
tanto in relazione all’utilizzo degli strumenti.
La disattivazione corporea conseguente all’u-
so degli strumenti plasma dunque il corpo in un 
intreccio mobile di regressione e progressione, con 
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l’atrofizzazione di alcuni organi e funzioni, come 
la dentatura o la brachiazione, e il potenziamento 
di altri. Scrive Alsberg: «La forma del corpo uma-
no si rivela così come una regolata mescolanza di 
formazioni progredienti e regredienti. Nella sua 
dipendenza monocausale dallo strumento questa 
mescolanza è però la migliore dimostrazione che 
si possa pensare per la nostra tesi che l’evoluzione 
umana è stata unicamente determinata dallo stru-
mento» (Alsberg [1937]: 89). Pur con una certa 
unilateralità o ingenuità, dovuta anche allo stato di 
avanzamento della ricerca nel suo tempo, Alsberg 
illustra chiaramente, sebbene non lo teorizzi in 
questo modo, ciò che altrove abbiamo chiama-
to “tecnogenesi preterintenzionale dell’umano” 
(Di Martino [2017]: 105). Quando afferma che la 
carenza, lo stato di indigenza del corpo umano, è 
un «risultato» (Alsberg [1937]: 88) della disattiva-
zione tecnica del corpo, ovvero «un effetto storico-
evolutivo dell’uso di strumenti» (Alsberg [1937]: 
92), egli mostra di aver perfettamente compreso la 
dinamica dell’“effetto di ritorno”.
È alla luce di tale dinamica che viene opera-
ta la duplice messa in questione della teoria della 
carenza da una parte e del paradigma “incremen-
tale” dall’altra. Sul primo lato, bisogna allora affer-
mare non che l’uomo, essendo incapace di soprav-
vivere a causa della sua sprovvedutezza biologica, 
ha dovuto sviluppare la tecnica, ma, al contrario, 
che ha potuto divenire ciò che è, vale a dire un 
essere singolarmente dis-adattato e de-specializ-
zato, e perciò straordinariamente plastico, proprio 
grazie alla tecnica, all’uso degli strumenti e al suo 
effetto retroattivo sull’organismo. In questo senso, 
non è solamente l’uomo che inventa la tecnica, 
ma, nella stessa misura e più originariamente, è 
la tecnica, l’uso degli strumenti, che inventa l’uo-
mo. Per questo, sul secondo lato, non si può ren-
dere conto, nel quadro della teoria dell’evoluzio-
ne, dell’apparizione dell’uomo se non si integra il 
genecentrismo classico, imperniato sul principio 
“mutazione-selezione”, mediante il riconoscimento 
del ruolo attivo degli individui (dei loro compor-
tamenti, delle loro attività, delle loro forme di vita) 
nell’evoluzione, nell’ottica – diremmo oggi – di un 
pluralismo eco-evolutivo e di una considerazione 
del legame tra dimensione biologica e culturale-
comportamentale (nella fattispecie, tecnico-cultu-
rale).
L’idea alsberghiana della «disattivazione del 
corpo attraverso strumenti artificiali», in cui è 
adombrato il principio genealogico dell’effetto di 
ritorno, si potrebbe esprimere oggi, in modo più 
compiuto e scientificamente fondato, nei termi-
ni della teoria della «costruzione di nicchia» di 
Olding-Smee (1988, 2003) e Laland (2003). Con 
essa si indicano quei processi in cui gli organi-
smi, attraverso specifiche attività o comportamen-
ti, giungono a modificare componenti importanti 
degli ambienti in cui vivono, dando luogo a cam-
biamenti che influenzano le pressioni selettive, 
le quali, una volta modificate, agiscono retroatti-
vamente sugli organismi modificandoli (ciò non 
riguarda solo i nostri remoti antenati, ma tutti 
i viventi, sebbene per i primi il fenomeno abbia 
avuto proporzioni e conseguenze immensamen-
te superiori). I processi di costruzione di nicchia 
intervengono sui fattori ecologici che sono alla 
base del meccanismo selettivo, mantenendo una 
certa autonomia rispetto alla selezione naturale, 
rappresentandone cioè non un semplice prodot-
to, bensì anche un agente modificatore. Non pos-
siamo sviluppare qui questo tema, di cui ci siamo 
occupati più da vicino in altra sede (Di Martino 
[2019]).
Dal punto di vista filosofico e per i nostri sco-
pi, decisivo è il principio dell’effetto di ritorno. L’u-
so degli strumenti – che sostituisce il corpo nei 
compiti dell’adattamento – produce effetti retroat-
tivi sugli utenti, sui loro organismi, occasionando 
significative trasformazioni che vanno anzitutto 
nella direzione di una crescente plasticità fisiolo-
gica e neuropsichica, aprendo a sviluppi che non 
erano in alcun modo previsti o prevedibili nelle 
intenzioni degli utenti. Si tratta di conseguenze del 
tutto preterintenzionali, connesse a utilizzazioni 
orientate a tutt’altri scopi, sempre determinati (per 
esempio lanciare, tagliare, nutrirsi, coprirsi ecc., 
se pensiamo ai nostri lontani predecessori). È in 
queste trasformazioni – con la mescolanza rego-
lata di regressioni-progressioni, per usare le paro-
le di Alsberg – che si delinea l’ominazione. Que-
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sto è il punto che si tratta di evidenziare: gli effetti 
dell’uso degli strumenti superano la prospettiva 
del problem-solving; l’agire tecnico, infatti, “torna 
indietro” sugli utenti modificandoli, comporta cioè 
effetti retroattivi autoplastici e preterintenzionali 
sui loro organismi. Ciò non avviene direttamente 
–  come pensava Alsberg –, bensì indirettamente, 
nei termini cui abbiamo accennato: i comporta-
menti “tecnici” modificano l’ambiente, inducendo 
un rilassamento delle pressioni selettive esterne 
che interferisce con la dinamica dei processi evo-
lutivi. Si innesca così un movimento ricorsivo: gli 
organismi modificano gli ambienti da cui sono a 
loro volta modificati.
6. IL CORPO-CULTURA 
Se ci siamo serviti della prospettiva alsberghia-
na è per mettere in evidenza, anche nella sua scia, 
un nodo che ha a che fare con il titolo che ci sia-
mo assegnati. Alla luce del principio genealogico 
dell’effetto di ritorno, in consonanza con il proces-
so di costruzione di nicchia, il fare tecnico-cultu-
rale (la progettazione, la fabbricazione e l’utilizza-
zione di strumenti) si è annunciato come respon-
sabile di conseguenze (autoplastiche e preterinten-
zionali) che interessano il livello bio-evolutivo e 
che portano in primo piano l’intreccio tra processi 
genetici legati alla selezione naturale e comporta-
menti tecnico-culturali. Si tratta di elementi inclu-
si nell’orizzonte della Sintesi Evoluzionistica Estesa 
attualmente in via di elaborazione, che si propone 
di integrare la teoria Standard della Evoluzione 
(Parravicini [2016]; Pievani [2016]). L’uso degli 
strumenti, l’adattamento attraverso il fare tecnico-
strumentale, ritorna – in maniera mediata – sul 
corpo disattivandolo, liberandolo dai suoi limiti, 
perciò anche trasformandolo nel senso accennato. 
Vale a dire: l’uso degli strumenti non si aggiunge 
semplicemente all’organismo, né per compensarne 
le carenze permettendo a esso di sopravvivere né 
come una appendice che ne rafforzi occasional-
mente le prestazioni (com’è per varie specie ani-
mali, che si servono all’occorrenza di strumenti, 
senza che su di essi ricadano gli oneri dell’adatta-
mento).
Al contrario, con l’assunzione della stazio-
ne eretta e la conseguente liberazione – che è più 
propriamente una istituzione – delle mani, l’uso 
degli strumenti configura un adattamento eso-
somatico che tende a sostituire quello somatico 
e interviene nelle dinamiche di costituzione dei 
corpi, concorre al loro divenire umani. Con le 
parole di Alsberg: «nella forma del corpo uma-
no si dovranno trovare, come legittima reazione 
all’utilizzo di strumenti, accanto alle manifestazio-
ni di regresso accertate anche le rispettive nuove 
acquisizioni di tipo progressivo» (Alsberg [1937]: 
88). Si tratta quindi di riconoscere una dimensio-
ne tecnica e culturale dell’ominazione, inseparabile 
dal piano bio-evolutivo: l’individuo umano, il suo 
corpo, viene emergendo e prendendo forma per 
una via che è anche «eso-somatica», grazie cioè 
agli strumenti tecnico-culturali e all’azione retroat-
tiva che questi esercitano su di esso (è così che il 
cranio degli ominini si è ovalizzato, la loro faccia 
si è accorciata, i caratteri del volto si sono ingen-
tiliti, i tempi di maturazione sono diventati più 
lenti, il volume e la plasticità del cervello si sono 
accresciuti, le attitudini socializzanti si sono sensi-
bilmente incrementate ecc.).
Possiamo dunque parlare di una tecnogenesi 
del corpo. Vi è una costituzione “tecnica” e “cultu-
rale” del corpo che ci invita a pensare altrimenti il 
rapporto tra corpo e cultura, corpo e tecnica. Non 
vi è cioè il corpo umano “più” la tecnica o il cor-
po umano “più” la cultura, ma un corpo-tecnica o 
un corpo-cultura: è già tecnico, in se stesso, que-
sto nostro corpo “naturale”, al di qua di qualunque 
attuale ricorso a dispositivi tecnici e a strumen-
ti culturali; la tecnica, la cultura, è infatti entrata 
nel corpo, nella formazione stessa della sua forma 
e, in questo preciso senso, non si aggiunge a esso 
dall’esterno. Siamo originariamente dei cyborg, 
prima ancora di considerare che molti organismi 
umani sono tenuti in vita da oggetti tecnologici 
(come le macchine per dialisi) oppure ospitano 
in se stessi protesi tecniche (da quelle dentarie ai 
bypass ecc.). Abbiamo un corpo tecnico-culturale 
prima di qualunque ricorso a strumenti, poiché è 
anzitutto il corpo stesso a essere “tecnico”, “cultu-
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rale”, vale a dire a portare inscritta nella sua for-
ma l’azione della tecnica e della cultura (Alsberg 
dedica in proposito un intero capitolo alla «retro-
azione del linguaggio sulla formazione del corpo»; 
Alsberg [1937]: 95), grazie alla quale esso è dive-
nuto quello che è, un corpo umano, una sorta di 
paradosso biologico, inadatto alla sopravvivenza, 
de-specializzato e dis-adattato, eccezionalmente 
plastico. Bisognerebbe chiamare qui nuovamen-
te in gioco la strana struttura del supplemento: 
«una possibilità produce a ritardo ciò cui è detta 
aggiungersi», impiegandola per significare la retro-
azione trasformatrice degli strumenti esosoma-
tici e degli abiti tecnico-culturali su quei corpi a 
cui tali abiti e strumenti sono normalmente detti 
aggiungersi.
7. POLITICHE DEL LIMITE
Che non si debba parlare, quanto agli esseri 
umani, di “corpo + tecnica” o di “corpo + cultu-
ra”, ma di “corpo-tecnica” o “corpo-cultura” dice 
qualcosa di particolarmente importante relativa-
mente a un aspetto delle questioni sollevate all’i-
nizio del nostro percorso sul rapporto tra l’uomo e 
la tecnica. Vale a dire: noi non facciamo niente di 
estraneo alla nostra “natura” quando ci esponiamo 
all’azione della tecnica, poiché tale esposizione ci 
ha caratterizzato originariamente, ha plasmato la 
forma stessa dei nostri corpi. L’irruzione della tec-
nica è già da sempre avvenuta, inaugura e accom-
pagna quella deriva “neotenica” che caratterizza gli 
organismi umani, dando luogo alla nostra peculia-
rità fisiologica, neuropsichica e cognitivo-sociale 
(come abbiamo tentato di fare altrove, occorre-
rebbe sottolineare, tra le altre cose, l’inseparabilità 
di socialità e cultura, cioè di cooperazione, cura e 
tecnica, per evitare l’equivoco di una assolutizza-
zione della tecnica quale dimensione unica e isola-
bile del processo bio-tecno-culturale di ominazio-
ne: lo sviluppo di capacità tecnico-culturali è cor-
relata in modo essenziale a un “surriscaldamento” 
della dimensione sociale e a una organizzazione di 
gruppo sempre più strutturata in senso cooperati-
vo; Di Martino [2019]).
L’intrinseco carattere tecnico (o tecnogeno) dei 
corpi dei membri della specie Homo sapiens – che 
motiva l’espressione corpus sive cultura – non ci 
autorizza tuttavia in alcun modo a concludere che 
l’esposizione dei nostri corpi all’azione delle attua-
li tecnologie, con le loro straordinarie possibilità 
di manipolazione, non comporti problemi, non ci 
autorizza cioè a un atteggiamento ingenuamen-
te apologetico né di disinvolta denegazione. Se 
in un certo senso la consapevolezza della “natura 
tecnica” dei corpi ci preserva dalle lusinghe degli 
apocalittici, non ci risparmia però i loro inter-
rogativi, impedendoci di passare, armi e bagagli, 
dal lato degli apologeti. Alla luce di quanto detto 
riguardo alla “liberazione dai limiti corporei”, alla 
de-specializzazione e plasticità che ci caratteriz-
za, occorre sottolineare infatti che agli organismi 
“umani” appartiene anche una peculiare assen-
za di limiti, di prescrizioni istintuali proprie della 
specie, che implica la necessità di una (continua) 
autoposizione di limiti. Gehlen parla in proposito 
di «eccesso pulsionale» e identifica nelle «istituzio-
ni» l’indispensabile argine al potenziale distruttivo 
di quell’eccesso. In analogia con ciò, vi è l’altra sin-
golare e determinante assenza di limiti (che chia-
miamo libertà), cioè la possibilità che l’uomo ha 
di scardinare le condizioni della propria esistenza, 
di venir meno a se stesso, di mettere in atto com-
portamenti distruttivi o “malvagi” (una possibilità 
che non appartiene agli altri viventi; un animale 
non può mai essere “malvagio”, sebbene talvolta 
ci esprimiamo in questi termini, poiché non può 
uscire dai suoi “limiti”: esso non può perpetrare 
ciò che noi definiamo “violenza”, né tantomeno 
quella violenza assolutamente gratuita, puramente 
distruttrice, di cui gli esseri umani sono “capaci”).
Raccordando i due ultimi rilievi, dobbiamo 
allora dire: gli uomini non fanno nulla di estraneo 
alla loro “natura” sia quando si espongono all’azio-
ne della tecnica sia quando pongono a essa, e non 
solo ad essa, dei limiti, dei confini. Il problema del 
limite, anzi, si pone necessariamente a “noi uomi-
ni” e con esso quello della responsabilità. Günther 
Anders lo rimette al centro a suo modo, in chia-
ve apocalittica, denunciando il fatto che nell’epoca 
della terza rivoluzione industriale il poter-fare sia 
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diventato un dover-fare, la possibilità si sia tra-
dotta in ingiunzione: «il possibile è quasi sempre 
accettato come obbligatorio, ciò che si può fare 
come ciò che si deve fare (…) Non solo ciò che si 
può fare si deve fare, ma anche ciò che si deve fare 
è ineluttabile» (Anders [1980]: 11). Tale denun-
cia costituisce un modo paradossale di sollevare 
il problema del limite e della responsabilità, nella 
forma di una rappresentazione della sua impossi-
bilità: ma, nel momento stesso in cui è formulata, 
essa diviene attestazione della capacità del «no», 
del distanziamento e del poter-non-fare.
Che posizione prendere, dunque, rispetto alla 
fattibilità (trasformabilità, manipolabilità) tecnica 
che si rivolge oggi in modo nuovo ai nostri corpi 
(che pure sono originariamente tecnici nel senso 
detto), alle nostre identità? Quando, e dove, col-
locare un limite? Non ci inoltreremo ora in una 
discussione sul tema, ma ci limiteremo ad avanza-
re un principio generale: porre limiti al possibile 
(al fattibile) è anche l’unico modo di salvaguardar-
lo, di tenere aperto l’avvenire dell’uomo e del suo 
corpo tecnico.
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Dal soggetto trascendentale al vivente umano. 
Corpo e artefatti in Helmuth Plessner
Roberto Redaelli
Abstract. The aim of this paper is to reconsider the relationship between living body 
and artefacts in the perspective of Helmuth Plessner’s aesthesiology. According to the 
outcomes of Plessner’s aesthesiology, I present two main theses: 1) artefacts are not 
created, but rather discovered (entdeckt) and expressed by human agency, and 2) the 
bodily dimension of the human being is the condition of the “discovery” of material 
and symbolic artefacts. To argue these theses I highlight a) the process of “somatisa-
tion” that engages the Kantian transcendental model of subject in Plessner’s philosoph-
ical anthropology, b) Plessner’s rejection of the Kantian profile of Uexküll’s theory of 
Umwelt as an application of this transcendental model of subjectivity in the biological 
field, and c) the development in Plessner of a type of transcendental aesthetics, which 
can be linked with S. Crowell’s recent theory of perception.
Keywords. Aesthesiology; Transcendental Aesthetics; Philosophical Anthropology; 
Living Body; Helmuth Plessner.
1. PLESSNER E IL NEOCRITICISMO.  
PER UNA CRITICA DEI SENSI
Gran parte della filosofia neokantiana ha assunto, nel corso del 
Novecento, la veste di filosofia astratta, apriorica, disancorata dal 
piano empirico-concreto, di cui ha indagato le condizioni di possi-
bilità, posando ineluttabilmente lo sguardo oltre la sfera mondana. A 
tracciare tale immagine del neocriticismo ha di certo contribuito la 
nozione di soggetto trascendentale, quale soggettività disincarnata e 
sovraindividuale, astratta immagine del soggetto empirico. Con essa, 
infatti, la dimensione corporea, al pari di quella psichica, è introiet-
tata, per così dire, ingoiata nell’alveo di un soggetto, la cui propria 
Heimat non riposa in seno al movimento proprio della vita1, bensì 
su un piano formale, svuotato di un contenuto suo proprio. Tuttavia, 
accanto al predominio della coscienza trascendentale – predominio 
in gran parte motivato dall’intento di affrancare il soggetto d’indagi-
1 Alla vita e alle sue categorie si riferì, in modo particolare, la filosofia dil-
theyana, che su Plessner esercitò un notevole influsso. Cft. Plessner (1949).
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ne gnoseologica dalle antiche pastoie di qualsivo-
glia forma di psicologismo, biologismo e antropo-
logismo – è possibile scorgere, in alcuni momenti 
del variegato movimento di ritorno a Kant, una 
sorta di resistenza alla riduzione dell’uomo a tale 
soggettività, priva di sangue e carne, dotata – 
secondo la celebre espressione diltheyana – del-
la sola «linfa annacquata della ragione» (Dilthey 
[1883]: LXI).
Accanto a tali resistenze, tra cui occorre ricor-
dare quella di Heinrich Rickert, che, negli ulti-
mi anni del suo magistero, avviò, parallelamente 
all’indagine erkenntnistheoretisch, un processo di 
riabilitazione della dimensione corporea del sog-
getto in seno a una più ampia riflessione antropo-
logica2, si staglia, nello scenario filosofico di ini-
zio Novecento, un peculiare programma teoretico 
che, benché non sia riconducibile nell’alveo del 
neokantianismo, intese integrare l’impianto cri-
tico attraverso una rinnovata riflessione sui sensi 
di carattere trascendentale. Tale programma, che 
assunse la foggia di una estesiologia dei sensi, di 
una critica dell’aisthesis, è stato realizzato, a più 
riprese, da Helmuth Plessner, il cui nome è indis-
solubilmente legato a quel movimento di pensie-
ro che prese forma in area tedesca, alla fine degli 
anni Venti del Novecento, sotto il titolo di Antro-
pologia filosofica3. Ma, benché, Plessner sia ricor-
dato, insieme a Scheler e Gehlen, quale massimo 
rappresentante della Philosophische Anthropologie, 
non si possono dimenticare gli anni di apprendi-
stato trascorsi dal filosofo a Heidelberg, fortezza 
della scuola neokantiana del Baden, e l’influenza 
che tale scuola ebbe sullo sviluppo del suo pen-
siero. Di quegli anni di formazione, in ambito 
biologico e filosofico, spesi al capezzale di Win-
delband e Lask, lo stesso Plessner reca, infat-
ti, memoria nella sua Selbstdarstellung (Plessner 
[1975]: 304-308), così come negli scritti giovanili, 
in cui il confronto con il neocriticismo prima e 
2 Sulla tematica antropologica nella filosofia rickertiana si 
veda, in modo particolare, Rickert (1934): 146-233.
3 Per uno sguardo d’insieme sul movimento di pensie-
ro della Philosophische Anthropologie si confronti Fischer 
(2008).
con la fenomenologia poi informa il ginepraio di 
questioni e problemi che il giovane filosofo stava 
affrontando all’inizio del suo percorso intellettua-
le4. L’influenza esercitata dal neokantismo non si 
arrestò, tuttavia, ai soli lavori giovanili di Plessner, 
bensì raggiunse, seppur forse solo nominalmente, 
anche la sua opera capitale Die Stufen des Orga-
nischen und der Mensch. Einleitung in die philo-
sophische Anthropologie, che si apre, non a caso, 
ricordando gli «anni di studio della zoologia a 
Heidelberg, come allievo di Bütschli e Herbst, 
Windelband e Troeltsch, Driesch e Lask» (Plessner 
[1928]: 3). 
Quegli stessi anni, in cui Plessner fu a con-
tatto con filosofi e scienziati della natura in una 
Heidelberg straordinariamente prolifica dal pun-
to di vista culturale, il cui centro d’attrazione era 
costituito dal Weber-Kreis, lasciano la loro traccia 
nel fitto dialogo che il filosofo seppe intessere con 
l’opera di Kant, il quale costituì un fecondo inter-
locutore lungo il suo intero Denkweg5. Una decisi-
va testimonianza di tale dialogo è offerta dall’opera 
del 1923 Die Einheit der Sinne, in cui è elaborata 
quella estesiologia critica dei sensi che condur-
rà Plessner al lavoro di «fondazione a priori del-
la realtà psicofisica umana» (Rasini [2006]: XIII) 
realizzato nelle Stufen. Questa fondazione, che 
ricolloca al centro dell’indagine filosofica l’uomo 
in carne ed ossa – il vivente umano – si può rea-
lizzare, agli occhi di Plessner, già nello scritto del 
1923, mediante un radicale ripensamento dell’este-
tica trascendentale presentata da Kant nell’impian-
to della prima Critica, ed in particolare mediante 
una reimpostazione del problema dello schema-
tismo trascendentale6. Altrimenti detto, è neces-
sario riformulare la relazione tra piano apriorico 
e materiale a partire dalla normatività intrinseca 
alla stessa sfera dell’aisthesis, che non è riducibi-
le a medium neutrale. Nell’Anthropologie der Sin-
ne (1970), che costituisce il pendant dell’opera del 
4 Tali scritti sono raccolti in Plessner (2015); Plessner 
(2016).
5 Sul ruolo svolto dal pensiero kantiano in seno allo svi-
luppo della filosofia di Plessner si confronti l’istruttivo 
Rasini (2013b).
6 Cfr. Plessner (1970): 30.
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1923, seppur affrancato dal grigiore dell’imposta-
zione kantiana, Plessner libera, infatti, i sensi tan-
to dalla subordinazione all’intelletto, quanto dalla 
riduzione di essi a semplici trasmettitori di infor-
mazioni7, di input, come vorrebbero le scienze 
positive. Differentemente da tali posizioni, in cui 
la dimensione sensibile è, in qualche modo, mar-
ginalizzata rispetto alle funzioni intellettive, per 
il filosofo, i sensi possiedono leggi strutturali, che 
dischiudono determinate possibilità all’uomo e, 
con esse, un mondo a cui è assegnata una pecu-
liare guisa: «nei modi che la nostra organizzazione 
sensibile ci mette a disposizione, nei modi del rap-
portarsi, del percepire, del sentire – scrive Plessner 
– si costruisce una corrispondente fisionomia del 
mondo: esso ha un aspetto, risuona, è palpabile... 
Ciascun senso ha il proprio fondamento ogget-
tuale in ciò che esso e solo esso lascia emergere» 
(Plessner [1970]: 74).
A partire dalla natura normativa8, dalle legalità 
dei sensi, Plessner pone nel cono di luce della sua 
riflessione la dimensione squisitamente corporea 
dell’umano, il suo peculiare avere ed essere corpo, 
nel suo ineludibile intrecciarsi al mondo culturale, 
costituito da artefatti materiali e simbolici. In que-
sto senso, le sue ricerche si collocano legittima-
mente nella scia di quella riscoperta del corpo, e 
della corporeità del soggetto umano che contrad-
distingue buona parte dell’orizzonte filosofico del 
Novecento, tanto che il suo nome può essere asso-
7 Più precisamente, nell’Anthropologie der Sinne, Plessner 
afferma che «il significato antropologico dei sensi non si 
esaurisce evidentemente nelle loro informazioni. Cer-
to sono anche fonti di informazione, cui è per esempio 
rimessa tutta la nostra motricità, che però è molto più 
esposta a disturbi di quella animale in virtù della capacità 
dell’uomo di riflettere sulle proprie membra e su se stes-
so» (Plessner [1970]: 15).
8 Sul carattere normativo dei sensi quale oggetto d’indagi-
ne dell’estesiologia, Plessner in Über die Möglichkeit einer 
Ästhetik precisa che «correttamente intesa dal punto di 
vista metodologico, l’estesiologia dello spirito è allora una 
critica dei sensi così come l’aveva in mente Goethe, criti-
ca e non psicologia, scienza delle possibilità e del signifi-
cato normativo dei sensi nell’ambito dell’attività comples-
sivamente dotata di valore dello spirito umano» (Plessner 
[1925b]: 76).
ciato, com’è stato fatto dallo stesso Plessner nell’o-
pera del 1928, a quello di Sartre e Merleau-Ponty9. 
Ora, della trama ordinata dalle indagini 
plessneriane intendiamo qui restituire le linee 
principali, le fughe, l’intrecciarsi di temi divergenti 
in modo armonico, al fine di mettere in luce quel 
processo di ridefinizione realizzato dal filosofo che 
investe la relazione sussistente tra corpo umano 
e artefatti. A tale ridefinizione, per cui gli artefat-
ti non sono creati dall’uomo bensì, in un senso 
ancora tutto da chiarire, sono scoperti, Plessner 
perviene attraverso un radicale procedimento di 
somatizzazione del modello kantiano del sogget-
to trascendentale, un procedimento che conduce 
a superare la tradizionale dicotomia tra cultura e 
natura, a favore di una ricomprensione unitaria, 
globale dell’umano nel suo essere un vivente dota-
to di un mondo culturale. Come accennato, tale 
ricomprensione avviene, in Plessner, grazie a una 
complessa indagine dedita alla sfera sensibile, i 
cui esiti più fecondi, come vedremo al termine del 
nostro percorso, possono contribuire, nel presente, 
a ripensare il decisivo ruolo svolto dalla corporei-
tà nella costituzione del mondo culturale squisita-
mente umano. 
2. OLTRE LE CATENE NEOKANTIANE  
IN DIREZIONE DEL VIVENTE UMANO. 
PLESSNER E IL SOGGETTO TRASCENDENTALE
Gran parte degli scritti giovanili plessneriani 
sono volti a un serrato confronto con la tradizio-
ne kantiana e neokantiana, ed in particolar modo 
con l’idea di sistema da essa veicolata, ossia, in 
ultima istanza, con la «natura architettonica della 
ragione» (Russo [2000]: 205). Legato al neokan-
9 Nella premessa alla seconda edizione de Die Stufen des 
Organischen und der Mensch, Plessner mette in luce una 
certa continuità tra le proprie ricerche e quelle dei due 
filosofi menzionati: «in Sartre, soprattutto nei suoi primi 
lavori, e in Merleau-Ponty si trovano talvolta delle concor-
danze sorprendenti con le mie formulazioni, così che non 
sono il solo a essermi chiesto se essi non conoscessero I 
gradi dell’organico e l’uomo» (Plessner [1928]: 25). Sulla 
relazione tra le riflessioni plessneriane e quelle svolte da 
Merleau-Ponty si veda il recente lavoro di Coolen (2014).
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tismo fu, tra l’altro, il primo maestro di Plessner 
Hans Driesch, la cui Die Logik als Aufgabe ave-
va ispirato l’opera d’esordio del giovane filosofo 
Die wissenschaftliche Idee. Ein Entwurf über ihre 
Form, che destò da subito l’attenzione di Wilhelm 
Windelband, capofila del neocriticismo baden-
se10. Ma, durante il lungo noviziato in ambito 
filosofico, Plessner non apprese esclusivamente 
l’uso degli strumenti concettuali offerti dal rinno-
vato trascendentalismo kantiano11, bensì guada-
gnò familiarità anche e soprattutto con il metodo 
fenomenologico promosso da Husserl. Di quest’ul-
timo Plessner seguì fedelmente le Vorlesungen a 
Göttingen, progettando di addottorarsi sotto la 
sua egida, con uno scritto dedicato, non a caso, al 
soggetto trascendentale sviluppato da Fichte nella 
Wissenschaftslehre, in comparazione alla forma di 
soggettivismo presentata dalle husserliane Ideen zu 
einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologi-
schen Philosophie. Benché naufragato tale progetto 
– a causa del trasferimento a Friburgo di Husserl, 
dove il filosofo ereditò non solo la cattedra che fu 
di Rickert, ma anche la stima del suo allievo Hei-
degger – Plessner continuò ad apprezzare l’ethos, 
l’attitudine filosofica promossa dalla fenomenolo-
gia, che fu posta al centro, a dire il vero non senza 
problemi, de Die Stufen des Organischen und der 
Mensch, pur volgendo alla svolta idealistica hus-
serliana (di cui il primo volume di Ideen fu por-
tavoce) una chiara rimostranza12. La nozione di 
soggetto trascendentale, comune, seppur con le 
dovute differenze, tanto al neokantismo quanto 
alla fenomenologia, assunse, difatti, agli occhi di 
Plessner, entro alcuni luoghi dell’opera del 1928, i 
contorni di un pallido soggetto, di una marionetta.
10 Per un profilo biografico di Plessner rimandiamo, in 
lingua italiana, a Russo (2000): 519-521; Ruco (2007): 
56-58.
11 Tra tali strumenti vi è di certo una deduzione a priori 
di natura kantiana, di cui il filosofo si avvale nelle Stufen. 
Sulle difficoltà derivanti da tale deduzione si veda la pre-
cisa analisi di Russo (2000): 320.
12 Una lucida analisi della svolta idealistica di Husserl è 
offerta in Bei Husserl in Göttingen (Plessner 1966). Per 
una ricognizione della ricezione plessneriana della feno-
menologia si confronti Rasini (2005).
Alle aporie cui incorre tale tipo di soggettività, 
alla quale si lega non solo il nome di Kant, ben-
sì anche quello di Cartesio, ribatte Plessner – pur 
rimanendo ancorato, almeno fino alla metà degli 
anni Venti, su un terreno, ancora in parte, criti-
cista – attraverso un’indagine che ha per ogget-
to l’organizzazione sensoriale dell’uomo. Tale tipo 
d’indagine, perseguita dapprima ne Die Einheit 
der Sinne, appare fin da subito informata da una 
duplice tensione: da un lato, essa risponde all’esi-
genza goethiana13 di completare, o sarebbe meglio 
dire perfezionare14 l’indagine trascendentale kan-
tiana mediante uno studio, a sua volta trascen-
dentale, dell’aisthesis; dall’altro lato tale teoria può 
perseguire l’obiettivo prefissato solo liberando-
si dalle catene kantiane e neokantiane che asse-
gnano ai sensi un ruolo subalterno nel processo 
cognitivo15. In questo senso, alla rinnovata fedeltà 
all’impostazione critica si accompagna, nell’opera 
plessneriana, un tradimento, consumato principal-
13 Sul profilo goethiano dell’impresa plessneriana riporta 
l’attenzione lo stesso filosofo in Über die Möglichkeit einer 
Ästhetik (Plessner [1925b]: 76). A tale proposito signi-
ficativa è anche la citazione plessneriana della missiva 
goethiana indirizzata a Eckermann in cui il poeta auspi-
ca un’integrazione della filosofia trascendentale kantiana 
mediante un’analisi, a sua volta, trascendentale della sen-
sibilità. Cfr. Goethe (1829): 317-318 e Ruco (2012).
14 Sull’intenzione di perfezionamento dell’idealismo kan-
tiano si cfr. Plessner (1970): 29. Nella Selbstanzeige der 
„Einheit der Sinne“, Plessner descrive il progetto filosofi-
co realizzato nell’opera del 1923 non tanto nei termini di 
perfezionamento, bensì di depurazione del metodo criti-
co: «la tendenza fondamentale del libro è: costruire un’an-
tropologia che permetta di conoscere l’uomo e la natura 
in modo equo e in pieno sviluppo, e depurare il metodo 
critico attraverso la sua piena applicazione» (Plessner 
[1925a]: 72).
15 A proposito del ruolo subalterno dei sensi nel proces-
so cognitivo, Plessner osserva che, «in quanto generico 
“sostrato del pensiero”, delle loro specifiche funzioni si fa di 
tutt’erba un fascio, quasi si trattasse di individuare collabo-
ratori o avversari della componente razionale della cono-
scenza. Una simile prospettiva risulta datata e, in fondo, 
considerata soltanto dal lato dell’interesse conoscitivo uma-
no, facendo perno sulla capacità di astrazione e di ideazio-
ne che consente infine all’uomo di affrancarsi dai sensi e di 
considerarli una qualité négligeable» (Plessner [1970]: 11).
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mente dal filosofo nell’Anthropologie der Sinne, per 
mezzo di un affrancamento dell’estesiologia dalle 
strette maglie del criticismo kantiano. Quest’ulti-
ma opera, infatti, si presenta al lettore nella veste 
di un’antropologia dei sensi, che individua il pro-
prio campo d’indagine nelle «strutture stesse della 
percezione sensoriale» (Plessner [1970]: 9) rela-
te ai modi di agire e operare del vivente umano: 
invero, scrive Plessner, «un’estesiologia dello spiri-
to rende necessaria una teoria della comprensio-
ne che, libera da catene neokantiane, conduca a 
una problematica più ampia: a un’antropologia dei 
sensi. Quali specifiche possibilità ottiene l’uomo 
(come persona) dai suoi sensi, quelli a cui nor-
malmente si affida e da cui dipende?» (Plessner 
[1970]: 21). 
Come appare chiaro già da questi brevi accen-
ni, al centro di tale interrogazione Plessner non 
colloca il soggetto trascendentale, bensì l’uomo in 
carne e ossa, e le possibilità offerte a questo essere 
vivente dai propri organi di senso. Da questo pri-
mato d’interesse per la sfera sensoriale-percettivo 
sorge poi l’esigenza, più volte ribadita da Plessner 
nel suo Denkweg, di fondare la ricerca filosofica 
sul fertile terreno offerto dal sapere biologico16, 
con il cui aiuto è possibile riformulare la questio-
ne antropologica. Tale questione coinvolge, infatti, 
non solo la posizione dell’uomo nel mondo, ben-
sì il mondo stesso, inteso nella duplice veste di 
natura e sfera culturale. Pertanto, la posta in gio-
co chiamata in causa entro la plessneriana critica 
dei sensi non è altro che la possibilità di avere un 
mondo così come esso è dato all’uomo tramite gli 
organi sensoriali, ossia nella forma di un mondo 
visibile, udibile, palpabile, odorabile, gustabile, 
entro il cui spazio possono sorgere le pratiche di 
vita e di sapere tipiche del genere umano. Detto 
16 A proposito dell’importanza della biologia ai fini dello 
sviluppo dell’antropologia filosofica, nelle Stufen, Plessner 
dichiara che «siccome l’uomo è l’essere più sviluppato 
nella scala degli organismi ed è quello che ha raggiun-
to più tardi la sua forma di vita attuale, e poiché tutte le 
sue manifestazioni della vita spirituale poggiano sulle sue 
proprietà corporee, l’antropologia deve avere come infra-
struttura una biologia, sia sul piano filosofico sia su quel-
lo empirico» (Plessner [1928]: 102).
con maggiore precisione, a tale mondo co-appar-
tengono strutturalmente i comportamenti umani, 
il suo operare e gli artefatti che da esso prendo-
no vita sulla base di una correlazione tra spirito 
e natura, la cui definizione rappresenta uno degli 
aspetti più innovativi dell’indagine plessneriana. A 
tale indagine antropologica va, infatti, il merito di 
lumeggiare quella complessa trama che coinvolge 
il «farsi sensibile dello spirito e il farsi spirituale 
dei sensi» (Plessner [1928]: 57), ossia il «sistema 
delle condizioni reciproche interne che domina 
tra le forme simboliche e l’organizzazione fisica» 
(Plessner [1928]: 57), in altre parole, il rapporto 
sussistente tra ciò che è offerto ai nostri sensi e i 
prodotti culturali, e quindi, in ultima istanza, l’i-
stituzione del mondo della cultura a partire dallo 
schema percettivo. 
Ora, seguendo il filo che intesse la trama for-
mata da organi di senso e prodotti culturali, 
Plessner traccia, con una riflessione teoretica di 
straordinaria efficacia, le linee di una estesiolo-
gia della vista, dell’udito, del sistema propriocet-
tivo, alla ricerca di quello che è stato definito da 
Erwin Straus «il senso dei sensi» (Straus [1935]) 
o unità dei sensi, di cui le scienze, agli occhi del 
filosofo, ben poco possono affermare. Ed è proprio 
in seno a questa ricerca, che tocca tanto le diver-
se arti (dalla pittura alla musica fino alla danza) 
quanto le diverse forme di sapere, che emerge la 
cifra del filosofare plessneriano, in virtù di cui, 
già nell’Einheit der Sinne, l’estetica della prima 
Critica è perfezionata – precisiamo ora – attra-
verso il ricorso alla fenomenologia husserliana17: 
alle vuote forme di spazio e tempo, squisitamente 
kantiane, il filosofo sostituisce le modalità senso-
riali, di chiaro sapore husserliano, che rivelano le 
cose stesse. Perciò, nell’inedita Selbstanzeige der 
„Einheit der Sinne“, risalente al 1925, Plessner può 
affermare che «le proprietà strutturali delle cose e 
le modalità della sensorialità si adattano recipro-
camente. La natura senza un occhio che la vede, 
un orecchio che la ascolta non sarebbe effettiva-
mente luminosa, ma possibilmente luminosa, non 
sonora, ma possibilmente sonora. Occhio e orec-
17 Cfr. Plessner (1925b): 76.
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chio come organi del corpo vivente di una per-
sona portano soltanto la condizione dell’obietti-
vazione delle proprietà reali delle cose» (Plessner 
[1925a]: 68-69).
Con tali parole, Plessner, esegue, in un sol col-
po, nell’opera del 1923, secondo quanto presentato 
nella Selbstanzeige, una duplice operazione: ripen-
sare criticamente i sensi, senza cedere alle lusinghe 
intellettualistiche del vuoto formalismo kantiano. 
Questo ambizioso compito è realizzato dal filoso-
fo grazie al riconoscimento di una correlazione, di 
un’intenzionalità tra sensi e sensibilia, tra perce-
zione e percetto, che coinvolge non solo la visio-
ne, bensì l’intera organizzazione percettiva, ossia 
il corpo vivente dell’essere umano, immerso nelle 
sue pratiche di vita. Con un solo gesto, possiamo 
ancora affermare, il filosofo risomatizza il sogget-
to, offrendogli un mondo mediante i sensi. Questo 
mondo non è, però, ridotto a mero prodotto della 
soggettività, bensì esso si presenta al soggetto per 
il tramite dei canali sensoriali, seguendo precise 
leggi estesiologiche. Si può così scorgere, entro le 
pieghe dell’impianto plessneriano, una peculiare 
logica dei sensi, al cui contraltare non si situa un 
materiale amorfo, al quale le regole che soggiac-
ciono alla percezione assegnerebbero una forma, 
bensì un mondo già formato, di cui i sensi rivela-
no la fisionomia: «tanti lati, tanti sensi; ma anche: 
tanti sensi, tanti lati» (Plessner [1970]: 74). Il 
mondo si offre, dunque, al soggetto umano secon-
do un’accordanza, ossia una relazione bilaterale 
tra soggetto e oggetto, in cui, come ben osservato 
da Ruco, «le qualità delle cose sono per Plessner 
le modalità di relazione sensoriale tra la sfera 
soggettuale e la sfera oggettuale e risiedono nelle 
proprietà reali, strutturali delle cose stesse» (Ruco 
[2007]: 16).
Ora, l’introduzione nel discorso filosofico 
di quello che lo stesso Plessner definisce l’aprio-
ri materiale, del quale Kant non possiede concetto 
(Cfr. Plessner [1975]), a cui si accompagna una ria-
bilitazione della dimensione somatica, sensibile del 
soggetto, scardina la nozione di coscienza trascen-
dentale che informa buona parte della riflessione 
filosofica dei primi decenni del Novecento, fornen-
do, al contempo, la base per lo sviluppo di un’an-
tropologia filosofica, quale quella plessneriana, che 
ha come suo fondamento una filosofia della natura 
di carattere evidentemente non idealistico. Solo con 
il passaggio dal soggetto trascendentale all’essere 
vivente si apre, dinanzi allo sguardo del filosofo, 
la via a una considerazione globale dell’uomo che 
possa legittimamente assumere come campo d’in-
dagine tanto i fenomeni limite, quali ad esempio il 
riso e il pianto, quanto la stessa posizione dell’uo-
mo entro il mondo naturale nella veste di organi-
smo tra gli organismi, facendo questione, in ulti-
ma istanza, del suo essere non solo un vivente, ma 
anche e soprattutto un soggetto culturale. 
Quest’ultima foggia dell’umano, il suo essere 
Kulturmensch, emerge già con forza nell’estesio-
logia dei sensi, poiché tra corpo e mente, come 
accennato, vi è un’accordanza, grazie alla quale i 
sensi offrono il materiale e, al contempo, la dire-
zione stessa in cui l’espressione e il senso veicolato 
dall’espressione possano manifestarsi. Più precisa-
mente, le forme culturali hanno il loro differen-
ziale nella materia stessa così come si offre alla 
sensibilità; una materia che non è, dunque, indif-
ferenziata, ossia priva di forma, bensì è già strut-
turata secondo determinate possibilità d’azione. 
Perciò, la cultura, nelle varie fogge in cui si mani-
festa, ha come propria condizione di emergenza il 
piano naturale, la dimensione corporea-percettiva 
dell’umano nella sua interazione con l’ambiente. 
Come vedremo ora, tale assunto conduce, nel ric-
co orizzonte tracciato dalle indagini promosse da 
Plessner, ad una radicale risemantizzazione delle 
sfere naturale e culturale, sottoposte a un focus che 
ne mette in luce l’intima interazione, la quale è 
costitutiva di quella dimensione stratificata e pro-
teiforme del vivente umano che è al centro dell’an-
tropologia filosofica sviluppata dal pensatore.
3. LA POLIFONIA DEL SOGGETTO 
UMANO E IL DESTINO DELLE CATEGORIE 
NELL’ANTROPOLOGIA DI PLESSNER:  
UNA CRITICA ALL’IDEALISMO ZOOLOGICO  
DI UEXKÜLL
L’istituzione plessneriana di uno spazio di 
riflessione – che armonizzi, almeno nelle inten-
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zioni dell’autore, motivi kantiani e fenomenologi-
ci – volto ad indagare l’organizzazione percettiva, 
ridefinisce lo statuto stesso dell’umano: l’uomo è 
soggetto naturale e culturale. Ciò significa che egli 
è parte del regno organico e, al tempo stesso, pro-
duttore di una sfera culturale: il secondo aspetto 
si abbarbica sul fertile terreno dissodato dal pri-
mo. Per tale ragione, possiamo affermare che cor-
po e psiche non sono, secondo il filosofo, due sfere 
ontologiche indipendenti, bensì due aspetti dell’u-
mano legati da una peculiare processualità. Di que-
sta processualità, che esibisce il carattere polifonico 
dell’uomo ne è testimone il destino a cui è piegata 
la nozione di categoria entro le strette maglie della 
trama concettuale intessuta dal filosofo. 
Tale nozione, centrale nella riflessione pro-
mossa da Kant e il neokantismo18, assume, infatti, 
nella teoria a priori dei caratteri organici presen-
tata da Plessner, un’originale veste, per così dire, 
relazionale. Essa non è più una funzione logica 
ascritta all’intelletto, bensì un principio che regola 
il rapporto tra organismo e ambiente: 
“Categoria” significa una forma a cui si adatta 
l’esperienza, ma che non deriva dall’esperienza; una 
forma il cui ambito non si esaurisce con la sfera 
del soggetto, ma si estende alla sfera degli oggetti, 
ragione per cui non solo l’esperienza che si fa degli 
oggetti, ma anche gli oggetti stessi le sottostanno. 
Pertanto le categorie sono forme che non apparten-
gono né soltanto al soggetto né soltanto all’oggetto, 
e che in virtù della loro neutralità permettono 
all’oggetto e al soggetto di incontrarsi. […] tali cat-
egorie avrebbero il valore di funzioni categoriali 
poiché, per quanto non siano né forme derivate dal 
18 A proposito delle categorie nel pensiero kantiano, e 
della loro relazione con la sensibilità, Plessner afferma, 
chiarendo in modo inequivocabile la sua posizione a 
riguardo, che «la ricchezza empirica dell’essere, che nel 
presentarsi e nel modo individuale di presentarsi è indi-
pendente dalla mia soggettualità e oppone resistenza 
alla mia volontà, questo mondo di conseguenza reale, dal 
momento che si manifesta, non differisce dalla media del-
le modalità di manifestazione. Tuttavia in Kant e in tutti 
i kantiani lo faceva. Questi conoscono soltanto spazio e 
tempo, la sintesi figurale e le categorie come presupposti 
soggettuali» (Plessner [1925a]: 67).
mondo che ci sta di fronte né forme imposte a quel 
mondo dal soggetto vivente, esse stabiliscono a un 
tempo la struttura del mondo e del soggetto vivente 
che si inserisce in esso. (Plessner [1928]: 90-91)
Da quanto emerge dalle parole plessneria-
ne, la categoria informa l’interazione tra soggetto 
e oggetto; essa struttura la relazione tra mondo e 
soggetto vivente. Tali categorie assumono, pertanto, 
nella riflessione antropologica sviluppata dal filoso-
fo, secondo la precisa espressione offerta da Russo, 
la veste di «principi metaempirici che sorreggono 
la congruenza, connessione, concordanza, armo-
nizzazione […] tra il vivente e il suo ambiente» 
(Russo [2000]: 326). Così intese le categorie sono, 
dunque, ancora trascendentali, ma in un senso ben 
diverso da quello assegnato loro da Kant e dai suoi 
originali interpreti. Nella declinazione relaziona-
le del categoriale si può, difatti, scorgere il defini-
tivo congedo di Plessner dalle posizioni kantiane 
e neokantiane, che furono presenti, attraverso un 
peculiare processo di naturalizzazione, all’inizio del 
secolo scorso, anche in campo biologico. Un esem-
pio di tale trascendentalismo naturalizzato, con cui 
Plessner si confrontò a più riprese nel corso del 
suo Denkweg, è offerto dalla celebre dottrina della 
Umwelt proposta dal fondatore dell’etologia moder-
na, Jakob von Uexküll. 
Secondo tale dottrina, presentata da Uexküll 
dapprima nella Theoretische Biologie e poi nel 
capolavoro Streifzüge durch die Umwelten von Tie-
ren und Menschen, a ogni specie animale corri-
sponde un ambiente suo proprio articolato in una 
sfera percettiva ed una operativa. Più precisamente, 
organismo e ambiente formano un’unità ben defi-
nita e un circolo funzionale strutturato secondo 
determinate regole, al cui centro si staglia la legge 
stimolo-risposta. Questa teoria, che riconosce un 
inscindibile rapporto di reciprocità tra organismo 
e ambiente, è sposata da Plessner, giacché l’orga-
nismo rappresenta ai suoi occhi «soltanto la metà 
della propria vita […] qualcosa di assolutamente 
bisognoso, che esige completamento senza il quale 
non può sussistere» (Plessner [1928]: 220). 
L’acquisizione da parte di Plessner della teoria 
uexkülliana del mondo-ambiente non è però sce-
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vra da critiche e revisioni. In modo particolare, il 
filosofo non condivide la piega squisitamente kan-
tiana che tale teoria assume: l’ambiente, secondo 
Uexküll, è prodotto dall’organismo animale. La 
teoria della Umwelt mette capo a ciò che è stato 
giustamente definito nei termini di un «solipsismo 
ambientale» (Brentari [2011]: 237), per cui l’aprio-
ri non è una forma del rapporto tra organismo e 
ambiente, come lo è nell’alveo dell’antropologia 
plessneriana, bensì rappresenta «una struttura del 
soggetto animale che solo in un secondo tempo 
verrebbe trasposta o proiettata all’esterno» (Bren-
tari [2011]: 237). In altri termini, nella visione 
uexkülliana, l’animale costituisce il suo ambien-
te, esso è creatore della sua nicchia ecologica. In 
questo preciso senso, si può leggere la biologia 
teoretica proposta dall’etologo nei termini di una 
declinazione in veste naturalistica del trascenden-
talismo kantiano. Infatti, se indiscusso merito del-
la rivoluzione copernicana di Kant è stato l’aver 
esibito il modo attraverso cui gli oggetti si costi-
tuiscono a partire dall’applicazione alla materia 
delle forme soggettive, fine ultimo della biologia, 
secondo Uexküll, è indagare le diverse modalità 
mediante cui i differenti soggetti, sulla base del-
le loro caratteristiche peculiari e dell’interazione 
con l’ambiente, istituiscano essi stessi l’oggettualità 
dinanzi a cui sono posti nella veste di soggetti. 
Ora, data la derubricazione della funziona 
costitutiva dal piano squisitamente categoria-
le, Plessner non può che prendere le distanze dal 
profilo, ancora kantiano, della teoria della Umwelt, 
pur accogliendo la tesi dell’unità organismo-
ambiente. A questo proposito il filosofo scrive 
ne Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch, 
in modo inequivocabile, che «Uexküll non ha 
ragione nel sostenere che “l’ambiente per come 
si rispecchia nel mondo oggettuale dell’animale è 
sempre una parte dell’animale stesso” […] Questo 
è in un certo qual modo idealismo zoologico. Al 
posto di una coscienza creatrice del mondo ver-
rebbe messa un’organizzazione creatrice del mon-
do» (Plessner [1928]: 283). Contro tale idealismo 
zoologico, abbracciato dal «“kantiano” Uexküll» 
(Plessner [1928]: 94), il filosofo fa valere la relazio-
ne bilaterale sussistente tra ambiente e vivente.
Com’è emerso dalla nostra indagine, tale rela-
zione bilaterale è presente, dal punto di vista sen-
soriale, anche nella sfera umana: il modo di dati-
tà del mondo è indissolubilmente legato ai sensi, 
benché non risolto in essi. Difatti, le modalità con 
cui si presenta la sfera mondana corrispondono, o 
forse sarebbe meglio dire si accordano alle moda-
lità con cui l’uomo struttura la propria esperien-
za, pur senza che il mondo sia ridotto a prodot-
to meramente umano, ad artificio. Ciò implica, 
in ultima istanza, un’unità dell’esperienza che ci 
è data tanto dai sensi quanto dallo spirito; unità 
entro la quale il mondo può manifestarsi, pur per-
manendo in un’eccedenza insuperabile. Tuttavia, 
è necessario precisare ora che, secondo Plessner, 
tale correlazione tra organismo e ambiente rea-
lizzata a livello sensoriale non garantisce all’uo-
mo un rapporto stabile con l’ambiente circostan-
te. Per il filosofo, infatti, la posizione eccentrica19 
dell’umano, il suo essere sospeso, a distanza da 
se stesso, decentrato, rende la relazione che sussi-
ste tra organismo e ambiente per lo più instabile, 
incerta, e perciò bisognosa di essere continua-
mente ritemprata e ridefinita mediante diversi 
strumenti, che danno luogo al mondo artificiale 
della cultura. La necessità umana di garantirsi un 
equilibrio (Plessner [1928]: 334) rispetto al mon-
do è, dunque, il movente che spinge questo essere 
vivente non specializzato ad attrezzarsi, divenen-
do un essere naturalmente artificiale: l’uomo «è 
per natura artificiale» (Plessner [1928]: 334) e «la 
19 Sulla nozione di eccentricità, già ampiamente indaga-
ta dalla letteratura secondaria sull’autore, rimandiamo a 
Fischer (2000) e Rasini (2013a). Particolarmente efficace 
è, inoltre, la sintesi della nozione plessneriana di posi-
zione eccentrica offerta da Gehlen in Der Mensch. Seine 
Natur und seine Stellung in der Werlt, per cui «nell’uo-
mo, il centro della posizionalità, sulla distanza dal quale 
rispetto al suo corpo proprio (Leib) si fonda la possibilità 
di ogni datità, acquista distanza rispetto a se stesso. Egli 
perciò sa di se stesso, è osservabile a se stesso e, in que-
sto, è “Io”, il punto di fuga, situato “dietro di sé”, della pro-
pria interiorità, il quale, sottratto a ogni possibile attua-
zione della vita a partire dal proprio centro, costituisce lo 
spettatore di fronte allo scenario di questo campo inte-
riore. È così attuata la scissione in campo esterno, campo 
interno e coscienza» (Gehlen [1940]: 299).
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cultura non è seconda, ma prima natura» (Russo 
[2000]: 375). Ora, questa identificazione dell’u-
mano con l’essere culturale non solleva comunque 
l’umano dal suo essere un organismo vivente, anzi 
possiamo ben dire che la cultura rimane ancorata, 
nell’ottica plessneriana, al sostrato corporeo. L’uo-
mo inadatto ricerca un completamento innaturale, 
senza per questo ridurre l’innaturalità della cultu-
ra a qualcosa di svincolato dalle occasioni conces-
se dalla sua natura e dalla natura in generale, ossia 
dall’ambiente che lo circonda.
Questa dinamica è espressa chiaramente dal-
la prima legge antropologica elaborata dal filo-
sofo in chiusura alle Stufen. Secondo tale legge, 
l’uomo vive, al contempo, come organismo ani-
male nell’immediatezza della natura e come esse-
re eccentrico nella mediazione culturale. Per tale 
duplicità, qualcosa si può dare all’uomo nella veste 
di utensile solo a partire da una ineludibile conti-
nuità con la natura: 
se si crede quindi che le cose del nostro commercio e 
utilizzo ricevano il loro senso pieno, la loro esistenza, 
unicamente per mano del costruttore, si vede solt-
anto mezza verità. Poiché altrettanto essenziale è, per 
il mezzo tecnico di ausilio (e per tutte le produzioni 
e la regolamentazione della forza creativa umana), 
il suo peso interno, la sua oggettività, che appare in 
esso come ciò che può essere soltanto trovato e sco-
perto, non fatto. Ciò che dunque si concretizza nel-
la sfera della cultura mostra il suo essere vincolato 
all’autorialità umana e insieme (nella stessa misura) 
la sua indipendenza. (Plessner [1928]: 344)
In linea con l’abbandono di qualsivoglia sog-
gettività creatrice di stampo kantiano, o, forse 
sarebbe meglio dire, in conseguenza di tale abban-
dono, la cultura non è, agli occhi di Plessner, il 
mero prodotto di un qualche ente che lavora ex 
nihilo: essa non è fatta, bensì trovata e scoperta. 
Ciò significa che il fare umano si abbarbica sulla 
sfera corporea, nel suo intimo legame con l’am-
biente circostante. In questo senso, la mano del 
costruttore è parte di quell’organismo mediante il 
cui schema sensoriale è dato all’uomo un mondo, 
a partire dal quale possono sorgere i suoi saperi 
e il suo operare. Secondo un esempio richiamato 
più volte da Plessner, la geometria non è il risulta-
to esclusivo delle nostre capacità intellettive, bensì 
anche e soprattutto di quelle visive e della nostra 
capacità di orientamento nello spazio. Tale capaci-
tà coinvolge tanto la stazione eretta quanto quella 
mano che si libera dalla locomozione per afferrare 
ciò che dalla vista è dischiuso. Attorno al nostro 
corpo si apre, dunque, un mondo fatto di possibi-
lità ben determinate, di strutture che sono rivela-
te dai nostri organi di senso; un mondo che non 
è il mero risultato della nostra azione, bensì di un 
peculiare incontro, di una correlazione, seppur 
instabile, tra l’uomo e l’ambiente.
4. L’ESTETICA TRASCENDENTALE 
PLESSNERIANA: SCOPRIRE GLI ARTEFATTI, 
SCOPRIRE L’UOMO
Riannodando i fili del discorso fin qui svol-
to possiamo osservare che, secondo la prospettiva 
inaugurata dall’estesiologia plessneriana, gli arte-
fatti si legano al corpo come occasioni che sono 
date all’uomo nel suo commercio intramondano; 
pertanto l’essere umano «deve riconoscere che 
non è stato il loro creatore originario, bensì essi 
sono stati realizzati solo come occasionati dal suo 
fare» (Plessner [1928]: 334). Come abbiamo visto, 
a tale tesi, secondo cui gli utensili, gli strumenti, 
il mondo artificiale della cultura non sono creati, 
bensì scoperti, Plessner può giungere solo median-
te una peculiare operazione teoretica: egli affran-
ca il soggetto dal primato assegnato da Kant alle 
attività sintetiche dell’intelletto, cui erano asser-
viti i sensi, e presenta, in opposizione al soggetto 
trascendentale e alla sua funzione costitutiva, un 
modello di soggettività che non crea un mondo, 
bensì lo accoglie e gli corrisponde originariamente 
mediante la percezione.
A partire da tale posizione, di contro alle teo-
rie spiritualistiche e naturalistiche relative all’an-
tropogenesi, secondo cui, l’uomo «si è, per così 
dire, inventato di sana pianta la cultura» (Plessner 
[1928]: 336] in virtù dell’intelligenza o della 
destrezza, Plessner può legittimamente sostenere 
che «l’uomo non inventa niente che non scopra» 
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(Der Mensch erfindet nichts, was er nicht entdec-
kt). L’oggetto, l’utensile, l’opera d’arte sono scoperti 
dall’uomo. Essi non sono una sua mera produzio-
ne: i mezzi tecnici, così come le creazioni artisti-
che, hanno un peso, un’oggettività che si “distacca” 
dall’agire umano. 
Per Plessner, questa oggettività è data, in ulti-
ma istanza, dalla «correlazione tra l’elemento a 
priori e a posteriori, per come esso in generale 
regola la situazione dell’essere vivente» (Plessner 
[1928]: 344); una correlazione che rinvia, nella 
sfera umana, tanto alla posizione eccentrica quan-
to alla «struttura della realtà cosale» (Plesnner 
[1928]: 345). Esclusivamente sulla base di una tale 
correlazione è realizzabile ciò che il filosofo nomi-
na scoperta, laddove con tale termine egli inten-
de una prestazione espressiva che si appoggia sul 
materiale offerto dalla natura, dal cui fertile terre-
no sorgono tanto la tecnica quanto la cultura qua-
li, per l’appunto, espressioni, forme, mediante cui 
si manifesta un contenuto. 
Come abbiamo visto, a questo contenuto l’uo-
mo ha accesso solo in seno alla dimensione mon-
dana dischiusa dal sistema percettivo. Per tale 
ragione, un’indagine volta all’essenza della tecnica, 
dell’arte, del sapere umano è legittima solo se con-
dotta nell’alveo di una più ampia analisi sui sensi, 
scandagliati nella complessa relazione strutturale 
che li lega al mondo. A un tale tipo di analisi si 
rivolgono gli sforzi teoretici di Plessner, che met-
tono capo a un’estetica trascendentale di ispira-
zione fenomenologica20, con cui è perfezionata la 
riflessione kantiana sui sensi sviluppata nella pri-
ma Critica. Difatti, Plessner sostiene, di contro ad 
ogni sterile formalismo, che l’ambito percettivo sia 
regolato da norme a cui rispondono i contenuti 
intenzionali e che le percezioni trovino il proprio 
fondamento nella relazione corporea che l’umano 
intrattiene con la sfera mondana. Dunque, il corpo 
vivente è coinvolto nell’esperienza sensoriale, nella 
20 È necessario precisare, seppur en passant, che, per 
quanto Plessner si avvalga del metodo fenomenologi-
co entro le sue indagini, egli non abbraccia l’idealismo 
coscienzialistico che per certi versi è riscontrabile nelle 
indagini husserliane a partire dal primo volume di Idee.
rivelazione di un mondo, in cui l’uomo, che è cor-
po ed ha corpo, agisce.
Occorre osservare ora che quest’ultimo carat-
tere dell’uomo in quanto embodied agency, messo 
in luce dalla riflessione plessneriana, è oggigior-
no al centro di un ampio spettro d’indagini che 
si appellano alla fenomenologia al fine di operare 
una rivalutazione della sfera percettiva. Un esem-
pio virtuoso di tale tipo di indagine è offerto dal 
recente studio di Steven Crowell The Normative in 
Perception. In esso, Crowell riconosce alla perce-
zione – a partire dalle celebri riflessioni husserlia-
ne sulla sintesi passiva, ma spingendo la riflessione 
ben oltre di esse – il peculiare statuto di pratica, la 
cui intrinseca normatività non emerge, come vole-
va il padre della fenomenologia, dalla coordinazio-
ne tra kinaesthetic e presentative sensations, bensì 
dal suo «essere ‘fuori per’ qualcosa, dal suo tenta-
tivo di eseguire un compito» (Crowell [2012]: 99). 
Difatti, per Crowell, «pratiche e abilità come cam-
minare attorno a una candela o giocare a tennis o 
scrivere a computer sono competenze corporee che 
non possono essere ridotte a relazioni covarianti 
tra sistemi di fenomeni nella coscienza» (Crowell 
[2012]: 98-99). 
Secondo tale prospettiva, dunque, i nostri 
comportamenti senso-motori non sono guidati 
dalle funzioni intellettive e dalla loro normatività 
logica, bensì hanno il loro terreno d’insorgenza 
in quella dimensione ante-predicativa del corpo 
umano che è strutturalmente relazionata al mon-
do. In questo senso, il modo di essere proprio del 
corpo, non più ridotto a un sistema di sensazioni 
da cui deriverebbe l’embodiment (Crowell [2012]: 
104 n. 32), diviene la condizione d’emergenza del-
la stessa normatività nel campo percettivo, a cui 
segue quella concettuale. Per tale motivo, Crowell 
parla, a ragione, di perceptual practice, di pratica 
percettiva, contraddistinta da fini non necessaria-
mente mediati concettualmente, che orientano le 
nostre abilità, indissolubilmente collegate alla fatti-
cità del corpo (facticity of the body). 
A un tale tipo d’indagine, che pone nel cono 
di luce della sua riflessione la pratica percettiva, 
può contribuire l’estesiologia plessneriana con la 
sua felice integrazione tra teoria della percezione 
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e antropologia filosofica, la quale restituisce all’uo-
mo quella dimensione corporea – l’avere ed esse-
re un corpo – verso cui la stessa fenomenologia 
rivolge lo sguardo ancora nel presente. L’antropo-
logia elaborata da Plessner ha, infatti, l’indiscusso 
merito di lumeggiare le prestazioni dello sche-
ma sensoriale-corporeo che precedono il piano 
concettuale-culturale, mostrando una particolare 
attenzione a ciò che oggigiorno è definito nei ter-
mini di embodied intentionality21. In virtù della 
tematizzazione plessneriana di tale intenzionalità, 
possiamo riconoscere, in seno al tracciato teore-
tico del filosofo, quello spostamento di interesse 
dalla temporalità della coscienza trascendentale 
all’embodiment, che rappresenta, agli occhi di Cro-
well, la cifra della riflessione proposta dalla feno-
menologia esistenziale post-husserliana (Crowell 
[2012]: 84). 
Come abbiamo mostrato, a tale cambiamento 
capitale Plessner può pervenire mediante l’oltre-
passamento del soggetto trascendentale di stampo 
kantiano in direzione del vivente umano, con cui è 
ridefinita la stessa relazione che sussiste tra l’uomo 
e i suoi artefatti. Infatti, nell’alveo dell’antropolo-
gia filosofica plessneriana, tale relazione non assu-
me più la forma di una riduzione degli artefatti a 
meri prodotti dell’azione umana, bensì coinvolge 
quel «mistero della creatività» che «consiste nella 
mossa riuscita, nell’incontro tra l’uomo e le cose» 
(Plessner [1928]: 345). Un incontro attraverso 
cui, possiamo precisare ora, l’essere umano mette 
a nudo non solo le possibilità che gli sono offer-
te dal mondo, bensì se stesso nella veste di sog-
getto senziente e agente. Dunque, secondo il det-
tato plessneriano, scoprire gli artefatti del mondo 
significa scoprire l’essenza stessa dell’umano, ossia 
il suo carattere eccentrico, alla cui base non vi è, 
secondo il pensiero dominante la tradizione filo-
sofica occidentale, la ragione o l’intelletto, bensì il 
corpo e i suoi sensi. 
21 A tale tema è dedicato, a partire da una prospettiva 
plessneriana, il recentissimo testo di M. Wehrle, Being a 
body and having a body. The twofold temporality of embo-
died intentionality (2019).
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The Technical Object and Somatic Thought. 
Theories of Gesture between Anthropology, 
Aesthetics and Cinema
Barbara Grespi
Abstract. This essay explores the lines of thought focused on the relationship between 
gesture and technique, examining the theories which have conceptualized the trans-
fer of gestural matrices into inert matter, and understood technique as a result of this 
process. Although associated mainly with the writings of the palaeontologist André 
Leroi-Gourhan, this thought actually predates his work, and consists of multiple 
branches: having first taken root at the end of the nineteenth century, it became dif-
fused throughout the following decades in different forms. These nevertheless shared 
a constant reference to cinema, both as a privileged place that captures gestures, and 
as a technique that can absorb their quintessence. From Espinas to Simondon, via 
Jousse and Eisenstein, the theory of gestural transmission breaks down various polari-
ties, such as body and environment, organic and inorganic, animated and inanimate, 
performativity and inner life. It foregrounds the imaginative logic of the body and the 
many forms of somatic thinking developed by man. Such forms lie at the heart of the 
creative processes and have found their highest appreciation in cinema, as a machine 
that, from its very origins, has been grafted not only on the eye but on the whole body.
Keywords. Gesture; Film theory; Body agency; Prosthetics; Mimetic.
Technical gesture is the producer of forms, deriving them 
from inert nature and preparing them for animation.
Leroi-Gourhan (1965)
Contemporary neo-animist thought, which attributes life and 
agency to inorganic bodies, from artefacts to technical objects, can 
find possible connections and roots in the philosophical-anthropo-
logical theories of the gesture which emerged in France at the end of 
the nineteenth century and matured midway through the twentieth. 
The main thread of this thought connects Alfred Espinas to Marcel 
Mauss and Marcel Jousse to Leroi-Gourhan, and its various stages 
of development include some of Gilbert Simondon’s most famous 
reflections. Here the gesture is no longer an involuntary, corporeal 
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manifestation of emotional states, but rather an 
interface between a subject and the world, a crea-
tive form of thought that rejects both rationality 
and the dimension of the drive. Being translated 
into an autonomous act of corporeal imagination, 
gesture moves therefore towards the dimension of 
technique, and achives this through a twofold tra-
jectory. The first establishes an apparently reflex-
ive relationship between the two terms, interpret-
ing the gesture as a technique that the body learns 
through different forms of knowledge; the second 
imagines a transitive relationship, maintaining that 
technique is a human gesture transfused into inert 
material.
Let us briefly examine the first, which is the 
more recent and more well known, albeit less rel-
evant to the neo-animist shift. The idea was born 
of a famous essay by Marcel Mauss, Techniques of 
the Body (1936), which focuses for the first time 
on the way in which socio-cultural condition-
ing affects our uses of the body. Mauss asserts the 
ways we use it are never natural, that everything 
is the result of having learned techniques that were 
constructed, historically and culturally, in various 
societies and traditions. These techniques are still 
tied to a biological element, that, while not exact-
ly denied, is nonetheless considered secondary to 
the huge process of re-writing to which bodies are 
constantly subjected, including by the media. The 
pioneer of the French school of sociology thus 
identified a border-space between the biologi-
cal and the social, where an old object – the body 
– becomes new:
The body is man’s first and most natural instrument. 
Or more accurately, not to speak of instruments, 
man’s first and most natural technical object, and 
at the same time technical means, is his body […]. I 
made, and went on making for several years, the fun-
damental mistake of thinking that there is technique 
only when there is an instrument. I had to go back to 
ancient notions, to the Platonic position on technique 
– for Plato spoke of a technique of music and in par-
ticular of a technique of the dance – and extend these 
notions.1
1 See Mauss (1936): 82-83.
The body’s ability is technical precisely because 
it invents, perfects and modifies its own efficient 
acts, using its skills to form «pairs of mechani-
cal elements», as Mauss writes. However, the 
body’s technique is only partially innate, due to 
its exposure to the social: the body is an object 
which is created by culture, and culture models 
its gestures, postures and motorial actions –  and 
not only its mental ones, as one might expect. In 
the «semi-unconsciousness» through which they 
are performed, techniques of the body intersect 
with traditions, and this factor led Mauss to his 
famous definition of technique as «effective and 
traditional actions», where the two adjectives have 
equal importance. His «borderline» science, as it 
has been defined (Karsenti [1998]: 230), consist-
ed in an extensive deconstruction of the apparent 
organicity of corporeal acts with the aim of locat-
ing the convergence point of the various forces 
that condition bodies, and therefore troubling the 
boundary between nature and culture. As Mauss 
writes, the body’s techniques are «physiopsycho-
sociological assemblages of series of actions»2, and 
he identifies three principal factors that compete 
in their formation. In brief: the nerve and mus-
cle synergies made by the body, for physiological 
reasons (the first factor), «engage» (or not engage) 
according to a psychological drive (the second fac-
tor); subsequently they can be reinforced thanks 
to solidarity with the social context (rewarding 
them as virtuous, making them ritualistic, exhib-
iting them, etc.) (the third factor). Such forms of 
recognition and exhibition include, as mentioned, 
media representations –  and especially those cir-
culating through cinema, as Mauss suggests. For 
example, the medium diffused a specific walking 
style for girls, a wavering strut that Hollywood 
screens introduced across Europe in the first post-
War period. Cinema’s role as the great modeler of 
gestures and bodily techniques has recently been 
rediscovered in filmology, in particular by Bulga-
kova (2005) and Blümlinger (2017). The former 
turns to Mauss in order to expand on a post-War 
context, and in particular on the explicit re-edu-
2 See Mauss (1936): 92.
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cation of bodies through film as an essential part 
of the stimulation of democratic thought in post-
Nazi Germany3. The latter focuses on the Tayloris-
tic experiments of Frank and Lillian Gilbreth, who 
created chronophotographs, some even in 3D, of 
the labour gestures that produced minimal energy 
dispersion, in order to model the actions of work-
ers and develop the most productive body tech-
niques possible4.
It is not by chance that the current revival of 
gesture theory was inspired by film studies: if, 
as Vilém Flusser argues, the analysis of gestures 
would necessitate the foundation of an entire dis-
cipline, or rather an inter-discipline that aspires to 
be a «means of orienting ourselves in the circum-
stances in which we found ourselves with respect 
to things and people»5, then it is also true that 
there is a platform where many twentieth-centu-
ry theories of gesture meet and interact, and this 
common ground is represented by cinema itself. 
The success of Giorgio Agamben’s reflections on 
cinemas as the «homeland of the gesture»6 can 
also be explained in terms of this shared percep-
tion, i.e., that cinema is a «stakeholder» in dis-
courses on gesturality; that it is the key instrument 
of its interception, archiving and transmission, 
and therefore also a privileged means to think 
through the gesture and its elusive dimensions.
Some of these nodes emerge more fully in the 
other trajectory where the relationship between 
gesture and technique has developed, thus far put 
aside: the transitive model7. Here, the technique is 
3 The 2005 book is mainly about the Russian context; the 
application of Bulgakova’s research to the German con-
text is presented in Bulgakova (2018).
4 Blümlinger (2017) and Blümlinger, Lavin (2018): 341-
360.
5 See Flusser (1991): 161.
6 See Agamben (1991): 57.
7 The imprint of gesture onto technical tools is different 
from Benjamin’s idea of innervation. According to Ben-
jamin, the nerves that growing through skin and muscles 
tissues so as to permit the transmission of motor impuls-
es to different organs continue their ramifications into 
technical apparatuses, which amplify and externalize this 
process (see Pinotti [2018]: 88). In the transitive theory 
of the gesture, the point is rather the propagation of the 
considered as a human gesture transferred to mat-
ter, a form of worldly intelligence based on imagi-
nation and the production of resemblance, with a 
resulting distribution of agency to things as a pre-
requisite of their animation (we can read this in 
the above epigraph by Leroi-Gourhan; a sign, as 
we will see, of the work that preceded his own). 
The transitive theory of the gesture was developed 
in three phases: the first straddled the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, the second emerged in 
the thirties, and the third in the fifties and sixties. 
It builds on scientific concepts, especially biologi-
cal ones, which enabled theorists to conceive of 
transition first as a bio-chemical reaction of the 
matter, a kind of paradoxical contagion between 
the organic and the inorganic; in a second phase, 
in relation to animal mimicry, a phenomenon that 
destroys the boundaries between the living and 
the inert, between body and environment; and 
finally as the transcendence of the prosthetic into 
the idea of the autonomous machine, a sort of 
sub-species of the human.
The following pages will attempt to reconstruct 
this line of thought, illustrating how it found 
a testbed in cinema. More than any other, the 
medium of the moving image inspired the reac-
tivation of animist thought, which emerged most 
fully in the so-called «lyrosophic» vision of Jean 
Epstein8. The animation of images and of the bod-
ies inscribed within lies at the foundations of this 
notion of cinema-as-technique, one that breathes 
life into the inanimate. However, the transition 
that is infused into such images derives concretely 
from a human gesture, and this can be imagined 
during the camera’s act of creation, according to 
a specific idea of the relationship between man 
and the world. This is why transitive theories of 
the gesture relied on cinema, and why they have 
served to reconsider the medium from an anthro-
pological perspective.
form (and meaning) of a human attitude through tech-
nology.
8 Epstein defines his own reflection on cinema as «lyroso-
phy (lyrosophie)», intending a form of thought that unites 
a rational component with an emotive and affective one.
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1. PRELUDE: PROJECTIONS AND RESONANCES
This discursive field, presenting the gesture as 
progressively absorbed by objects utilized by the 
body, united anthropologists and aestheticians. At 
the end of the nineteenth century, these thinkers 
demonstrated a shared interest in biology, a key 
field that helped to evade the swamps of various 
spiritualisms. The first such thinker was the phi-
losopher and anthropologist Alfred Espinas (1844-
1922), Marcel Mauss’s teacher at the University of 
Bordeaux, friend and colleague of Théodule Ribot 
and promoter of a «scientific» sociology that looks 
at human phenomena from a biological perspec-
tive, searching for the rules of nature that govern 
the actions of men within their social life. Regard-
ing the themes at issue here, Espinas’s volume on 
the origins of technology (1897) is particularly 
relevant. Though predominantly a social history 
of antiquity, the volume also introduces two key 
notions: first, the idea of praxéologie, the study 
of simple and spontaneous human actions that 
are governed by social rules and followed uncon-
sciously; second, the theme of the prosthetic, 
adapted from the German philosopher Ernst Kapp 
– the first to have elaborated this concept in an 
explicit way. In his pioneering Elements of a Phi-
losophy of Technology, Kapp interprets technique 
as a continuation and a projection of limbs, organs 
and senses, from the concave hand as a bowl to 
the neural system as telegraph cables9. This pro-
duced a very important intuition, the full rel-
evance of which Espinas fully understood. Kapp’s 
idea of «projection» represents the first materiali-
sation of the notion of technique as reproduction 
of a form; it meant not only the intensification 
and extension of the body’s functions, but also the 
transfer of a conceptual matrix, from the organic 
to the inorganic. Espinas then adopted Kapp’s key 
concepts, addressing the question from a specific 
slant: emphasizing the unconscious, uncontrolled 
and unacted part of the extension of the body in 
tools. «The tool and the worker are one», Espinas 
9 See Kapp (1877). On his fundamental role to the theory 
of the prosthetic see Somaini (2018).
writes, «the worker uses it like an extended limb, 
barely ever remarking on its structure, nor seek-
ing to understand how its various parts adapt so 
well to their aim» (Espinas [1897]: 45). In use and 
design, the process is therefore «naturally» an imi-
tation, and thus Espinas’s work establishes a first 
idea of the body-machine.
The machine is no longer a projection of the limb’s 
extremities, but of the articulation that unites them 
with each other and with the torso, enabling them to 
be, to act upon each other, to carry out certain move-
ments and to exclude others. A machine is a combi-
nation of rigid and elastic pieces that are put together 
in such a way that the application of force to one part 
of the system produces movement in another, the only 
possible movement, that is perfectly designed for a 
useful objective.10
The same year that Espinas’s Les origins de la 
technologie was published also saw the release of 
De la correlation des sons et des couleurs en art by 
the musicologist Albert Cozanet, under the nom 
de plume Jean d’Udine11. The synesthetic theory 
of art that d’Udine developed in this volume was 
the first step toward his more comprehensive the-
ory of the gesture. It then found a more definitive 
form in L’art et le geste (1910), a very influential 
essay that profoundly conditioned the work of 
Francis Picabia12 and left its mark, as we will see, 
on the work of Sergei M. Eisenstein too. D’Udine 
adapted the notion of the gesture from the work 
of Swiss musician and pedagogue Jacques-Dal-
croze, the father of eurythmics. He moreover 
combined it with the ideas of another key fig-
ure from his education, the doctor and biologist 
Félix Le Dantec, who provided a source of inspi-
ration in particular for his studies of the imitative 
behaviours of protoplasm. D’Udine’s bio-aesthetic 
project covered many of the arts, with the curi-
ous exception of cinema, though the musicolo-
gist had come close in his synesthetic experiments 
–  enough so to invent an apparatus that could 
10 Espinas (1897): 46 (my translation).
11 See D’Udine (1897).
12 Pierre (2002): 102.
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project colours to accompany sounds (Guido 
[2007]: 147). In the chapters of his extensive trea-
tise, however, he addresses sculpture, painting, 
architecture, literature and music, and identified 
the primary role of dance: a naturally synesthet-
ic art since it converts sounds into movements 
of the body according to a rhythmical meaning. 
With Dalcroze, d’Udine believed that the gesture 
was originally born of the body’s immediate reac-
tion to an auditory stimulus, a muscular contrac-
tion that was an instinctive imitation, but which 
could be sophisticated and strengthened through 
specific learning. He hence formulated an initial 
definition of the gesture as human imitation and 
restitution of the natural rhythms of things. This 
however followed Le Dantec’s definition of imita-
tion, i.e., not as a mere reproduction of appear-
ances but rather as resonance, as the result of an 
affinity between two immeasurable systems that 
are harmonized through a shared interface (Le 
Dantec [1902]). The interface is guaranteed by 
the Dalcrozian «muscular sense», a hyper-sense 
which unites all others and which consists in a 
vast, rhythmic memory stored within cells. This 
organic database is accessed every time a gesture 
is used in response to a stimulus, which resonates 
in the colloidal nodes (made of suspended micro-
particles in perpetual movement). Among the 
nodes lies protoplasm, the base material of living 
cells, which reacts to the stimulus by vibrating and 
reproducing the external rhythm in an undulating 
movement. Continual interceptions and transla-
tions of rhythms constitute a physiological ques-
tion that also has significant psychological reso-
nances, therefore inspiring d’Udine to introduce 
a second definition of the gesture: «The gesture 
is the plastic form of our “state of mind”, and not 
only its emanation; it is an integral, essential part 
of it, and constitutes an inseparable rhythm, the 
breadth of which directly influences the intensity 
of our passion»13. Though he strays into the realm 
of expression, d’Udine does not reaffirm the clas-
sical idea of the gesture as a symptom of a pas-
sion located elsewhere (i.e. in man’s unfathomable 
13 D’Udine (1910): 214 (my transl.).
«interiority»); rather he argues that gesture and 
state of mind are two parts of the same rhythmic 
phenomenon. This can find other sensorial trans-
lations including, as he suggests in one of the text’s 
most well-known sections, in colours, volumes or 
words. Indeed, the arts are grafted onto this first 
conversion of rhythm into gesture, after each one 
has retraced a gesture according to its own spe-
cific sensorial modality. The aesthetic process that 
d’Udine describes is therefore similar to a kind of 
contagion, it is a circular chain of intermediated 
transmissions of gestures: the rhythm infects the 
muscular sense and becomes gesture/affect, these 
grow together into an «aggregation of matter»: the 
work. Even though it is inert, the latter can always 
reproduce the original gesture, transferring it to 
other individuals and enabling them to feel the 
same emotion. In this way, the artefact becomes 
a kind of fossil, which contains the «plastic form 
of a state of mind», the creative gesture translated 
and transferred but always ready to be re-activat-
ed. In this way, the visions of the anthropologist 
and the musicologist meet, in the shared idea that 
to create is to model matter according to a gesture, 
projecting onto it a framework which consists in 
a series of rhythmic combinations that identify 
operative models or forms of feeling.
But is it really worth insisting on the latter dis-
tinction? Are there ultimately some gestures that 
are purely technical and serve only to manipulate, 
and others that are essentially expressive, so lim-
ited to externalizing a state of mind in a sympto-
matic or symbolic way? This is one of the most 
elusive questions relating to the gesture, and one 
of the unresolved knots that cinema highlighted in 
a particularly explicit way, not only in film theo-
ry but also through the force of its images. When 
Kubrick portrayed a hominid in the exact moment 
it understands the potential of a dried-out tapir 
bone, creating the first aggressive-defensive tool, 
he used montage to show how the monkey’s ges-
ture is simultaneously an efficient action and the 
expression of a feeling. First the hominid is look-
ing for food, it digs with its back legs but keeps its 
snout close to the carcass to get organic remains 
into its mouth quickly. But then, under the influ-
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ence of the infamous monolith, it stops, it repeat-
edly tilts its head from side to side, as though 
seeking the perfect angle to take in what stands 
before it. It attempts to hold a femur as a club, 
first allowing it to fall languidly to the ground 
two or three times, enough to note the destruc-
tive effect of its impact on the skeleton. In that 
moment, its body has begun to imagine, its arm 
carries out more and more consciously the percus-
sive and violent gesture through its weaponized 
limb, depicted carefully in all of its parts through 
slow-motion (and made triumphant over Strauss’s 
musical notes). In a sense, the use of slow-motion 
transforms the technical object into an expres-
sion, or, perhaps trying to nuance the concept, 
foregrounds the feeling that it accompanies. With-
out doubt it shows that exercising a gesture in all 
its technical functionality introduces an excess 
of some kind: the more precise its execution, the 
more the gesture transcends its performative lim-
its and filters what it affects. As soon as the club 
has been invented, hand and mouth are separat-
ed in an energetic, upward outburst of the body: 
a medium shot becomes a close-up of the mon-
key’s face as it howls and bears its jaws, as though 
the hand gesture has continued into the face, in 
the form of an expression; the mouth express-
es what the hand does; in this sequence we see 
ground zero, the moment in which the two cor-
poreal actions coincide. At the same time, beat-
ing the ground with the club has its own expres-
sivity, determined by the intensity of the blow, its 
frequency and its efficiency. As the monkey beats 
the bone languidly we see its mental condition, 
its state of perplexity and suspension; analogous-
ly the more the impetus grows, the more we see 
aspiration, desire, fury, and the development of 
a dominating posture. In this cult sequence, cin-
ema therefore «thinks», via images, the precarity 
of the confines between technique and expression, 
re-articulating the profound dialectic within the 
human gesture14.
14 In the first decade of the nineteenth century, many 
thinkers discussed the relationship between technique 
and expression, from Wilhelm Wundt – who believed 
2. THEME: REFLEXES AND IMITATIONS
The Kubrickian sequence therefore helps us to 
conceive of how a gesture impressed in an object 
consists in two elements, one performative and 
the other affective, combined in varying propor-
tions. The motif of the composition of gestures 
returned, later, in the work of two extremely dif-
ferent thinkers, as regards their formation and 
contexts: the Jesuit anthropologist Marcel Jousse 
(1886-1961), a student of Mauss that, through 
the latter, had access to Espinas’s philosophy; and 
the director and film theorist Sergei M. Eisen-
stein. Their work makes more explicit the ques-
tion of imitation posed by d’Udine, and achieves 
this returning to the important theme of mimetic 
ability, the irrational basis of which was mean-
while the object of much discussion in the 1930s. 
In 1933, for instance, Walter Benjamin wrote Doc-
trine of the Similar and On the Mimetic Faculty, in 
which he touches a set of questions that Jousse, 
almost contemporaneously, placed at the centre 
of his own anthropological approach, including 
the link between primary gestures in dance and 
cosmic movements, the Wundtian problem of the 
gestural origins of language, the question of ani-
mal camouflage and the mimetic power of infants 
(Benjamin [1933a] e [1933b]). At the same time, 
research on the physiological foundations of the 
psyche was translated into the explosion of reflex-
ology, culminating in the English translation of 
Vladimir M. Bechterev’s volume General Princi-
ples of Human Reflexology (1932), while in France 
the legacy of Théodule Ribot and especially Pierre 
Janet had a strong impact (for example on Henri 
Delacroix and his ideas of automatic imitation as 
«the body’s reflected and undefined plasticity», 
that technique (and especially language) was, on the con-
trary, a by-product of expression (since initially labial 
gestures had been mere expressions) – to Ludwig Klages, 
who saw the expression as a metaphor of the action. Sub-
sequently, Helmuth Plessner absorbed this dialectic with-
in the broad idea of «human eccentricity», a condition of 
existence consisting in being at the same time a body, in 
a body and outside a body, with the consequent split of 
each gesture into technique and affect.
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Delacroix [1927]: 56). At the end of the nineteenth 
century, Janet had explored «the inferior states 
of consciousness» in their ability to highlight the 
body’s automatisms, and shed new light on the 
phenomenon of hysteria (Janet [1889]). Roger 
Caillois, an anthropologist from an entirely dif-
ferent tradition, had begun to study animal mim-
icry from an anti-evolutionist perspective (Cail-
lois [1934]), referring specifically to Janet’s termi-
nology in defining the state of the animal in the 
moment it occurs: psychasthenia (and not the sur-
vival instinct), a psychological condition of aban-
don, the abandon of the Self as it strays into the 
other, an ambiguous pleasure in fusion based on 
cellular mimesis with environmental conditions.
Osmosis between the body and the environ-
ment, as well as the coincidence of somatic chang-
es and affectivity, exhibited so strikingly in ani-
mals, became a point of reference for the gestural 
theories of Jousse and Eisenstein, both of which 
were developed in relation to cinema. Jousse 
elaborated his own anthropological approach to 
the gesture in around a thousand lessons, held 
at l’École d’Anthropologie at the Sorbonne and 
l’École des Hautes Études, between 1931 and 
195715. His courses had a widespread impact, 
defining the mood of that historical moment even 
without ever proving disruptive, instead circu-
lating a form of knowledge that continued to re-
emerge even decades later and in the most dispa-
rate of contexts16. Jousse’s thought was constructed 
around a neologism that sought to appropriate a 
particular form of logic, halfway between imita-
tion and animal mimicry, that informed human 
15 His lectures have been recently digitalized by the Asso-
ciation Marcel Jousse, Paris (Jousse [2002]). At the time 
they were professionally shorthanded, but Jousse never 
wrote them in full before presenting them to students. 
Jousse (1969) provides a collection of his ideas, assem-
bled by his pupils.
16 Jousse was the main reference for artists such as 
Jacques Lecoq, but he also inspired theorists. In Agam-
ben (1991) many of Jousse’s arguments resurface, includ-
ing the juxtaposition between gesture and image, and the 
idea of modernity as a loss of gesture, that is partially 
redeemed by cinema.
gestures. He defined mimism as man’s ability to 
understand the world somatically, assimilating 
her/himself through gestures, a primordial tool 
that was the subject of his most famous sentence: 
«in the beginning was the gesture», a testament, 
moreover, to an unconfessed debt to d’Udine17.
The gesture remained the only tool through 
which man could capture and participate in the 
universe’s extremely intricate network of relation-
ships. It provides a form of somatic18 intelligence 
that advances in phases and makes use of all the 
body’s organs, because, as Pierre Janet –  Jousse’s 
teacher at the Collège de France –  wrote, «we 
think as much with our hands as we do with the 
brain, we think with the stomach, we think with 
the whole body»19. The skeleton serves only to 
«attach» gestures, Jousse writes, while muscles 
and nerves are directly connected to the imitative 
process, since their fibres respond immediately to 
environmental triggers, reflecting them and initi-
ating the mimismologic process. This first neuro-
mimetic phase constituted a reflexological recon-
sideration of the late-nineteenth century question 
of muscular sense, adopting comparisons to the 
animal kingdom, where this process is most fully 
visible. While the animal does not go beyond this 
phase, humans begin a second one, rejeu (replay), 
which consists in a remodelling of the reflex as a 
gesture, a tool through which they reproduce the 
environment in the way they discern it. Only in 
the third phase, formulism, are gestures encod-
17 Considering his familiarity with the Gospel, Jousse may 
have autonomously adapted the verse «In the beginning 
was the word» – though D’Udine had certainly done this 
some decades earlier (1910: 86), reformulating Hans von 
Bülow’s postulate (“In the beginning was the rhythm”), 
making it, as d’Udine said, more precise.
18 Throughout this essay, I prefer to define this form of 
thought as somatic rather than bodily, to foreground the 
body not as an object seen from outside, but in the pro-
prioception of its owner, living through it as a mixture 
of sensations and movements, both of which are central 
factors in gesturality. Doing so, I follow theoretical work 
from the past fifty years in the field of dance, sport sci-
ences and psychotherapy. See Eddy (2009).
19 Jousse quotes this phrase often, for instance Jousse 
(1925): 39.
70 Barbara Grespi
ed and fossilized, losing their vital element and 
becoming simply a code of communication or a 
rhetorical tool. Jousse writes off this degenerative 
moment rather hastily, concentrating instead on 
rejeu as a knowledge of forms. Intercepted and 
extracted from the environment, these forms can 
nevertheless also come back to it: with the crea-
tion of the instrument –  for the first time defined 
here as an extension of a human gesture –  man 
deposits them within matter.
One of these instruments, the most important 
one is cinema. Cinema does not simply extend 
any gesture, but rather the quintessence of the 
gesture, that is, its mismological capacity; hence 
it becomes anthropology’s principle tool20. Cin-
ema is an intelligent machine that thinks by mim-
ing. Humans –  congenitally capable of miming 
– have transmitted to film their gestural abilities, 
or perhaps invented an “imitative” technique that 
prolongs them, therefore simultaneously mak-
ing visible (and studiable) the process that most 
fundamentally characterizes themselves21. Jousse 
insists on the parallelism between cinema and the 
human body: the two «machines» function in the 
same way, since man is «a plastic film camera that 
records and assembles gestures with his own body, 
his own hands, his own ocular musculature»22, and 
cinema is the mechanical translation of this chain 
of impressions and replays, a means of prolonging 
it but also of becoming a part of it («I ask of the 
cinematic technique to provide me with an exten-
sion of my gesture –  nota bene, an extension»23). 
Cinema’s gesture begins with an impression of the 
20 «With cinema, the anthropology of gesture has found 
its instrument», see Jousse’s 26 March 1936 lecture at Sor-
bonne (Jousse [2002]: 269) (my transl.).
21 Jousse dealt with cinema in many of his courses, for 
instance: L’analyse cinématographique du mimisme (12 
December 1932), Les mimogrammes cinématographiques 
(1 April 1935), L’anthropologie et le cinématographe (8 
April 1935), Le livre cinématographique et la science (19 
March 1945), L’anthropologie du mimisme et le cinéma (6 
March 1952). See Jousse (2002).
22 See Jousse’s 5 November 1934 lecture at l’École 
d’Anthropologie (Jousse [2002]: 8).
23 See Jousse’s 26 March 1936 lecture at the Sorbonne 
(Jousse [2002]: 271).
film that is traced out by the energetic waves of the 
real, in the way of our nerve receptors, and it ends 
with montage, a tool of replay, of the creation of 
chains of affinity in which the «environment’s ges-
ticulations» are connected to those of the individu-
al24. Cinema provides the possibility to observe the 
creation of these links: slowing down or accelerat-
ing the flow of film reveals how a gesture passes 
from one being to another. «Today», Jousse writes, 
«thanks to technical and scientific tricks that the 
screen allows, cinema lets us witness that fluid 
passage from one being to another, that gradual 
and imperceptible fusion of a man and an object, 
through which he realizes and ‘makes successive’ 
his own actions and gestures»25.
The nodes that cinema creates – the subtle 
links between the animate and the inanimate, the 
individual and the environment – also inspired 
film theory at that time, with which Jousse entered 
into close dialogue,  even if only indirectly26. The 
most animistic inflection of Jousse’s discourses can 
be found, with incredible precision, in the work 
of Jean Epstein. Epstein considered the use of the 
camera as a rational technique, a «metal brain» that 
thinks through mechanical synapses, thanks to the 
complexity of its inner workings27. Gestures tied 
together on screen create connections and develop 
thoughts, especially when observed at twice the 
speed (the «trick» that Jousse also mentions); this 
makes them visible even when formed by plants or 
stones. Their transit remixes and radically re-artic-
ulates the scale of the various kingdoms, allowing 
us to observe the movement of forms between the 
organic and the inorganic, to see continual transfu-
sions of gestures that in the end are deposited, in 
Epstein’s work too, in objects and tools28.
24 See Jousse’s 1 April 1935 lecture at l’École 
d’Anthropologie (Jousse [2002]: 357).
25 Jousse (1969): 125.
26 Jousse’s lectures were echoed in national newspapers, 
where his approach to cinema is often reported (see for 
instance “Le Monde”, 24 November 1928); however, cin-
ema theorists of his time do not mention him.
27 Epstein (1946): 309.
28 Epstein mentions the laborer’s gesture of screwing-
in and defines it as «moving», because he perceives it as 
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Though Epstein’s anti-physiognomic and anti-
psychological notion of the gesture is unique in 
film theory, the important questions that Jousse 
raises also return in Eisenstein’s last work. In the 
essay Opredeliaiushchii zhest [The Underlying Ges-
ture] (1939-1940), as yet untranslated but summa-
rized by Anna Hedberg Olenina and Irina Schulz-
ki (2018), Eisenstein drafts a general theory of the 
gesture as a fundamental component of pre-logi-
cal thought, a primitive force that structures the 
work of art and models the aesthetic experience of 
its user. He argues that the film image takes root 
in the director’s psycho-physiological gesture, in 
one of his/her specific expressive movements that 
constitutes the somatic embryo of the film, from 
which its chain of images and sounds emerges 
and is broadcast. This perspective is coherent with 
Jousse’s vision of the gesture as a bodily intuition, 
and the impression is further confirmed both in 
an essay written one month before the direc-
tor’s death (Eisenstein [1948]) and in a passage of 
the unfinished volume Metod, in which his early 
reflections on expressive movement are connected 
to the gestures of film direction29. 
In Metod, Eisenstein interprets «the system 
of the creation of images as a superior stage of 
expressive movement, and of its manifestation»30. 
Human gestures find their ideal continuation in 
the creative act, which gives form to the work, 
where giving form itself (in the case of cinema, 
to images) consists in a an out-pouring of body 
matrices that are at the same time manipulative 
and expressive31.
This point is made more clearly in Eisenstein 
(1948), which presents the concepts of mise-en-jeu 
the endpoint of a chain of transmissions (Epstein [1921]: 
100).
29 This essay from the unfinished book Metod (Eisenstein 
[2002]) has been translated into Italian by A. Cervini, 
and included in Eisenstein (2009): 91-119.
30 See Eisenstein (2009): 93 (my transl.).
31 Pietro Montani asserts that «the integral dramaturgy 
of the filmic form finds its germinal cell precisely in the 
biomechanics, in the intrinsically “expressive” movement 
of the anthropologically qualified bios». See Eisenstein 
(2009): 9 (my transl.).
and mise-en-geste (literally, «putting into play» and 
«putting into gesture»). Both of these correspond 
to Jousseian equivalents; however, these terms 
do not refer to the abstract operations of the film 
camera but rather to the concrete work of direc-
tion. Constructing a scene implies making a series 
of directorial decisions that are consistent with the 
initial gestural matrix, but translated into a system 
of relationships between bodies and objects within 
a specific spatial orientation. This conversion of a 
subterranean motif into structures of images cor-
responds to mise-en-jeu: affect, conflictual themes, 
forms of movement, all these become concrete in 
the specific traits of the scene («embodiment in 
action») (Eisentein [2014]). In a way, mise-en-jeu 
re-introduces a corporeal intuition and distrib-
utes it among various environmental factors, and 
in this sense it very much resembles Jousse’s con-
cept of «rejeu». For Eisenstein, the phase of mise-
en-geste, on the other hand, refers exclusively to 
the character, to their choices of movements and 
positions. Here, on the contrary, the specific con-
figuration of the scene must be absorbed and rein-
stated in the body of the actor, whose gestures are 
therefore not motivated on a narrative or psycho-
logical level but, if anything, justified by rational 
«cover stories», not unlike those that hypnotized 
people use to give meanings to their manipulated 
actions. In another contribution, Eisenstein argues 
even more radically for a need for the actor’s 
«auto-hypnosis of the nerves»32, as though the 
ultimate objective of his/her work was something 
similar to mimicry, at a neuro-mimetic level33. 
Moreover, as well as recalling the inferior states 
of consciousness (hypnosis) that, via Janet, were 
of great interest to Jousse, he also makes recourse 
to the phenomenon of animal mimicry in order to 
illustrate the continued interchange, in film itself, 
of gestural material between bodies and environ-
ments. Following d’Udine, whom he cites explicit-
32 Eisenstein (2009): 49.
33 Cf., however, the circularity of this concept in Eisen-
stein’s Montage 1937, in which he presents gesture as the 
concentration of mise-en-scène in a person, and mise-en-
scène as gesture exploding into a spatial sequence (Eisen-
stein [1994]: 21).
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ly34, Eisenstein interprets colour as the translation 
of a gesture, and compares the creation of a film 
as a chromatic surface to the corporeal elaboration 
of colour by the chameleon, which oscillates con-
tinually «from the objective colouring of its sur-
roundings to its objective recreation»35.
Through the work of Jousse and Eisenstein, 
cinema therefore became the principal space for 
interchanges between body and its surroundings; 
its anthropological dimension, as a medium that 
allows man to confront his/her own way of under-
standing the world somatically, therefore emerged 
fully. It is not so much a reinforced eye, but a 
body that imitates and replays, a body that is both 
mechanical and biological thus bringing together 
together the logic of machines and animal behav-
iour, legitimating the movement from organic to 
inorganic, and ultimately presenting gesture as a 
vital form that can animate the inanimate.
3. CODA: EXUDATION AND CRYSTALLIZATION
This brings us to the renowned perspec-
tive of the French palaeontologist André Leroi-
Gourhan, who reinstates an emphasis on tech-
nique in the strictest sense. In the pages of his 
writings, he clarifies the transitive hypothesis, 
though in part deprived of its complexity and 
audacity, since the idea of gesture that he adapts 
is more traditionally operative. Already in work 
written in the forties, the palaeontologist had 
defined the tool as «the exteriorization of an 
efficient gesture»36 as «an interaction of matter 
with the means to transform it»37; in the fifties, 
he began to formulate the concept of the opera-
tional sequence (chaîne opératoire), which would 
then become central to his most important con-
tribution (Leroi-Gourhan [1964-1965]). In this 
work, technique is defined as the interweaving of 
«gestures and tools organized in sequence by a 
34 We find a direct quotation from d’Udine in Eisenstein 
(1949): 150.
35 Eisenstein (2014), digital edition.
36 See Leroi-Gourhan (1943): 319.
37 See Leroi-Gourhan (1945): 333.
true syntax», and this syntax of actions is, for the 
most part, devoid of those irrational components 
that had characterized previous definitions of 
technique, in the thirties. What therefore emerg-
es here is the difference between humans and 
animals: animals use their own bodies, or body 
parts, as tools; man learns to separate the sup-
port and the gesture, increasingly able to transfer 
the latter into an object that is separate from the 
body. «The tool», as Leroi-Gourhan writes, is in 
some way «“exuded” by humans in the course of 
their evolution», thus departing from an animal 
condition of total incorporation, as for the crab, 
whose «claws and jaws are all of a piece with 
the operating program through which the ani-
mal’s food acquisition behavior is expressed»38. 
In the passage from primitive tools to modern 
techniques, the key point is that the gestures of 
which they are descendants are no longer rec-
ognizable. While for machines of the first phase 
of industrialization they were still intuitable, by 
the information revolution (and in digital cul-
ture even more so) the gesture is obscured within 
an operative matrix that is increasingly abstract 
and sophisticated. With the creation of artificial 
memory, the operative programme is entirely 
externalized. As such, new machines become 
autonomous and therefore are denied the sta-
tus of prosthesis (something that beforehand 
was recalled constantly, in the memory of a pro-
longed gesture). Rather they are effectively pro-
moted to the level of thinking bodies, as «some-
thing like a real muscular system, controlled by 
a real nervous system, performing complex oper-
ating programs through its connections with 
something like a real sensory-motor brain»39. 
This conclusion appears coherent with Jousse’s 
and Eisenstein’s anthropo-bio-aesthetics, as the 
proximity between the technical object and the 
animal world is made explicit and noticeable. 
«A biologist», Leroi-Gourhan writes, «will find it 
hard to resist comparing the mechanisms of ani-
mals whose evolution is already completed with 
38 See Leroi-Gourhan (1965): 239.
39 See Leroi-Gourhan (1965): 248.
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these organisms which, in the last analysis, con-
stitute a parallel living world»40. But in the 1960s, 
with the explosion of mediatization, sensibilities 
changed. In this parallel world of tools that were 
no longer dependent on humans, they began to 
be perceived as threatening and conflictual. This 
is clear immediately, for instance, reading the 
observations –  which even then were somewhat 
dated –  that the palaeontologist made about 
cinema, and more generally about audio-visual 
media. As a medium that demands that we listen 
and watch movement, cinema can be accused of 
producing passive forms of perception, penal-
izing man’s imagination and and thinking in his 
place, rather than allowing him to think freely. 
«Audiovisual techniques really seem to represent 
a new stage of human development»41, he writes, 
hypothesizing an anthropological mutation: one 
probably caused by a misunderstanding of the 
idea of the transition of living components to 
objects, but considered rather in terms of their 
theft underwent by man.
In order to find less anxious models that 
maintain the enthusiasm of previous histori-
cal moments, we can look to the work of Gilbert 
Simondon. Here, I limit myself to evoking his 
well-known rehabilitation of the technical object. 
At the end of the fifties, Simondon reinserted 
technique into the circuit of human action, more-
over emphasizing the gesture as a component that 
remains connected to the machine and creating a 
link between man and nature – man’s nature that 
goes beyond pure rationality and ability to oper-
ate, to include somatic and affective thought. His 
work begins with these famous words: 
Culture has constituted itself as a defense system 
against technics; yet this defense presents itself as a 
defense of man, and presumes that technical objects 
do not contain a human reality within them […]. 
The opposition drawn between culture and technics, 
between man and machine, is false and has no foun-
dation […]. Behind a facile humanism, it masks a 
reality rich in human efforts and natural forces, and 
40 See Leroi-Gourhan (1965): 251.
41 See Leroi-Gourhan (1965): 213.
which constitutes a world of technical objects as medi-
ators between man and nature.42
The human reality that exists within machines 
–  defined as «a human gesture fixed and crystal-
lized into working structures»43 –  consists in the 
expression of a certain relationship between man 
and the world, which makes the object beautiful. 
That beauty, however, is naturally not the result 
of design, but dependent on the perception of 
a connection to the real that one is able to redis-
cover. «It is never the object strictly speaking that 
is beautiful», Simondon writes, «it is the encoun-
ter – which takes place about the object – between 
a real aspect of the world and a human gesture» 
(Simondon 1958) (Simondon [2017]: 202). Cinema 
returns within this discourse (even though the part 
of his work dedicated to film is incomplete), and 
in particular it inspires concepts once again, start-
ing with the definition of film as «a psycho-social 
reality» that generates interindividual relationships 
and establishes a new regime in the relationship 
between man and himself. Simondon writes that 
cinema represents «the return of man’s reality to 
man’s knowledge, and of the gesture to conscious-
ness of the gesture»44. We are tempted to perceive 
an echo of the transitive theory of gesture in this 
sentence, even though it is difficult to grasp exactly 
what the philosopher had in mind. This is especial-
ly true in a project constructed on such a complex 
structure, consisting of «Cinema and the Past; Cin-
ema and the Present; Cinema Itself; Cinema and 
the Future» (of these only the first part was writ-
ten). In «Cinema and the Past», Simondon invokes 
various technical gestures made by the machines of 
moving images, and attributes them to the sphere 
of magic. He lingers on the enlargement of forms 
that were made to appear for projective means, 
and concludes that cinema took the place of Greek 
thaumaturgy. His argument is left incomplete, but 
what we can extract from his suggestions, like 
from the theories of the technical gesture in gen-
42 Simondon (1958): 15.
43 Simondon (1958): 18.
44 Simondon (2014): 308 (my transl.).
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eral, is the need for a systematic reconsideration 
of cinema’s gestural dimension, that the digital 
era seems to have rediscovered and enhanced in 
every respect. The gestures represented in films – 
which remodel and often re-invent «natural» ones, 
creating techniques of the body – are in turn the 
result of a filmic gesture, consisting in an interpre-
tation of what was inscribed in the camera in the 
moment of its invention. The director can decide 
whether to support or subvert the implicit «pre-
scriptions of use» of his tool, but his way of gen-
erating images must always be contrasted with the 
indications inscribed in the machine. By following 
the close interweaving of these three forms – the 
cinematographic gesture, the filmic gesture and the 
filmed gesture, it may be possible to reconsider the 
way in which the main medium of the twentieth 
century became grafted, from its very origins, onto 
our bodies.
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Sugli effetti di ritorno della nostra creatività 
tecnica
Elisa Binda
Abstract. The essay aims to reflect on the question about how we become ourselves 
finding an answer in our species-specific technical creativity. By using the reflexions of 
Gilbert Simondon, Lambros Malafouris and Don Ihde, I want to suggest that through 
the modifications imported to the environment by virtue of technical mediations, 
human beings are in the condition of acting upon themselves. Our very technical 
mediations reorganize our cognitive and sensitive experience of the world.
Keywords. Simondon, Techno-Aesthetics, creativity, transduction, Material Engage-
ment Theory, Malafouris, Ihde.
In un breve scritto, datato 8 settembre 1953, il filosofo francese 
Gilbert Simondon ferma sulla carta alcune suggestive riflessioni: trat-
teggia immagini di case alte, un dedalo di pontili, un camion carico 
di operai, la luce che li illumina. Descrive il granito che brilla, lo sci-
sto che si sfalda, un ponte che si inarca da una collina all’altra. Intor-
no a lui, «in armonia», convivono elementi naturali e artificiali. Infi-
ne, conclude: «noi siamo degli esseri naturali che hanno un debito di 
tecnica [τέχνη] per pagare la natura [Φύσις] che è in noi; il germe di 
natura [Φύσις] che è in noi si deve dilatare in tecnica [τέχνη] intor-
no a noi» (Simondon [2014]: 24). Secondo Simondon il legame tra 
essere umano e tecnica è dunque così serrato da assumere la forma 
di un debito; siamo spinti, costretti, a manifestare tecnicamente, al di 
fuori di noi, la nostra natura di essere umani. È in questo movimento 
dall’interno verso l’esterno che si è sviluppato il nostro processo evo-
lutivo il quale ci ha condotto, nel succedersi delle ere, a quella che è 
definita oggi come Antropocene, dove l’azione umana condiziona in 
una forma profondamente inedita gli aspetti strutturali, climatici, 
ambientali, chimici e fisici del mondo in cui si propaga.
In questo contributo intendo considerare in particolare il movi-
mento opposto - e conseguente - a quello dell’esternalizzazione. La 
specie cui apparteniamo, infatti, è tale non soltanto per la sua ten-
denza a prolungarsi esternamente in artefatti, ma perché sussiste un 
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movimento di ritorno, di retro-azione che la modi-
fica e la modella, tanto a livello cognitivo quanto 
sensibile. Siamo diventati noi stessi manipolando 
i nostri ambienti di vita. Secondo questa prospet-
tiva viene a cadere non soltanto la dicotomia tra 
natura e cultura (intesa qui come insieme in cui 
confluiscono tutti i prodotti della creatività uma-
na), ma anche quella tra interno ed esterno. Inten-
do dunque far convergere su questo tema le rifles-
sioni di alcuni studiosi, filosofi e non, più e meno 
recenti. 
1. ESTENDERSI 
È ormai entrata a far parte del senso comu-
ne l’idea che i nostri dispositivi siano una sorta 
di prolungamento di ciò che siamo; riconoscia-
mo come il nostro modo di incontrare il mondo 
sia costantemente mediato da ciò che teniamo 
a portata di polpastrelli o che addirittura indos-
siamo. Queste esperienze possono far riferimen-
to a un complesso di idee di stampo scientifico, 
filosofico, artistico, che si arricchisce sempre di 
più e che cerca di rendere conto di come i nostri 
processi cognitivi, affettivi, emotivi, individuali e 
collettivi, si originino e si estendano in ambienti 
sempre più tecnicizzati. Sul concetto di esterna-
lizzazione inteso come tratto specie-specifico si è 
costruito il lavoro, ormai classico, del paletnologo 
André Leroi-Gourhan. I suoi studi lo portano a 
ravvisare una completa coincidenza tra il proces-
so di ominazione e quello di tecnogenesi, tanto da 
affermare che «il solo criterio d’umanità biologica-
mente innegabile è la presenza dello strumento» 
(Leroi-Gourhan [1957]: 63). È qualcosa di appa-
rentemente “innaturale”, di artificiale, ma che pos-
siede in realtà un carattere radicalmente biotico, a 
permettere di identificare la forma di vita umana. 
Leroi-Gourhan evidenzia come la strada evolutiva 
percorsa dalla nostra specie si sia sviluppata al di 
fuori delle coordinate strettamente corporee: «tut-
ta l’evoluzione umana contribuisce a porre fuori 
dell’uomo ciò che, nel resto del mondo anima-
le, corrisponde all’adattamento specifico» (Leroi-
Gourhan [1964]: 277).
Gli esseri umani non sono semplicemente del-
le creature “naturali” o “biologiche” e non sono 
nemmeno soltanto il prodotto di ciò che definia-
mo “cultura”. Nell’annullamento di questa presun-
ta dicotomia – nel venir meno di polarizzazioni 
imposte, meramente concettuali, tra «“nature” 
and “culture” or “mind” and “matter”» – risiede 
il nostro «mode of being» che, secondo le paro-
le del filosofo della tecnica Don Ihde, può essere 
descritto come un «continuum of human-prosthe-
ses inter-relations» (Ihde-Malafouris [2019]: 196). 
Questo riferimento al concetto di protesi permette 
di sottolineare come lo stretto rapporto tra uma-
no e tecnica sia profondamente iscritto nella sua 
aisthesis, nella sua peculiare sensibilità, in via di 
principio connotata da specifiche qualità – prima 
tra tutte la sua illimitata apertura allo stimolo – e 
capace di prestazioni che la predispongono a pro-
lungarsi in artefatti inorganici (Montani [2014]: 21 
sgg.). A questo proposito, Bernard Stiegler indivi-
dua nella nostra specie una “originaria tecnicità”, 
riconoscendo le protesi non più come «un sim-
ple prolongement du corps humain», ma, piut-
tosto, come ciò che costituisce «ce corps en tant 
que “humain”» (Stiegler [1994]: 162). L’evoluzione 
delle protesi, attraverso le quali la nostra specie 
ha costruito i suoi habitat, ha irrimediabilmente 
condizionato il modo di procedere del nostro arco 
evolutivo; il progresso del non vivente è intercon-
nesso a quello del vivente: «ciò che rimane delle 
attività tecniche è quindi la sola testimonianza, 
accanto ai resti dello scheletro, dell’aspetto pura-
mente umano dell’evoluzione. [...]. In altri termini 
si può considerare uno sviluppo parallelo e sin-
crono degli uomini e dei loro prodotti» (Leroi-
Gourhan [1943]: 19).
È Simondon a trovare un termine per indica-
re efficacemente come la nostra sensibilità sia da 
sempre tecnicamente alterata. In una lettera scrit-
ta, ma mai inviata, a Jacques Derrida nel 1982, 
conia il concetto di tecno-estetica e ne descrive 
i diversi possibili aspetti. La tecno-estetica indi-
ca, innanzitutto, la dimensione fondamentalmen-
te attiva della nostra esperienza, quella che «non 
ha come categoria principale la contemplazione» 
(Simondon [1992]: 34). Gli esempi messi in gio-
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co da Simondon, i quali spaziano dal dipinto della 
Gioconda al martello, passando per chiavi inglesi 
e strumenti musicali, mostrano come nel nostro 
rapporto quotidiano con il mondo la componen-
te pratica, la quale coinvolge in prima istanza il 
nostro complesso senso-motorio1, sia imprescindi-
bile. Il nostro ambiente circostante viene così atti-
vamente riconfigurato attraverso le nostre protesi 
tecniche, le quali ci permettono di cogliere nuovi 
modi di orientarci nell’ambiente. Simondon sot-
tolinea inoltre la presenza di un «piacere» provo-
cato dall’interazione con l’oggetto, il quale si può 
cogliere, ad esempio, nel forgiare o nel lavorare il 
legno, in cui «il corpo dell’operatore dona e rice-
ve» (Simondon [1992]: 34). Il corpo stesso diviene 
in questo senso un’interfaccia, un medium, perfor-
mativamente coinvolto nel suo commercio con le 
cose che lo circondano. Ma è nella parte conclu-
siva della lettera che Simondon giunge a definire 
l’aspetto più radicale della tecno-estetica, dal qua-
le si può ricavare «un altro senso, più primitivo, 
più pienamente corporeo»2: «Il sentimento tecno-
estetico sembra essere più originario rispetto al 
solo sentimento estetico o all’aspetto tecnico con-
siderato semplicemente sotto l’angolazione della 
sua funzionalità, che è penalizzante» (Simondon 
[1992]: 46).
Con queste parole il filosofo giunge ad affer-
mare con chiarezza quanto il nostro modo di 
nascere nel mondo e di farne esperienza sia già 
di per sé tecno-estetico. Ciò significa che la tec-
nica non può essere intesa come qualcosa che si 
aggiunge solo secondariamente a un presunto e 
1 La sensibilità tecno-estetica si può riferire così a quel 
tipo di apprendimento che Francesco Antinucci defini-
sce di tipo senso-motorio, «il sistema cognitivo più fon-
damentale e più antico che abbiamo», il quale sfrutta «il 
costante flusso interattivo con l’ambiente prossimale» 
(Antinucci [2011]: 23).
2 Ritengo molto significativo che nel momento in cui 
Simondon descrive il significato più radicale della nozio-
ne di tecno-estetica, introduca il termine greco aisthesis; 
in questo modo riconduce la parola “estetica” alla sua ori-
gine etimologica la quale indica la sensibilità, la sensazio-
ne. L’estetica non è riferibile soltanto a una teoria dell’ar-
te, per quanto, nel corso della lettera, Simondon indaghi 
brevemente anche questo aspetto.
più primitivo incontro dell’essere umano con il 
suo habitat; non vi è un sovrapporsi successivo 
della tecnica a un rapporto con l’ambiente sem-
plicemente sensibile, corporeo. La sensibilità tec-
no-estetica dell’umano è quindi tale perché è più 
originaria rispetto al solo sentimento estetico (che 
potremmo definire il polo “naturale” della dicoto-
mia natura-cultura) o al semplice aspetto tecnico 
(il polo “culturale”). La nostra aisthesis è da sem-
pre innervata tecnicamente. Utilizzando le parole 
di Merleau-Ponty, uno dei maestri di Simondon, si 
può così riconoscere come «il nostro corpo è sem-
pre altro da ciò che è […] radicato nella natura nel 
medesimo istante in cui si trasforma mediante la 
cultura, mai chiuso in sé e mai superato» (Merle-
au-Ponty [1945]: 271).
L’umano è, secondo Simondon, in grado di 
incontrare la «realtà data» dell’ambiente in cui 
si trova, di organizzarla in «nuove forme», gra-
zie alla sua sensibilità tecno-estetica e a una stru-
mentazione cognitiva altamente plastica e crea-
tiva (Simondon [1958]: 56). Questa produzione 
di «nuove forme», che in misura esponenziale è 
connessa alle nostre mediazioni tecniche, ha, tra le 
sue notevoli conseguenze, quella di dare origine a 
ciò che Simondon definisce un ambiente associato, 
quel tipo di ambiente inedito che l’oggetto tecni-
co istituisce all’interno dell’ambiente nel quale si 
installa. L’ambiente associato è un ambiente rin-
novato, misto, perché composto da elementi natu-
rali e artificiali, condizionato dalla presenza di un 
oggetto tecnico e a sua volta in grado di condi-
zionarne l’evoluzione. Quando Simondon formula 
questa nozione, ci troviamo nel 1958. Gli esempi 
di ambienti associati che il filosofo ha sotto i suoi 
occhi, e cui fa riferimento, sono le ferrovie, le stra-
de, le reti di comunicazione televisiva e la radio. 
Basti ricordare che non era ancora giunta la rivo-
luzione di Internet. Ma oggi? 
Oggi, con l’avvento delle tecnologie digitali, 
di tutti i dispositivi con cui ci interfacciamo quo-
tidianamente, degli schermi che abitano i nostri 
spazi, della Augmented Reality e delle Wearable 
Technologies, siamo totalmente immersi in vasti 
ambienti associati, sempre più complessi. L’intrec-
cio serrato, di cui parlava Simondon, tra aspet-
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ti naturali e tecnici, in cui ci troviamo a vivere, 
può essere definito come un chiasma tra ambienti 
mediali che sono anche media ambientali (Monta-
ni [2015]: 79). È in questo chiasma che si inscrive 
la storia evolutiva della nostra specie.
Alla base di queste considerazioni vi è la con-
vinzione secondo la quale un individuo non è mai 
pensabile senza il suo ambiente. A questo rappor-
to Simondon ha dedicato la sua monumentale tesi 
di Dottorato, nella quale si impegna a mostrare 
come, grazie a questa relazione, tanto l’individuo 
quanto l’ambiente si modifichino mutualmente. 
Il filosofo chiama questa modificazione reciproca 
individuazione. Con questo termine intende indi-
care il processo attraverso cui si origina l’indivi-
duo, ma soprattutto vuole sostenere come esso 
non possa mai essere considerato un’entità defi-
nita, determinata: l’individuo è sempre aperto a 
continui processi di individuazione, potenzialmen-
te infiniti, mai compiuti. La possibilità che questo 
processo sia indefinitamente sollecitato è data dal 
fatto che l’individuo non può mai esistere isola-
tamente: innanzitutto, «ciò che l’individuazione 
fa apparire non è solo l’individuo, bensì la cop-
pia individuo-ambiente» (Simondon [2005]: 34). 
Detto altrimenti, un individuo è tale soltanto per-
ché è implicato in quella serie di rapporti, i qua-
li si instaurano nel momento stesso in cui viene 
a generarsi, che intrattiene con il suo circostante: 
«le effettive proprietà di un individuo risiedono a 
livello della sua genesi e, per questa stessa ragione, 
a livello della sua relazione con gli altri esseri poi-
ché se l’individuo è l’essere in grado di continuare 
sempre la sua genesi, è nella relazione con gli altri 
esseri che risiede il suddetto dinamismo genetico» 
(Simondon [2005]: 124).
Simondon, per far emergere il carattere costi-
tutivo di queste relazioni, prende a prestito un 
concetto dalla fisica, ovvero quello di trasduzio-
ne (transduction). Attraverso questo termine il 
filosofo intende rendere evidente che la relazione 
non può mai essere intesa come ciò che si inter-
pone tra elementi già individuati; la relazione è, 
piuttosto, condizione necessaria alla loro costitu-
zione. Secondo Simondon «individuazione e rela-
zione sono inseparabili; […] non vi è limite tra 
l’individuo e la sua attività di relazione» (Simon-
don [2005]: 170). Siamo esseri di relazione, più 
che esseri in relazione. La relazione è, in altri ter-
mini, occasione di individuazione. Per la specie 
umana, in modo particolare, questa occasione è 
originata dall’interfacciarsi costante con ciò che 
produce: «l’individuo si individua», si modifica, 
«nella misura in cui percepisce altri esseri, agisce 
o fabbrica, è parte del sistema che comprende la 
sua realtà individuale e gli oggetti che percepisce o 
costruisce» (Simondon [2005]: 333).
Queste riflessioni di Simondon ben si accorda-
no con le posizioni teoriche assunte da Don Ihde 
e Lambros Malafouris. I due autori riconoscono 
come la nostra specie, secondo modalità differenti 
rispetto alle altre specie animali, «have been alte-
ring their paths of development by creating new 
material forms and by opening up to new possi-
bilities of material engagement». Ihde e Malafouris 
aggiungono che «we become constituted throu-
gh making and using technologies that shape our 
minds and extend our bodies» (Ihde, Malafouris 
[2018]: 195). La nostra specie è capace di creare 
nuove modalità di interazione con l’ambiente che 
la circonda proprio grazie al ricorso ad artefatti, 
in particolare tecnologici, e questa capacità genera 
effetti retroattivi sulle sue strumentazioni cogni-
tive e sensibili. È proprio su tale movimento di 
ritorno che questo contributo intende ora focaliz-
zarsi.
2. EFFETTO FEEDBACK
In un testo recente, scritto a quattro mani, 
Ihde e Malafouris hanno indagato il peculiare 
tipo di rapporto che lega l’essere umano ai suoi 
artefatti, ciascuno a partire dalle loro prospettive 
di ricerca: Malafouris da studioso di archeologia 
cognitiva e promotore della Material Engagement 
Theory (MET), e Ihde da filosofo della tecnica di 
matrice post-fenomenologica. Formulando una 
Material Engagement Theory, Malafouris intende 
riconsiderare le modalità attraverso cui va inte-
sa la relazione tra umano e materia. Attraverso 
l’idea di un coinvolgimento materiale, e riferen-
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dosi, tra le altre, anche alle riflessioni di Leroi-
Gourhan e di Stiegler, l’archeologo cognitivo 
descrive la nostra evoluzione come intimamente 
connessa con gli oggetti che manipoliamo e che 
produciamo. La nostra struttura cognitiva e sen-
sibile è frutto della nostra evoluzione biologica 
tanto quanto è prodotta e costantemente ricon-
figurata da noi stessi in quanto esseri originaria-
mente tecnici. Il presupposto della MET è che la 
nostra cultura materiale non possa essere intesa 
come semplice sfondo, come contesto nel quale 
siamo immersi, in quanto «things mediate, acti-
vely shape, and constitute our ways of being in the 
world and of making sense of the world. Things 
also bring people together and provide channels 
of interaction. Things envelop our minds; they 
become us» (Malafouris [2013]: 44). Ciò avviene 
in forza di ciò che Malafouris definisce una meta-
plasticità dell’essere umano; il fatto che «we have a 
plastic mind which is embedded and inextricably 
enfolded with a plastic culture – might well be the 
locus of human uniqueness par excellence». È pro-
prio questa caratteristica della nostra specie a ren-
derla «in grado di accogliere l’impatto della tecno-
logia nella sua bio-genesi» (Parisi [2015]: 143).
Sullo sfondo di queste riflessioni sono presen-
ti le teorie dell’Embodiment e dell’Extended Mind. 
Anche grazie alle conquiste teoriche delle neuro-
scienze, supportate da tecniche di Brain Imaging 
sempre più affinate, si è messa in crisi la convin-
zione secondo cui il cervello-encefalo basti a spie-
gare l’intera complessità dei nostri processi cogni-
tivi e affettivo-emotivi. La presenza pervasiva di 
una tecnologia intimamente connessa alla nostra 
vita rende quanto più urgente riflettere sulla «que-
stione della frontiera tra corpo e oggetto, e quel-
la tra corpo e cervello» (Bruner et al. [2016]: 31). 
Al corpo è opportuno riconoscere un’importan-
za fondamentale per la nostra cognizione; esso è 
elemento attivo, ponte delle relazioni tra il nostro 
sistema nervoso e l’ambiente esterno. Si utilizza 
dunque il concetto di incorporazione (Embodi-
ment), per spiegare come nella nostra esperien-
za cognitiva sia necessariamente integrata quella 
corporea, senso-motoria; come scrive Malafou-
ris, «the mind is to be understood as embodied, 
indeed as extended beyond the body, and beyond 
the individual, and as interacting with the things 
of the material world» (Malafouris [2013]: xi). Il 
termine “things” viene qui usato nel suo senso più 
ampio e indica «material forms and techniques 
– it refers to the materiality of mundane objects, 
tool and artefacts as much as it refers to modern 
technologies and new form of digital culture» 
(Ihde, Malafouris [2018]: 196). A una Embodied 
Mind si correla così una Extended Mind: l’ambien-
te, che per la nostra specie, come abbiamo visto, 
«significa innanzitutto cultura e, in particolare, 
cultura materiale, tecnica», diventa una vera e pro-
pria «estensione extra-neurale del nostro sistema 
nervoso» (Bruner et al. [2016]: 32)3.
Come i contributi che compongono questo 
numero di Aisthesis, così anche Ihde e Malafouris 
intendono riflettere su come diventiamo noi stes-
si. Non è il semplice utilizzo di strumenti a fini di 
adattamento a identificarci come specie. Nume-
rosi studi attestano l’impiego, talvolta complesso, 
di utensili nelle altre specie animali. L’accento va 
piuttosto posto sul tipo di relazione che ingaggia-
mo con gli oggetti: «humans are self-conscious 
fabricators that become (ontogenetically and 
phylogenetically) through their creative engage-
ment with the material world» (Ihde, Malafouris 
[2018]: 200). Non si tratta dunque di una sem-
plice interazione, ma di ciò che Malafouris e Ihde 
propongono di definire, con un riferimento alla 
filosofia di John Dewey e alla teoria della Niche 
Construction4, una transaction. Con questo termi-
3 Come scrive Andy Clark, uno dei massimi esponenti 
della teoria della Extended Mind, possiamo distinguere 
«two distinct, but deeply interanimated, ways in which 
biological cognition leans on cultural and environmen-
tal structures. One way involves a developmental loop, in 
which exposure to external symbols adds something to 
the brain’s own inner toolkit. The other involves a persi-
sting loop, in which ongoing neural activity becomes gea-
red to the presence of specific external tools and media» 
(Clark [2003]: 78).
4 Anche la posizione filosofica di Simondon è avvicinabi-
le alle recenti teorie della Niche Construction, gruppo di 
ricerca composto, tra gli altri da F. J. Odling-Smee, K. N. 
Laland e M. W. Feldman. Si tratta di riflessioni che con-
siderano ogni forma di vita come risultato di una co-
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ne sottolineano la necessità di abbandonare qual-
siasi prospettiva di ricerca che consideri individuo 
e ambiente come pre-esistenti alla loro messa in 
relazione. Appaiono immediatamente evidenti le 
somiglianze con il concetto di trasduzione elabo-
rato da Simondon: soltanto riconoscendo il carat-
tere non semplicemente interattivo della relazione 
con il nostro mondo materiale si potranno coglie-
re gli esiti trasformativi che essa produce sugli ele-
menti che pone in rapporto. Perciò, se, grazie alle 
riflessioni fino a qui condotte, abbiamo colto come 
il nostro tratto specie-specifico sia da individuare 
nella nostra tendenza all’“esternalizzazione”, nel 
particolare tipo di rapporto che intratteniamo con 
gli artefatti, è ancor più opportuno comprendere 
che a questo consegue un movimento di “inter-
nalizzazione” il quale genera potenti effetti retro-
attivi che, in un circolo di feed-back, dall’esterno 
ritornano e agiscono sull’individuo.
Simondon è ben consapevole che il nostro 
modo di diventare quello che siamo, di indivi-
duarci in quanto specie umana, si costituisce pro-
prio in questo circolo. In un testo del 1965, inti-
tolato Cultura e tecnica, il filosofo riflette sulla 
tecnica non come mero mezzo, ma come «fase di 
un’attività di relazione tra l’uomo e il suo ambien-
te» (Simondon [1965]: 266). Nel corso di questa 
fase, l’individuo stimola il suo ambiente introdu-
cendovi una modificazione e l’ambiente modificato 
propone e apre a sua volta un nuovo campo d’a-
evoluzione dell’essere vivente con l’ambiente. In particola-
re, la teoria della Nicchia ha constatato non solo che gli 
organismi trasmettono alle generazioni successive i loro 
geni, ma che possono farlo anche attraverso le modifica-
zioni dei loro ambienti. Gli organismi, dunque, non solo 
si adattano all’ambiente, ma in parte lo costruiscono, e 
questa costruzione ha un effetto di ritorno potente sull’or-
ganismo stesso e sui suoi discendenti: «Dal punto di vista 
dei teorici della Niche Construction la corrispondenza 
evolutiva tra organismo e ambiente, cioè l’adattamento 
biologico, andrebbe intesa come prodotta dall’interazio-
ne tra il processo di selezione e il processo di Niche Con-
struction. (...) In pratica gli individui della generazione 
neoformata oltre ad ereditare dalla generazione parenta-
le i geni, erediterebbero anche un ambiente trasformato 
durante la costruzione della nicchia» (Forestiero [2009]: 
269).
zione possibile: «l’energia del gesto tecnico, essen-
do progredita nell’ambiente, ritorna sull’uomo e gli 
permette di modificarsi, di evolvere» (Simondon 
[1965]: 266). Simondon mostra allora come questi 
effetti di ritorno innescati dal gesto tecnico impri-
mano dei risultati sulla nostra esperienza cogniti-
va e sensibile:
tutto avviene come se lo schema corporeo della spe-
cie umana fosse stato modificato, si fosse dilatato, 
avesse ricevuto delle nuove dimensioni, con il livello 
di grandezza che cambia e il sistema percettivo che si 
ingrandisce e si differenzia. Nuovi schemi di intellegi-
bilità si sviluppano, come quando il bambino lascia il 
villaggio e misura l’estensione del suo paese. Si tratta 
di una incorporazione, (…) dell’apparizione di una 
nuova forma vitale. (Simondon [1965]: 269)
L’azione di ritorno esercitata dal gesto tec-
nico è paragonata alle scoperte acquisite da chi 
abbandona la propria casa per aprirsi al mondo; 
essa produce «nuovi schemi di intelligibilità», un 
significativo ampliamento delle nostre prestazio-
ni cognitive, nuove occasioni di apprendimento; 
ma ciò si accompagna ad un’altrettanto signifi-
cativa riconfigurazione delle nostre capacità per-
cettive. La nostra sensibilità risulta trasformata, il 
nostro schema corporeo si dilata e si arricchisce di 
nuove dimensionalità; la nostra «rete percettiva» 
si amplia e si differenzia maggiormente. Queste 
modificazioni incorporate dall’individuo umano 
favoriscono l’insorgenza di nuovi approcci all’am-
biente, di tipo cognitivo e percettivo-motorio. L’e-
voluzione umana e l’evoluzione tecnica si trovano 
in un rapporto di interazione reciproca; in questa 
mutua configurazione ne va anche della modifi-
cazione, dell’ampliamento o, in taluni casi, della 
riduzione del nostro assetto percettivo e sensibile 
che si riorganizza attraverso la relazione con l’am-
biente tecnico nel quale, di volta in volta, si dispie-
ga. Inevitabilmente queste riflessioni richiamano 
un celeberrimo brano di Walter Benjamin, conte-
nuto nella prima edizione del fondamentale testo 
L’opera d’arte nell’epoca della sua riproducibilità tec-
nica: «Nel giro di lunghi periodi storici, insieme 
coi modi complessivi di esistenza delle collettività 
umane, si modificano anche i modi e i generi della 
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loro percezione. Il modo secondo cui si organiz-
za la percezione umana - il medium in cui essa ha 
luogo - non è condizionato soltanto in senso natu-
rale, ma anche storico» (Benjamin [1955]: 24).
Benjamin evidenzia come la nostra percezio-
ne risulti profondamente modificata dai disposi-
tivi tecnici che costituiscono il medium in cui si 
dispiega. La percezione dell’uomo contemporaneo, 
più che in passato, sta in mezzo ad un ambiente 
sempre più tecnicizzato: è di questo che Benjamin 
tiene conto, confrontandosi con il cinema, con la 
radio e con la sempre più vasta industrializzazione. 
Tutti questi dispositivi costituiscono il «medium 
della percezione» che viene «incessantemente con-
figurato, plasmato, modulato, scolpito, da un’Ap-
paratur tecnica in costante evoluzione» (Somaini 
[2013]: 118). Il nostro corpo è dunque «innerva-
to» dai dispositivi tecnici: «l’innervazione è una 
modalità dell’incorporazione in virtù della quale 
medium tecnico e corpo umano cessano di essere 
contrapposti come l’artificiale e il naturale, ma si 
integrano reciprocamente in un complesso protesi-
co funzionale» (Pinotti, Somaini [2012]: 10). 
Questo aspetto di incorporazione presente nel-
la relazione tecnica-umano viene considerato nel 
testo di Malafouris e Ihde attraverso due esempi. Il 
primo, di tradizione fenomenologica, è il bastone 
utilizzato dal non vedente: tale strumento cessa di 
essere un semplice oggetto e diventa parte del sen-
sorio, estendendone l’area tattile; lo schema corpo-
reo dell’individuo si amplia, incorporando lo stru-
mento. Ma si può far riferimento a un modello 
ancor più recente di questo tipo di relazione pro-
tesica: l’Esoscheletro robotico progettato da Miguel 
Nicolelis e dal suo team, il quale ha permesso a un 
ragazzo paraplegico di tirare il calcio d’inizio dei 
Mondiali di Calcio 2014 in Brasile. Si tratta di un 
congegno guidato dalle onde cerebrali in grado di 
restituire dei feedback sensoriali a chi lo indossa 
e che permette di lavorare con pazienti incapaci 
di camminare in conseguenza a paralisi degli arti 
inferiori dovuta a lesioni del midollo spinale in 
seguito a incidenti, cadute o ictus.
Il secondo esempio riportato da Ihde e Mala-
fouris è quello dell’utensile bifacciale acheula-
no, prodotto per primo dall’Homo erectus, usato 
soprattutto per la macellazione e nella lavorazio-
ne del legno. Secondo Malafouris il processo di 
scheggiamento che porta la pietra ad assumere 
quella tipica e simmetrica forma a mandorla, non 
può essere spiegato come risultato di uno schema 
mentale pre-formato che si applica a una mate-
ria inerte. Scheggiare la pietra è piuttosto l’esito di 
un’esplorazione possibile solo grazie alla collabo-
razione, potremmo dire alla relazione trasduttiva, 
tra umano e la «material agency». La creazione di 
questo strumento comporta dunque una cognizio-
ne non soltanto embodied, nella quale il corpo del 
nostro antenato era coinvolto, ma anche extended, 
poiché comprende la pietra stessa: «the stone, like 
the knapper’s body, is an integral and complemen-
tary part of the intention to knap» (Ihde-Mala-
fouris [2018]: 207-208). In questa primitiva esplo-
razione è presente ciò che, grazie alla riflessione 
di Simondon, abbiamo definito un sentimento 
tecno-estetico, considerato anche nel suo aspet-
to di piacere. Ogni colpo dato è in collaborazione 
con una materia che mostra la sua lavorabilità o 
una sua resistenza, che rivela nuove opportunità 
di manipolazione, di coinvolgimento materiale. È 
indicativo che lo stesso Malafouris si riferisca a un 
sentimento: «One of the first things the knapper 
must learn comes from the senses and relates to 
the skill of understanding the qualities of stone as 
formless material-what we might call the “feeling” 
or “tactility” of stone» (Malafouris [2013]: 174). 
Malafouris e Simondon condividono l’inten-
to di opporsi a qualsivoglia posizione teorica di 
stampo ilemorfico. Ne L’individuazione alla luce 
dei concetti di forma e informazione, infatti, il 
filosofo francese avvia la sua riflessione sull’indi-
viduazione proprio a partire da questo punto. L’e-
sempio di cui si serve è quello della produzione 
di un mattone di argilla per il quale non si tratta 
di imporre una forma rettangolare a una mate-
ria semplicemente passiva. L’artigiano avverte le 
potenzialità colloidali dell’argilla, le quali parte-
cipano, tanto quanto il suo apparato cognitivo e 
il suo sentire tecno-estetico, alla creazione di un 
oggetto utile. Lo schema ilemorfico presuppo-
ne e sostanzializza forma e materia, e non coglie 
dunque l’aspetto trasduttivo dell’atto produttivo. 
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L’essere umano, “frequentando” e modellando la 
materia, si modella a sua volta. Attraverso questi 
esempi – che rappresentano alcuni dei casi di ciò 
che Montani definisce empowerment, poiché rea-
lizzano «una singolare unità di organico e inorga-
nico, capace di scoprire se stessa, e le sue potenzia-
lità, solo nel corso di un’effettiva attività» (Montani 
[2017]: 8) – appare dunque opportuno ridefinire i 
confini che separano cervello, corpo e cose.
Ogni giorno siamo continuamente sollecitati 
dalle numerose relazioni che intratteniamo con i 
più disparati dispositivi tecnologici. Viviamo in 
ambienti associati che ci sottopongono costante-
mente a possibili occasioni di individuazione che 
conducono a esiti adattivi, ma anche restrittivi. La 
comprensione del potere trasformativo e poten-
ziale delle nostre esternalizzazioni tecniche sul 
nostro modo di vivere e di abitare il mondo che 
ci circonda è il punto di intersezione tra le rifles-
sioni dei vari autori che sono stati qui conside-
rati. Le mediazioni tecniche prodotte e utilizzate 
dagli esseri umani non possono essere considerate 
come passive o neutrali: esse riconfigurano attiva-
mente ciò che siamo5. Il dualismo che opporreb-
be natura e cultura, come abbiamo visto, perde 
definitivamente di significato, non è infatti in gra-
do di trovare una risposta all’indagine che cerca 
di capire come diventiamo noi stessi: è la nostra 
relazione, il nostro coinvolgimento, con gli arte-
fatti che produciamo e manipoliamo a produrre 
ciò che siamo.
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Devices in Experimentation: The Work of 
Art in a Pragmatist Perspective, between 
Somaesthetics and Techno-aesthetics 
Dario Cecchi
Abstract. John Dewey puts aesthetic experience at the center of his reflection on art 
and beauty, reconsidering it dynamically. Nowadays, this view opened the path to 
somaesthetics, a term coined by Richard Shusterman, and aesthetic anthropology. 
Here, it is argued that the contribution of pragmatist aesthetics could be further devel-
oped by exploring its analogies with techno-aesthetics, a paradigm proposed by the 
French philosopher Gilbert Simondon in the early 1980s. Art occupies accordingly a 
special place within the different forms of aesthetic experience, being considered as 
a way of experimenting the impact of new technologies in the human experience. It 
is a process by which technologies create “devices” for experimenting perception and 
reflection: namely, ways of reconstructing the nature of the human mind in-between 
body and technology, and by means of their interaction. Cinema reconsidered by Dew-
ey’s fellow George H. Mead, offers an exemplary case as both artistic and technological 
devices.
Keywords. Techno-aesthetics; Somaesthetics; Art; Aesthetic Experience; Philosophical 
Anthropology.
INTRODUCTION
Contemporary philosophy, above all pragmatism, is especially 
engaged in rediscovering the meaning and import of bodies to the 
human experience. The formulation of a new paradigm of aesthet-
ics is exemplary of this trend. It is the case for Richard Shusterman, 
who coined the very expression of “somaesthetics” – soma being the 
Greek word meaning “body”. Somaesthetics is symptomatic of some 
of the interests and claims animating the contemporary philosophi-
cal debate. On the one hand, we see the appeal to the reformation 
of aesthetics. As every reformation, Shusterman’s idea of rethinking 
aesthetics as “somaesthetics” is also a way of reconsidering its theo-
retical premises: for aesthetics, according to the idea if his founder, 
Alexander G. Baumgarten, was originally meant to be the doctrine 
of the «sensible or inferior cognition (cognitio sensitiva seu inferi-
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or)». And as far as sentience is concerned (Shaviro 
[2016]), bodies constitute an unavoidable refer-
ence, which still needs to be adequately investi-
gated. The aim of the present paper, however, is 
not to consider the body as an independent entity, 
no matter whether aesthetic or not. Bodies will be 
rather considered here as means for developing 
cultural and cognitive structures, by which data 
are not only gathered but also elaborated.  This 
idea leads to the way Kant reconsidered the theo-
retical status of aesthetics in 1790, with the pub-
lication of the Kritik der Urteilskraft, about forty 
years after Baumgarten’s foundation of aesthetics. 
When speaking of the interrelationships existing 
among understanding (cognition), imagination 
(sense-data elaboration) and feeling (sentience) in 
the formulation of aesthetic judgments, Kant actu-
ally argues, among other things, that the elabo-
ration of experience cannot be isolated from its 
constitution in (Desideri [2011]). In the present 
paper, I argue that pragmatist aesthetics, as this 
latter is theorized by John Dewey, is more con-
sistent with Kant’s insight than what somaesthet-
ics would think; pragmatist aesthetics just puts a 
stronger emphasis on the bodily interaction with 
the surrounding world in the course of experience.
Soamesthetics also argues against any sharp 
and rigid division between popular and eye-brow 
culture. As soon as the emphasis passes in aes-
thetics from old categories, such as contempla-
tion, to the newly considered category of the body, 
the abovementioned distinction between “high” 
and “low” phenomena in culture loses some of 
its legitimacy: for, at any rate, bodies express or 
perform values that cannot be judged according 
to highly spiritualized standards. In other words, 
aesthetic distance, that is, the need for removing 
any direct emotional commitment, is no longer, 
at least not necessarily, a discriminating stand-
ard for judging artworks. Let us take pop music. 
The evaluation of its aesthetic import cannot be 
reduced to melody and lyrics, although these fea-
tures still play a role. Pop music occupies a place 
in our lives, from love to leisure time, which leads 
us to consider its aesthetic value as having creative 
effects to the atmospheres of our everyday life (Di 
Stefano [2017]; Griffero [2016]; Matteucci [2015]). 
However, a charitable interpretation of the prag-
matist criticism of the eye-brow culture should 
lead us to consider the possibility of “re-embod-
ying” the official culture (painting, classic music, 
drama, etc.) into new patterns. This phenomenon 
is well epitomized by the filmic adaptation of nov-
els and dramas. By the way, this was John Dewey’s 
attitude toward art experience.
The common trait of these phenomena is that 
aesthetic experiences address a living body, rather 
than a reflecting mind: for instance, movies ask 
the beholder an identification that goes beyond 
beliefs and opinions and appeals to a virtual 
embodiment into the hero’s deeds (Mead [1926]). 
This is even more relevant to the contemporary 
process of the aestheticization of politics: let us 
only think to the importance given by politicians 
to the bodily appearance – often by means of the 
social media – and its power of creating collective 
identities.
Nonetheless, pragmatism does not usually 
provide an analysis of the body’s nature, rather 
focusing on its agency and performance. Other 
philosophical schools have developed this issue 
at length. Let us only think of phenomenology: 
the interest of this school for the body starts with 
Edmund Husserl’s (1960) distinction between Leib 
and Körper, that is body considered as an organic 
living entity, interacting with the rest of the world, 
and body as a purely physical entity. Or Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty’s (1968) concept of “flesh” (chair), 
which does not correspond entirely to Husserl’s 
Leib, inasmuch the former argues the ontological 
mutual implication of the perceiver’s flesh and the 
world’s flesh within the process of perception. And 
of course, we must consider the approaches which 
are critical of phenomenology, though being 
inspired by it: from Helmuth Plessner’s (1980) 
idea that Leib and Körper are mutually implied 
to Gilles Deleuze’s (2005) belief that the most sig-
nificant experience with which painting could ever 
supply its beholder, as happens in Francis Bacon’s 
art, is not the “flesh of the world” but rather the 
inorganic and dead-like character of reality, its 
being “meat” (viande).
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Such insight into the nature of the human 
body is likely to be found in pragmatism: its 
interest being rather the interaction between the 
world and us. Of course, this interaction finds in 
the body its unavoidable means. But, behind the 
emphasis on interaction, pragmatism seems to be 
more interested in its expressive, rather than its 
receptive agency: on how it exposes the state of 
the mind outside, rather than how it configurates 
it inside, in accordance with the object of experi-
ence. Expression is, of course, not addressed to 
any special target, but refers to the configuration 
of the expressive self as such. In the pragmatist 
perspective defended by Dewey, this is the very 
target of expression in aesthetic experiences: not 
this or that object, but the general address of the 
“live creatures” to their surrounding environments 
considered (in general) as the means of their life. 
According to some accounts, this is a reference 
to the biological survival of the species (Ottobre 
[2012]) or the psychological condition of the self 
(Alexander [1987]). To Dewey, however, there is 
a difference between the bare discharge of a bio-
logical need through a bodily “motion” and the 
embodied expression of an “emotion”. Both refer 
to life, though at different degrees and stages.
Nonetheless, somaesthetics tends to overlap 
motion and emotion. But if my approach is right, 
the aim of pragmatist aesthetics is rather to under-
stand why emotion is able to absorb and reshape 
motion while exceeding its scope in the expres-
sion of feelings. My argument is, therefore, that we 
are bodies – that is, living beings, whose thoughts 
are inseparable from their deeds – inasmuch 
we have “interactive feelings” – that is, feelings 
which enhance the exchange with the surrounding 
world. That’s why interaction has been the center 
of the aesthetic concerns in pragmatism, since 
John Dewey and George H. Mead, who was Dew-
ey’s fellow at Chicago University and applied the 
former’s aesthetic theory to his own studies in the 
psychology of identification. But this is true also 
for a philosopher like Susanne K. Langer, although 
she was critical to Dewey’s sympathy for non-tra-
ditional art experience. Nevertheless, whilst she 
draws her examples from some very traditional 
contexts – but surprisingly for her age, not only 
from the usually called “fine arts” – and refus-
es any aesthetic implication in ordinary life and 
objects, she develops a concept of interaction that 
is totally consistent with the pragmatist method of 
investigating experience.
I shall proceed as follows: in the next para-
graph, I reconstruct Dewey’s concept of inter-
action as it emerges in his account of aesthetic 
experience; in the third paragraph, I consider the 
cognitive implications of this account of aesthetic 
experience, according to some of its most recent 
readings; in the last paragraph, I make some final 
remarks about Mead’s notion of aesthetic identi-
fication, which I shall consider as one of the best 
candidates to explain the relevance of the bod-
ily interaction to culture as a concrete experi-
ence. The first paragraph supplied with the general 
paradigm of aesthetic interaction; the second one 
help argue the meaning of aesthetic experience as 
a device available to the human subject: namely, a 
structure being able of establishing the conditions 
of experience anew; the third one let me theorize 
the work of art as a sort of technology of attention 
orienting and redirecting the audience’s percep-
tion by giving it a cultural – and technological, as 
far as art is a form of technique – framework. In 
other words, an aesthetic experience so construed 
arguably designs and shapes human subjects as 
constitutively exposed to the technological recon-
figuration of their cognitive and emotional agency 
(Ihde [2002]; Stiegler [1998-2010]). 
In the light of the German philosophical 
anthropology, above all Plessner (2019), one could 
speak of the human position – in the world as 
well as in itself – as essentially “decentered”. But 
unlike the German philosophical anthropology, 
with its claim for technics as a sort of “compen-
sation” for this decentered position, pragmatism 
is consistent with the idea of “techno-aesthetics”. 
Techno-aesthetics is a word coined by the French 
philosopher Gilbert Simondon (2014), in his 1982 
letter answering Derrida’s request of suggestions 
concerning the foundation of the Collège inter-
national de Philosophie. According to this letter, 
the meaning of this new branch of philosophy is 
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manifold: it ranges from the reconsideration of the 
aesthetic experience in terms of technique – the 
beholders of Leonardo’s Mona Lisa admires her 
smile because they integrate it with the movement 
of her lips, as if their vision was a filmic montage 
– to the discovery of the aesthetic features of both 
technological devices – the Eiffel Tower – and 
technology-oriented artworks – as happens for the 
Futurist movement – to mention only of the most 
influential versions of techno-aesthetics argued by 
Simondon. The version mostly consistent with the 
present paper sounds as follows: as far as the work 
of the senses is especially concerned in the human 
interaction with the world, which is even consid-
ered its primary task, we discover that our sensa-
tions refer not only to passive (or rather, recep-
tive) states of our minds, but also to an active 
engagement in technical operations of manipula-
tion or transformation of the physical matter of 
our experience. Drawing an example from ordi-
nary experience – an example of mine, not of 
Simondon – the sensations we receive from food 
as we cook (colors, flavors, texture of the food) 
cannot be isolated from the concrete act of cook-
ing, that is, transforming those natural elements 
into a dish ready for being tasted. Accordingly, 
Simondon argues that even the aesthetic delight 
we take in beauties is, at least originally, insepa-
rable from some technical disposition toward the 
subject-matter of our experience. Architecture is 
particularly suitable to this case: as far as we take 
delight in the shape and decoration of a building, 
we also appreciate its “fitness” for the function it 
was designed for. Nor is beauty subordinated to 
function, and neither is the opposite true: it is 
rather plausible that beauty and technical func-
tionality are two interdependent factors in the 
process of building and dwelling. If we consider 
the reuse of pagan temples as Christian churches 
in many places throughout the territory of the for-
mer Roman Empire, or the passage of the same 
holy site from and to being either a church or a 
mosque, we see how far aesthetic, cultural and 
technological factors interacted in defining the 
“form” of those sites. Most importantly, we are led 
to acknowledge that we are unable to fully appre-
ciate that form outside a joint evaluation of its aes-
thetic, cultural and technological agency: the bril-
liancy in reusing a certain space for a new litur-
gical need, without losing its aesthetic effect, can 
be considered as one of the highest virtues of the 
architects who worked to those buildings in differ-
ent ages and having different purposes. Simondon 
(1954) considers the radical separation of aesthetic 
and technical motivations in the evaluation of a 
work as a later product of modernity.  
AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE ACCORDING  
TO JOHN DEWEY
John Dewey develops his aesthetic theory in 
a period of time that is also a fundamental step 
in his philosophical elaboration. In 1925, with 
the publication of Experience and Nature, Dew-
ey offers a synthesis of his philosophy and pre-
sents his method of investigation. Experience and 
Nature contains a chapter on aesthetics, the title 
of which is Experience, Nature and Art. Experi-
ence, Nature and Art already contains the heart of 
Dewey’s aesthetic theory, although some remark-
able differences can be found, with regard to his 
later reflections on aesthetics. However, his gen-
eral idea of the aesthetic remained unaltered. In 
1934, he publishes his best-known treatise on aes-
thetics, Art as Experience, in which he gathered 
and ordered the lectures he gave the year before 
on that very topic. Between 1925 and 1934, he 
published short essays, in which he deals with spe-
cial issues concerning aesthetics. One of the most 
interesting is Individuality and Experience (1926), 
in which Dewey enquiries the importance of art 
education, as well as the relevance of this form of 
education to a proper understanding of aesthetic 
experience at large.
In Art as experience, Dewey famously argues 
that we should consider the aesthetic “in the raw” 
before passing to the most refined aesthetic expe-
riences available to our civilization, such as works 
of art. To have such a “raw” aesthetic experience, 
one just needs to go out and have a walk through-
out the city: noise, sounds, colors, the shape of the 
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buildings, the speediness of the cars, the crowd 
occupying the streets and squares being busy with 
their affairs – all of these aspects being as many 
triggers to the experiencer’s sensibility.
Actually, Dewey did not make his account 
of the aesthetic in the raw depend on any previ-
ously argument or theory on the human sentience 
and perception. On the contrary, the remarks 
contained in his aesthetic essays seem rather to 
depend on his general account of the aesthetic 
experience as a whole. This is, of course, an effect 
of the “empirical method” Dewey presented in 
first chapter introduced in the second edition 
(1929) of Experience and Nature. According to 
this method, the pragmatist philosopher should 
never start her enquiry from an abstract con-
ception of the subject’s mind or perception: the 
nature of these entities should rather result from 
the actual investigation of experience, just as hap-
pens with nature, the reality of which cannot be 
fully detached from the experience we have of it. 
But if what I have just said is true, then experience 
is but a name for a form of interaction that puts 
in mutual contact the subject’s inward life and the 
reality outside them, as well as each one of them 
with the others. Or at least, this is the case for aes-
thetic experience.
The reference to mind activities at work in the 
process of experience, together with the establish-
ment of their relationship to the world outside, 
is especially mentioned by Dewey in the last part 
of Art as Experience, when he argues that, before 
being a noun, “mind” is a verb (“to mind”) des-
ignating our special care for the persons, things 
and affairs surrounding us. Dewey is not only 
committed to the mind-body problem, as clearly 
stated in Experience and Nature. His remarks actu-
ally foreshadow the Extended Mind Theory, as he 
imagines mind as a reality existing in-between 
the brain’s inward processes and the reality of the 
world available to our knowledge and action. One 
of the main functions of experience is, therefore, 
that of recreating the mutual connection between 
thought and reality anew. Every kind of experi-
ence fulfills this task in a way or another: educa-
tional experiences do it for the sake of the youth’s 
education and intellectual growth; cognitive 
experiences do it for the sake of getting a deeper 
knowledge of nature; ethical experiences do it 
for the sake of redirecting more adequately emo-
tions to the objects of their interest. This is just to 
mention some of the most eminent examples of 
human experience and their task with a view to 
the enhancement of the mind.
But what is the task of aesthetic experience? 
The answer to this question is in fact much hard-
er than one could believe. Before answering this 
question, let me only remind that the idea that 
aesthetic experiences have a task must be intended 
in a broad sense. It is precisely the sense according 
to which, following the Kantian paradigm, aes-
thetic experiences have the power of supplying us 
with the experience of the non-empirical condi-
tions of experience generally construed (D’Angelo 
[2011]). In other words, aesthetic experiences have 
the “task” of reorganizing the cognitive faculties of 
the mind and enhance their agency, though only 
in an indeterminate way, that is, having no imme-
diate cognitive purpose (Garroni [1976]; Kukla 
[2006]; Marcucci [1988]; Palmer [2011]). The idea 
that aesthetic experiences have such an indetermi-
nate and mediated task becomes even stronger in 
a pragmatist perspective. As a matter of fact, since 
Dewey, pragmatist philosophers often refer the 
sense of aesthetic experience to the reorganization 
of the human form of life, considered either bio-
logically (Noë [2015]) or culturally (Shusterman 
[1992]). If we consider experience from the point 
of view of its outcome, we come to the following 
conclusion: the outcomes of either the cognitive or 
the ethical experience are much more easily recog-
nizable than that of the aesthetic experience. Cog-
nition and behavior offer easy references for such 
outcomes, being respectively the outcome of either 
investigation or deliberation. The solution is less 
evident when we pass to the case for education. 
Education is relevant as far as art education occu-
pies an important part in Dewey’s (1988a) account 
of aesthetic experience. Dewey’s (1988d) influen-
tial views on education are largely based on the 
idea of cooperation between teacher and student. 
Scholars in education usually investigate the para-
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digm of the “learning by doing” education accord-
ing to this preference given to cooperation in the 
educational process. But there are some other 
aspects implied in this process, which are maybe 
more interesting for a philosophical account of the 
aesthetic experience. As far as art is concerned, 
Dewey cares for the fact that teachers are “mas-
ters” whose task is not limited to share an already 
accomplished knowledge with students – who are 
considered as “apprentices”. Education is a pro-
cess of growth, the conclusion of which coincides 
with the recognition that students, the youth, have 
become autonomous individuals: they are able and 
free to behave and have experiences independent-
ly from their teachers’ directories. Furthermore, 
teachers are now in the condition of learning from 
their own students’ outcomes, in order to revise 
their previous know-how. If we consider aesthetic 
values (beauty, harmony, style, decoration, etc.) 
as elements of such a know-how, we acknowledge 
then that aesthetic values stay neither entirely on 
the teachers’ side, nor in the students’ side. Aes-
thetic values lie rather in-between them.
Dewey’s remark on art education are relevant 
to his aesthetic theory at large. They point out, 
in fact, to a new model of autonomy in art, con-
ceived not subjectively in the facts and intersub-
jectively only in theory, as might be argued for 
Kant’s theory of the reflecting judgments. Having 
an independent insight into art creation implies 
cooperation: for cooperation is the pragmatic 
enhancement of the human interaction with envi-
ronment. This position recalls Friedrich Schiller’s 
arguments in the Letters upon the Aesthetic Edu-
cation of Man (1795) when arguing the anthropo-
logical basis of aesthetics. It is not by chance that 
Dewey admired Schiller’s way to aesthetics, whilst 
criticizing Kant’s one – needless to say, largely 
misunderstanding this latter. Nonetheless, as far 
as we are concerned with Dewey’s way to art edu-
cation, his ideas could sound even closer to Kant 
than to Schiller. I am referring to what Kant writes 
in § 46 of the third Critique about the difference 
existing between “imitation” (Nachahmung) and 
“emulation” (Nachfolge) in the affairs concern-
ing beauty. One imitates somebody else’s taste 
or genius when one attempts to reproduce them 
mechanically, as if they could be reduced to a set 
of rules – which is impossible in principle. Con-
trariwise, one emulates somebody else when one 
takes the somebody else’s taste or style as a model 
for her own aesthetic judgment or creativity, while 
keeping in mind that emulation does not replace 
her freedom in judgment and creation, but is 
rather a means by which they can be fostered and 
enhanced. The difference between imitation and 
emulation is epitomized quite easily and immedi-
ately if we refer to art. The Italian historian, critic 
and theorist of art Cesare Brandi (1986) considers 
Mannerism as an art movement in which creativ-
ity was reduced to the reproduction of two styles: 
namely, those of Michelangelo and Raphael. The 
painters belonging to the Mannerist movement 
followed either the former or the latter in mat-
ters of style: paintings were considered not really 
as pictures by the artists of Mannerism, but rather 
as “signs” witnessing their belonging to either the 
former’s or the latter’s school. This is imitation, 
properly speaking. And by the way, it may lead 
to remarkable aesthetic results – as happens to 
many Mannerist painters, such as Andrea del Sar-
to, Pontormo or Rosso Fiorentino – but still lacks 
originality. On the other hand, emulation is exper-
iment in art when analogies can be discovered 
between an artist’s work and other artists’ works 
or other genres and styles. It is so for Caravag-
gio’s Vocazione di San Matteo (1599-1600) (Prater 
et alii [2012]). It is a painting in which the artist 
probably applied the devices and even the tricks 
he learnt while training in making a genre of art 
inspired by ordinary life, which followed different 
standards than official historical, mythological and 
above all religious art. The cycle of St Matthew 
for the Contarelli Chapel was Caravaggio’s first 
commission in religious art. Furthermore, many 
observers suggested that Jesus’ gesture of indicat-
ing the publican Levi with his finger, while being 
accompanied by a certain degree of ambiguity 
that was unusual in religious painting and more 
typical of profane art, could be inspired by Adam’s 
hand gesture toward God Father in the Frame 
of the Creation of Adam in the vault of the Sist-
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ine Chapel. By means of a web of art “quotations”, 
Caravaggio’s painting would be therefore nour-
ished by a series of theological references, while 
presenting the scene taken from the Gospel as a 
scene of ordinary life. In this case we have emula-
tion, rather than imitation: the artist did not fol-
low his models slavishly, but took them as patterns 
of inspiration. By the way, emulation seems to 
require a good degree of interpretation. Another 
example of this sort of experimented emulation in 
contemporary art can be found in Francis Bacon’s 
variants of Velásquez’ portrait of Pope Innocenzo 
X. In this case, Bacon finds new meanings, con-
cerning his own views on humanity and its bodily 
condition, in a masterpiece of the Baroque art of 
official portrait (Deleuze [2005]).
Not mind alone but mind in action – which is 
an embodied mind, by the way – operates in Dew-
ey’s account of emulation in art. Arguably, the art 
creator, before designing the work of art she has in 
mind, imagines a virtual body by which she is able 
to simulate the interactions with the work, both 
during the creative process and at the moment of 
reception (Dewey [1988b]). In this perspective, 
culture is the complex of all bodily operations and 
affections that can be designed and simulated with 
regard to the world of artworks available at a given 
moment. In Experience and Nature, Dewey argues 
indeed in favor of a special task of art – or “fine 
art”, as he calls it, recovering this word from the 
language of the modern theory of art and renew-
ing its meaning. “Art in being, he writes, the active 
productive process, may thus be defined as an 
esthetic perception together with an operative per-
ception of the efficiencies of the esthetic object” 
(Dewey [1981]: p. 281). For this very reason, con-
sidered from the audience’s point of view, art is “a 
device in experimentation carried on for the sake 
of education. It exists for the sake of a specialized 
use, being a new training of modes of perceptions” 
(Dewey [1981]: p. 293). Dewey does not isolate art 
from the aesthetic realm: he rather finds the prop-
er place for art within the manifold manifestations 
of the aesthetic quality of experience, that is, the 
several different ways by which human beings, the 
“live creatures”, are able to organize the raw and 
scattered matter of their sensible interaction with 
the world into an experience.
According to the quotation mentioned above, 
art is likely to perform its powers more espe-
cially on perception: it trains or educates us to a 
new perception of reality. As I said, the overlap-
ping between training and education is typical of 
Dewey’s pragmatist approach to education, which 
brings him to develop a philosophy of education 
based on the principle of “learning by doing”. The 
analogy between works of art and tools (micro-
phones and telescopes) strengthens this belief. 
Nonetheless, it could be misleading: for technolo-
gies offer new tools for having further experiences, 
which might be in turn scattered and result in no 
organic experience, whilst the work of art is cre-
ated for fulfilling the second task, which is an aes-
thetic enterprise properly speaking. To put it in a 
formula, one can say that microphones, telescopes 
and every sort of capture technology supply us 
with perceptions made available by a certain oper-
ability: the aesthetic quality of these perceptions, 
that is, their pointing out to the dynamic unity of 
experience, is left for further elaboration. Contra-
riwise, works of art present this very elaboration 
and so empower their audience to larger areas of 
operability than before. This is the meaning of 
the feeling of liveliness often bound – by Dewey, 
among others – to the aesthetic experience. This is 
what Dewey calls sometimes the “consummation” 
of the aesthetic experience, which emerges in the 
interplay with its “instrumentality”. Experience 
is momentarily liberated from both the routines 
of already assumed habits and behaviors, and the 
fragmentation of pure contingence, in which the 
only standard to evaluate facts and events is dic-
tated by the law of impulse. Expression, as Dew-
ey repeatedly states, differs from mere impulse as 
far as the latter is triggered by immediate needs, 
whilst the former entails a larger and deeper con-
sideration of reality and engages all the forces 
available to the self to support this interaction. 
We can say now that expression is but the general 
phenomenon concerning the set of operations and 
affections by which a body simulation becomes 
available to cultural exchanges. If this statement 
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is right, then aesthetic perception acquires a fun-
damental importance inasmuch it is the moment 
when the cultural import of art, that is, a form 
of body simulation, proves its efficacy. In other 
words, it is through perception that minds dis-
cover whether and how far bodies are available to 
their designs and imaginations. Works of art can 
be therefore considered as “strange tools” (Noë 
[2015]), the function of which is to either enhance 
or stabilize the identity of living organisms gov-
erned by a reflecting mind – human beings, for 
example. Furthermore, they provide these organ-
isms with devices that either implement or expand 
their communicational agency. In that sense, 
works of art are not just “strange tools”: they are, 
more precisely, perceptual and emotional devices1. 
This is peculiarly true for those technologically 
supported works of art that are movies – as well 
as, of course, for their contemporary expansions: 
video installations, web documentaries, etc.
THE WORK OF ART AS PERCEPTUAL  
AND EMOTIONAL DEVICE
Art seems therefore to be a device being able 
to orient perception, in order to trigger its agency. 
Accordingly, aesthetic experience does not lose 
its instrumental quality when developing a new 
consummation of reality. On the very contrary, it 
reorganizes the mind’s (and the body’s) relation-
ship to the world: now, it is the search for new 
consummation – that is, renewed pleasure taken 
things and events, accompanied by the acquisi-
tion of new meanings concerning those things 
and events, as well as reality at large – that leads 
instrumentality, whilst in the ordinarily utilitarian 
experience, it is the instrumentality of this expe-
rience that seeks the repetition of already experi-
mented consummations. Of course, the concept of 
instrumentality does not entail the actual use of 
technologies. However, it sheds a special light on 
1 In a recently published book, Giovanni Matteucci 
(2019), in a philosophical perspective comprehending 
Dewey and pragmatism, suggests a revival of the argu-
ment that works of art are “devices”.
the human practical intercourse with nature: for it 
foreshadows that every practical interaction with 
nature is oriented to the discovery, development 
or refinement of some tool or technique. For that 
very reason, one might argue that, far from fore-
running somaesthetics, Dewey’s aesthetic theory 
could be considered as an original version of tech-
no-aesthetics.
Nonetheless, in Dewey’s account of the techni-
cal import of aesthetic experience, bodies matter 
to a techno-aesthetics much more than in Simon-
don’s original formulation of this concept. As we 
saw above, Dewey reaffirms the analogy of works 
of art with technics. But this relationship is much 
different than it was conceived during antiquity 
– although Dewey aims at finding some continu-
ity with the Greek thought, arguing that as far 
as techne indicated in Greek a skilled and expert 
interaction with a special kind of objects, this is 
the equivalent of his conception of experience. 
But Dewey addresses especially the issue of how 
minds, bodies and eventually cultures are engaged 
in the imaginary simulation and technological 
design of experience. The category of “work of art” 
must be considered here at large. Dewey consid-
ers also new media – radio and newspapers, for 
instance – as artistic devices that newly design 
the citizens’ participation to the public sphere and 
the very process of deliberation2. This phenom-
enon points out to a sort of “proxification” of the 
body, in the broad sense of body argued here. By 
“proxification” I mean the tendency the human 
body manifests to be prolongated by technologi-
cal proxy. This phenomenon is more evident in 
2 Honneth and Farrell (1998: 775) argue that, in Dewey’s 
perspective, the public sphere functions as a “cognitive 
medium”. I agree with their perspective in Dewey’s politi-
cal theory; however, I believe they do not consider how 
far media, in the narrow, technological sense of the word, 
are necessary to establish the public sphere as a cognitive 
medium amid political agents. Furthermore, they do not 
consider that Dewey actually considers these media as 
artistic devices, in a sense that emphasizes their power on 
perception and sensibility. Accordingly, we should speak 
of the public sphere as both a cognitive and an aesthetic 
medium.   
95Devices in Experimentation: The Work of Art in a Pragmatist Perspective, between Somaesthetics and Techno-aesthetics 
the case of capture technologies (microscopes, for 
instance), which extend one of our sense organs 
(mainly, but not only, the eye). It is less evident, 
but still relevant, in the case of media, such as 
newspapers and radio. But it becomes extremely 
significant for new media, which create duplicates 
of ourselves, acting in our place and are our rep-
resentatives in a public virtual sphere: let us just 
think to the use of tweeter, blogging, YouTube 
and even holograms as means to political action, 
and sometimes replacement of traditional politi-
cal identities. New media intercept their artistic 
import as far as we consider them as necessary 
proxy of the acting and communicating selves: 
they provide them with a «radical mediation» 
(Grusin [2015]) of their deeds, speeches and 
imagery.
As a matter of fact, in all of the abovemen-
tioned cases, technological devices enact an artis-
tic power while keeping their nature of device. 
Furthermore, these devices depend on the interac-
tion between technological device and the body, 
but do not necessarily replicate the body’s struc-
ture and functioning: bare intensification of the 
body’s “natural” powers is only one of the mani-
fold solutions available to technology. On the con-
trary, this latter is able to shape the body’s form 
and identity: as has been noted, media environ-
ments are for instance able to make visitors liter-
ally feel sensations and feelings to which they have 
no access in their ordinary lives (Pinotti 2018). 
Are these experiences part of our bodily memory, 
as much as those offered by real life? I believe they 
are as far as virtual or augmented reality (Diodato 
2013; Montani 2014) affects us, shapes our habits3 
and orients our behaviors: they are instrumental 
to a new consummation of reality, to use Dew-
ey’s words. Nor such experiences always end with 
the reduction to natural bodies: artistic devices 
sometimes establish new stable “hubs” for our 
identities, as happens for instance to our social 
media accounts. Most noteworthy is the fact that 
the reflecting mind does not precede the inter-
3 For the role played by habits in Dewey’s philosophy, see 
Dreon (2016).
action among body, technology and reality, but 
rather emerges during this interaction as a sort 
of dynamic background of experience, as Dewey 
argues in the last part of Art as Experience. As a 
matter of fact, we deal with natural objects having 
in mind the purpose of discovering new proper-
ties of them: this means, in a pragmatist perspec-
tive, that we make them available not only to our 
present action but to an indeterminate and virtu-
ally infinite series of future actions – an operabil-
ity, the meaning of which appears inexhaustible: 
namely, indefinitely available to our consumma-
tion. Most importantly, we make them available 
to forms of common use and exploration: to this 
purpose, body simulation becomes pivotal. And 
the design of perception through artistic and tech-
nological devices is the primary target. 
Interactive video installations, such as Carne 
y arena (2017) by Alejandro González Iñárritu or 
Studio Azzurro’s narrative museums and sensi-
tive environments, are good examples of this situ-
ation: mind is able to develop its tools for elabo-
rating experience only after and with reference 
to a new organic alliance between the body and 
the technology we apply to4. Noë (2015) applies 
a techno-aesthetic perspective on aesthetic expe-
rience and especially art, although he never calls 
his theory in this way, in order to enlarge the 
horizons of the Extended Mind Theory and apply 
it to the aesthetic realm. But to do that, he needs 
to open the perspective of this theory to biology 
broadly construed, in particular the idea of organ-
ism, while arguing the role of technics in building 
a properly human culture. The aim of this strategy 
in argumentation is not reductionist: aesthetics 
is still a part of philosophy, not of science. Nar-
rowly speaking, conceiving works of art not just 
as “strange tools”, but also and more importantly 
4 I use the term “organic” in the same sense as Noë (2015) 
who, in a pragmatist vein inspired by Dewey, argues that 
technics is able to literally reorganize human life outside 
the boundaries of biological organisms, and that works 
of art are “strange tools” that do not apply to any special 
task in particular, but enhance our consciousness of how 
far our identities can be established only through the dis-
placement of our bodies onto technology.
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as perceptual and emotional devices, I argue that 
to have an aesthetic experience by the means of 
art implies the fact of being charged by the estab-
lishment of new cultural values, in order to make 
sense of, or reject, the new affections triggered 
by the encounter with a given work. Accordingly, 
we need to formulate some hypotheses concern-
ing the emotional attitude we have in the course 
of the aesthetic experience. The hint for such 
hypothesis is given by George Herbert Mead’s 
reconsideration of Aristotle’s notion of katharsis 
in his article The Nature of Aesthetic Experience, 
appeared on the International Journal of Ethics in 
1926 and largely influenced by John Dewey.
George H. Mead’s interests as a scholar mainly 
went to the psychology of the self and social psy-
chology. Philosophically speaking, he was large-
ly inspired by John Dewey’s pragmatism. With 
Dewey, he contributed to the development of 
the University of Chicago, where they were col-
leagues. Mead devoted only few articles and essays 
to the issue of the aesthetic. This issue, however, 
could but play a key role in the definition of the 
psychology of the self, in the light of its social 
meaning. As far as aesthetic experience is con-
cerned, Mead seems to appropriate Dewey’s aes-
thetic theory. However, Mead develops an issue 
that Dewey seems not to consider in his aesthetic 
writings, and with the outmost originality. Dewey 
was much concerned with contemporary mass 
phenomena in aesthetics, and was sometimes 
reproached for this reason (see Langer [1957]: 
27, 110-111); nevertheless, he never elaborated a 
theory upon cinema. By the way, cinema is often 
considered as the forerunner of the contemporary 
experimentations with video art and interactive 
technologies (Grusin [2015]). In his article about 
aesthetic experience, Mead fills this gap; however, 
the scope of this article is not limited to filmic 
experience and entails a general pragmatist con-
ception of the aesthetic. Furthermore, the origi-
nality of Mead’s contribution is not bound to the 
fact of filling a gap in Dewey’s theory. Mead elabo-
rates here an original view concerning the role of 
emotion in the aesthetic experience: he recovers 
Aristotle’s classical notion of katharsis and recon-
siders its meaning in the light of the new forms of 
narrative, that is, at his times, cinema. The import 
of Mead’s contribution is therefore twofold: on the 
one hand, he discovers a new connection between 
pragmatist aesthetics and the previous conceptions 
of art in the history of philosophy; on the other 
hand, he specifies what happens when emotion is 
not aesthetically oriented generally speaking, but 
is triggered by an artistic device.
Mead considers a mass consume product of 
the Hollywood cultural industry of his times: 
adventure movies. Accordingly, he wonders as fol-
lows:
Does this discovery of a situation in which one may 
enjoy unreproved the terrors and fright of another 
quicken the old impulse and render him callous to 
sufferings of others? I think not. I think the experi-
ence is rather a catharsis, in an Aristotelian phrase, 
than a reversion. Nor does physically timid man 
become more courageous from watching with com-
pensatory delight Doug Fairbanks annihilate a nest 
of bandits. But there should be a certain release, 
and relief from restraint, which comes from the 
fulfilment of the escape reaction with a richness 
of imagery which the inner imagination can never 
offer. If these escape reactions play any legitimate 
part in the economy of keeping house with one’s self, 
and I think they do, the elaboration of them at just 
the point where the imagination fails should empha-
size that function, and the enjoyed imagery is genu-
inely aesthetic. (Mead [1926]: 392)
Otherwise – Mead concludes as he applies the 
same consideration to modern literature, such as 
Joyce’s Ulysses – imagery would be only a “private 
affair”, lacking any social meaning (Mead [1926]: 
393). Interestingly, Mead’s insight into “catharsis” 
as a filmic device is consistent with the interpreta-
tions of Aristotle’s notion, developed by both her-
meneutics (Gadamer [1960]) and the aesthetics of 
reception (Jauss [1972]) during the second half of 
the 20th century: the end of this purification from 
“terrors and fright” is that the spectator finds her 
place in the world and recognizes reality as her 
own reality anew. Every theory based on the idea 
of the spectator’s direct and immediate identifica-
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tion with the “hero” are here rejected as too naïf.
But Mead is interested in the psychology of 
the audience: namely, to what happens to their 
bodies as their emotions are triggered by some 
movies. He seems to forerun the recent appli-
cation of the concept of “embodied simula-
tion” forged by the neurosciences to film theo-
ry (Gallese&Guerra [2015]). According to the 
Embodied Simulation Theory, the spectator who 
watches, for instance, a scene characterized by 
suspense activates the same neuronal networks as 
if she is undergoing the same experience. Many 
sequences in Hitchcock’s movies are likely to be 
designed according to this principle. However, 
Mead gives us an important indication concern-
ing how to avoid any form of reductionism in 
applying this theory to cinema and art in gen-
eral. He distinguishes, in fact, between the indi-
vidual’s “imagination” and the movie’s “imagery”: 
the former is limited as far as it depends on the 
individual’s constituency, habits, behaviors and 
past experience, whilst the latter is intrinsically 
social. Mead’s remarks on the social value of film 
go exactly in the opposite direction than those 
proposed by Adorno and Horkheimer (1973) 
about twenty years later: filmic imagery does 
not expropriate the individual’s imagination of 
its freedom in “schematizing” experience; on the 
contrary, the former has the power of nourishing 
the latter.
When we consider works of art as perceptual 
devices, the idea of “proxy”, that is, a mere exten-
sion of sense organs, is consistent with our con-
sideration. However, when we pass to consider 
them as emotional devices, our reflection upon 
the technological import of art needs to be recon-
sidered too. To conclude, I would like to argue 
that, as far as emotions are concerned in art, the 
very concept of device needs to be reformulated. 
In the ordinary experience, emotion appears to be 
a special tie between subjects and objects, or sub-
jects and subjects: the capability, or incapability, of 
handling objects or relationships to other subjects 
seems to be an essential drive in the phenomenol-
ogy of emotions (Nussbaum 2001). In the aesthet-
ic experience, things stay in a different way. Here, 
emotions target not a dual but a triple relation-
ship: subjects, objects and the devices connecting 
them. The subject’s emotions contemporarily refer 
to some objects (stories, images, sounds, etc.) and 
devices (the media used). The expertise required 
to handle these media triggers an emotional con-
dition as much in the use (broadly construed) of 
the artistic media as in the experience of the very 
content of the work of art. Arguably the emotion 
oriented to technology is an essential component 
of our aesthetic pleasure as much as the emotion 
oriented to content: for both of them concur to 
the reorganization of the subject’s cognitive atti-
tude at large. Here it is one of the possible sens-
es of the connection between aesthetics and the 
Extended Mind Theory (Noë 2015; Matteucci 
2019): our interactions with works of art consid-
ered as devices provide us with new “landscapes” 
for our cognitive activity.  
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